United States v. Walker
| Decision Date | 15 April 2016 |
| Docket Number | 1993 FEL 012122,1993 FEL 012121 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. EILEY JORDAN TYRONE WALKER |
| Court | D.C. Superior Court |
Closed Cases
These matters are before the Court on the government's Motion for Correction of Sentence Pursuant to D.C. Superior Court Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a), filed on July 14, 2015,1 a pro se Opposition filed by Defendant Jordan on July 31, 2015, an Opposition filed on behalf of both defendants by the Public Defender Service on November 4, 2015, the government's Reply to Defendant's Opposition, filed on December 14, 2015, and the defendants' Surreply, filed by the Public Defender Service on December 21, 2015. Finally, the Court also considers the oral arguments conducted on November 30, 2015. For the reasons set forth below, the government's motion is GRANTED.
Prior to April 24, 1992, the mandatory minimum sentence for First Degree Murder was 20 years to life. D.C. Code § 22-2404(b) (1991 ed.). On April 24, 1992, the Council of the District of Columbia ("the Council") adopted the First Degree Murder Amendment Act of 1992 ("Amendment Act"), which raised the mandatory minimum to 30 years to life. D.C. Act. No. 9-153, 39 D.C. Reg. 3868. For a number of reasons, including the mandatory 60 day period of congressional review, the Amendment Act did not take effect until September 26, 1992.2 Also on April 24, 1992, the Council approved the First Degree Murder Emergency Amendment Act of 1992 ("Emergency Act"). The Emergency Act made the same changes as the Amendment Act, raising the minimum sentence from 20 years to life to 30 years to life. It was in effect for 90 days, and was renewed by the Council for an additional 90 days on July 21, 1992.
On June 10, 1992—while the Emergency Act was in effect but before the Amendment Act came into force—Tyrone Walker and Donnell Reed illegally entered a house and shot two individuals, Araminta Coates and Michael Johnson. Coates later died of her wounds. Witnesses identified Walker as the shooter who killed Coates, and Reed as the shooter who wounded Johnson. Eiley Jordan was identified as the individual who drove the shooters to the house. Jordan's brother had been killed by Johnson the night before, and Jordan was present when Reed, immediately before the shootings, vowed to hurt Johnson in retaliation for the murder of Jordan's brother.
Jordan, Walker, and Reed were initially indicted on November 18, 1993. A superseding indictment in March 1995 charged all three defendants with two counts of First Degree Murder While Armed—Felony Murder, in violation of D.C. Code §§ 22-2401, 22-3202 (1993 ed.); one count of First Degree Burglary While Armed, in violation of D.C. Code §§ 22-1801(a), 22-3202; one count of Assault with Intent to Kill While Armed, in violation of D.C. Code §§ 22-501, 22-3202; one count of Possession of a Firearm During a Crime of Violence ("PFCV"), in violation of D.C. Code § 22-3204(b); one count of conspiracy, in violation of D.C. Code §§ 22-2401, 22-3202; and one count of Carrying a Pistol Without a License ("CPWL"), in violation of D.C.Code § 22-3204(a). Walker was additionally charged with one count of First Degree Murder While Armed—Premeditated, in violation of D.C. Code §§ 22-2401, 22-3202.
Trial began on June 27, 1995. On July 7, 1995, the Court granted Jordan's motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of CPWL. All other charges went to the jury. On July 13, 1995, the jury returned a verdict finding all three defendants guilty on all counts.
On September 11, 1995, Jordan was sentenced to 30 years to life for each of the two First Degree Murder charges, 15 years to life for First Degree Burglary While Armed, 15 years to life for Assault with Intent to Kill While Armed, five to 15 years for PFCV, and 20 to 60 months for conspiracy. The two murder and one burglary convictions were to run concurrently with each other, but consecutive to all other counts.
On September 15, 1995, Walker was sentenced to 30 years to life for each of the two First Degree Murder charges; 30 years to life for First Degree Murder While Armed—Premeditated; 15 years to life for First Degree Burglary While Armed; 15 years to life for Assault with Intent to Kill While Armed; five to 15 years for PFCV; 20 to 60 months for conspiracy, and one year for CPWL. All sentences were to run consecutively.3
Through counsel, both defendants appealed in 1996. Also in 1996, Walker filed an "Informal Pro Se Brief" in his direct appeal, in which he made the argument that his sentence of 30 years to life was ex post facto because the Amendment Act had not come into effect until September 26, 1992, many weeks after the June 10, 1992, murders. No mention was made of the Emergency Act. While the direct appeals were pending, Walker, through counsel, also filed a new trial motion pursuant to Superior Court Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 and D.C. Code § 23-110.
On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions but remanded the matters in order to merge several of them. It also instructed this Court, without taking any position on the merits, to "consider, perhaps on separate motion filed under Super. Ct. Crim. Rule 35(a), the claim adverted to by Walker in his pro se motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel . . . that his mandatory 30-year minimum prison sentence for first-degree murder ran afoul of the prohibition against ex post facto punishment." Jordan v. United States, 722 A.2d 1257, 1262 (D.C. 1998).
On remand, in 1999, both defendants filed motions under Superior Court Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 challenging the 30 years to life sentence as ex post facto. The Court ordered a hearing on the motion for June 25, 1999. There is no record of the hearing because the Superior Court destroys recordings of trial proceedings after 10 years and no transcript was ever produced. While it is unknown what was said at that hearing, the Court and defense counsel—and perhaps the government—thought that the sentence was indeed an ex post facto sentence because both defendants were resentenced to 20 year to life on their respective murder charges. Those sentences remain in place to this day.
On July 14, 2015, the government filed the instant motion. On July 31, 2015, Defendant Jordan filed a pro se Opposition. On August 24, 2015, Defendant Walker's former counsel on appeal, Joseph Virgilio, filed a motion on behalf of Defendant Walker requesting that counsel be appointed to file an opposition to the government's motion.
The Court appointed Jonathan Anderson of the Public Defender Service to jointly represent both defendants on September 8, 2015. The Court ordered a defense response to the government's motion by October 1, 2015. A hearing date of November 30, 2015, was also set.On October 1, 2015, both defendants filed Motions for Extension of Time to Respond, and Defendant Walker also requested to be brought to the District on a writ for the November 30, 2015, hearing. Defendant Jordan waived his presence. The Court granted the motions for extension of time and ordered the government to writ in Defendant Walker on November 3, 2015. The defendants' joint Opposition to the government's motion was filed on November 4, 2015.
Seventeen years after the initial resentencing, the government moves this Court to correct the defendants' sentence pursuant to Superior Court Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a) ("Rule 35(a)"). The government contends that the Court erred in imposing a minimum sentence of 20 years because the Emergency Act—which raised the mandatory minimum from 20 years to 30 years—had gone into effect on April 24, 1992, well over a month before the defendants committed their crimes. While the Amendment Act did not go into effect until September 26, 1992, it is now undisputed that the Emergency Act was in effect on June 10, 1992. All parties agree that the sentence is an illegal one pursuant to Rule 35(a).
The defendants contend, however, that correcting the illegal sentence would be unconstitutional because they have a "reasonable expectation of finality in their sentences such that increasing them now, even to comply with a statutory minimum, would violate the Double Jeopardy and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution." The lengthy delay in moving to correct the sentence combined with the fact that the issue was successfully litigated by the defense post-conviction combine to create that finality, they argue. The Court addresses both issues in turn.
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution "protects the defendant against multiple punishments for the same offense." Ellison v. United States, 919 A.2d 612, 614 (D.C. 2007) (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)). Because "[a] prisoner would be twice in jeopardy for the same crime if he or she could begin serving a sentence and yet be hauled into court for imposition of an increased term," Christopher v. United States, 415 A.2d 803, 804 (D.C. 1980), "[t]he courts of this jurisdiction have long recognized a general rule—premised on double jeopardy concerns—that, once a defendant begins serving a sentence, the sentence may not lawfully be increased. Smith v. United States, 687 A.2d 581, 583 (D.C. 1996).
The general rule has exceptions. It has long been established that a court may "modify an illegal sentence to bring it into conformity with the law, even if the defendant receives a stiffer sentence as a result." Id.; see Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 35(a); Prince v. United States, 432 A.2d 720, 721-22 (D.C. 1981) (citing Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 166-67 (1947)); see also Lindsay v. United States, 520 A.2d 1059, 1063 (D.C. 1987) (...
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