United States v. Walker

• Decision Date: 10 July 1951
• Docket Number: No. 242,Docket 21978.,242
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. WALKER.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

190 F.2d 481 (1951)

UNITED STATES v. WALKER.

No. 242, Docket 21978.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

Argued April 9, 1951.

Decided July 10, 1951.

Irving H. Saypol, U. S. Atty., New York City, for Southern District of New York (Bruno Schachner, Harold J. Raby and Robert Rubinger, Asst. U. S. Attys., all of New York City, of counsel), for appellee.

Sabbatino & Todarelli, New York City (Peter L. F. Sabbatino, New York City, of counsel), for appellant.

Before SWAN, CHASE and FRANK, Circuit Judges.

CHASE, Circuit Judge.

Following the reversal by this court of his former conviction, the appellant was again tried by jury upon the same indictment and was found guilty and sentenced.

The indictment charged in one count that, on or about February 17, 1947, he transported the sum of approximately $26,000.00 in interstate commerce from Houston, Texas, to New York, N. Y., knowingly and willfully in violation of the provisions of § 415 of Title 18 U.S.C.¹ The second count was like the first except that the sum of money was alleged to be approximately $23,500.00 and the transportation on or about June 1, 1947.

The facts as stated in our former opinion² are so close to what was shown in this trial that we shall assume familiarity with them and take up at once the grounds upon which the appellant relies for reversal, adding only such facts as may be necessary to a disposition of the new points now made and following our former decision as to those which were raised before.

There no question was raised as to the sufficiency of the indictment and it was treated sub silentio as good. Now it is argued that each count was fatally defective because instead of alleging that "money" of a stated value was transported it refers to the "sum" of a stated amount of dollars. It would be hard to think of a more insubstantial objection to the indictment and it should not detain us long. Surely since Rule 7(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A., became effective such a finely spun attack on an indictment is fruitless. There was a clear compliance with that rule and no more was necessary. United States v. Josephson, 2 Cir., 165 F.2d 82, certiorari denied 333 U.S. 838, 68 S.Ct. 609, 92 L.Ed. 1122. Moreover, a bill of particulars was filed by the government which removes any possibility of prejudice to the defendant.

It is argued that when Mrs. Ashe delivered the two checks to the defendant she intended to pass the title to him, and that it was error for the court to deny a request to charge the jury that if it was found that she so intended he was not guilty as charged in the indictment. This, however, leaves entirely out of account the element of deceit by which, according to substantial evidence, he induced her to obtain the checks and deliver them to him. The statute covers the transportation of money obtained by fraud regardless of title, see Davilman v. United States, 6 Cir., 180 F.2d 284, and the failure to charge as requested was not erroneous.

Before the trial, the appellant moved to suppress evidence which had been obtained by a government agent in a search of his luggage after his arrest and while he was in jail. The luggage had been seized and some of it searched, in the hotel room occupied by Mrs. Ashe, who then thought she was the appellant's wife, and both the agent's entry into the hotel room and the seizure and search of the luggage were consented to by her. The motion to suppress the evidence thus obtained was rightly denied, for the appellant had no right to object to the search of premises not occupied by him nor to the seizure of property not within his possession. United States v. Reiburn, 2 Cir., 127 F.2d 525; United States v. Ebeling, 2 Cir., 146 F.2d 254. Cf. Stein v. United States, 9 Cir., 166 F.2d 851, certiorari denied 334 U.S. 844, 68 S.Ct. 1512, 92 L.Ed. 1768. In connection with the motion to suppress, appellant's counsel moved for the production of the F. B. I. report of the investigation, for examination by the court, "to test the credibility" of the agent. Mrs. Ashe, as well as the agent, had testified to the circumstances of the search, and we are unable to conclude that the denial of this motion was seriously prejudicial to the appellant because of the possibility that something in the report might have been inconsistent with the agent's testimony at the hearing.

The appellant's counsel in summation pointed out that government agents had testified in this trial to certain admissions of the appellant which they had not mentioned in the earlier trial. By way of explanation, one agent had stated that the prosecutor in the earlier trial had told him not to mention these admissions. Presumably further to persuade the jury to infer that it was untrue that the admissions had been so made and suppressed, or perhaps to charge the prosecutor with misconduct, the appellant's counsel sought also to point out that the prosecutor in the present case had been present and had assisted at the former trial, but an objection was sustained to that observation. Appellant's counsel insisted that the record showed that fact, and requested leave to point it out and to read from the record, but the judge, evidently believing that he meant the record of the former trial, denied the request saying, "No, the record was not introduced in this trial." The attorney then said he meant the record in this trial but the denial stood, and the judge told him, "conclude your summation and do not argue with me." Apparently this episode shows nothing more than judicial impatience, which we are not prepared to say was unjustified under the circumstances, but, however that may be, it was no more than an exercise of the discretion to limit summation on a point which the judge justifiably believed had already been made repetitiously.

During the summation of the district attorney no objection was made to his remarks but at the end counsel for the appellant moved for a mistrial because of the "prejudicial nature" of the summation, and pointed out specific terms which had been used to characterize the appellant. He also included the fact that the government attorney had told the jurors that he believed "on the evidence in this case that the guilt of this man has been proved incontestably" and that if they should acquit him "they were not competent to serve as jurors." The motion was denied. No reference was made to the summation in the charge and there was no request to do so nor exception because of any such failure on the part of the court.

In a sort of peroration the assistant district attorney had undertaken to refute some of the argument made by the appellant's attorney by pointing out how despicable the evidence did show the appellant's misconduct to have been. The evidence was ample to show that, while he was playing the part of a wealthy suitor so enamored of Mrs. Ashe that he wanted her to marry him, the appellant had gone to Ohio and had there gone through the marriage ceremony with another woman from whom he had been fraudulently obtaining sizeable amounts of money during the current months. He then quickly deserted her to go back to Mrs. Ashe, to go through the pretense of a marriage to her within the following month. This pretended marriage was a part of the fraud practiced upon her to obtain the money he was charged with having transported in interstate commerce. Such a portrayal in the evidence of such a person did lend itself to caustic comment, and some of the terms used in referring to the appellant were "* * * these telegrams over which no one but the defendant had any control, on their face show him to be what he is, a crook and a phony, that is as plain and sure as two and two make four, tricky, crafty, and a type of worm." Although the prosecutor could, doubtless, have chosen his language with better taste and by so doing the better have advanced his cause, we are not disposed to reverse because, instead, he chose to sting sensibilities with blunter, shorter, and somewhat unsophisticated words.

At another point he referred to "silent witnesses" whom appellant's counsel had previously mentioned, meaning those who had not testified, and among them the district attorney included a son of the appellant. The language was as follows:

"The silent witnesses Mr. Sabbatino talks about, the new type of witness, I have never heard of them before and I think the Judge will instruct you unless I am wrong, that they are not witnesses at all. We don't know the fact and you have no right to conclude as there is no evidence on the point.

"We don't know whether this natural son of an unnatural father despised this man or loved him. Now let us draw no conclusions about it."

The argument is made that in referring to the appellant and his son as "this natural son of an unnatural father" the prosecutor was especially abusive, without warrant in the evidence, because it was an accusation that the appellant was the father of a son born out of wedlock. It is true that is one of the meanings of the expression "natural son," see Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary, and it may be taken to have that connotation in legal parlance. Marshall v. Wabash R. Co., C.C.Ohio, 46 F. 269, 273. But it may also mean a begotten child in contrast to an adopted one, and "natural" may mean "human," or normal, as opposed to "unnatural" meaning "abnormally cruel or wicked." Webster's New International Dictionary, 2 Ed. Thus, instead of an unfounded slur which more or less subtly accused the appellant of being the father of an illegitimate son, the language used may well have expressed the thought that the jury should ignore the son as a "silent witness" for the appellant because it was unknown whether the appellant's own normal son did love or dispise his wicked father. At least the language now attacked was so ambiguous that if counsel for the appellant felt that the jury would believe the prosecutor meant what it is now...