United States v. Walker
| Decision Date | 04 January 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 15-4171,15-4171 |
| Citation | 844 F.3d 1253 |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
| Parties | United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John Eugene Walker, Defendant-Appellee. |
Jeannette F. Swent, Assistant United States Attorney (John W. Huber, United States Attorney, with her on the briefs), Office of the United States Attorney, District of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Scott Keith Wilson, Assistant Federal Public Defender, (Kathryn N. Nester, Federal Public Defender, with him on the brief), Office of the Federal Public Defender, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before HARTZ, BACHARACH, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
The government appeals the sentence of Mr. John Eugene Walker, a serial bank robber who pleaded guilty to two counts of bank robbery. See 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). Mr. Walker attributed his criminal history to an addiction to drugs and alcohol. Hoping to overcome this addiction, Mr. Walker asked for an opportunity to attend in-patient treatment before he was sentenced. The district court agreed and the treatment program appeared to be successful. Mr. Walker's success in the treatment program led the district court to impose a sentence of time served, giving credit for the 33 days spent in pretrial detention.
In our view, this sentence was unreasonably short based on the statutory sentencing factors and our precedent. As a result, we reverse.
Though district courts have broad discretion at sentencing, the sentence must be substantively reasonable. United States v. Hanrahan , 508 F.3d 962, 969 (10th Cir. 2007). Substantive reasonableness focuses on the length of the sentence and requires that sentences be neither too long nor too short. Id. The reasonableness of a sentence is reviewable under the abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Friedman , 554 F.3d 1301, 1307 (10th Cir. 2009).
In reviewing a sentence for substantive reasonableness, we recognize that the job of sentencing criminal defendants is difficult. The court must individualize sentences without creating unwarranted sentencing disparities. And the court must consider the seriousness of crimes while recognizing the uniqueness of the individuals committing crimes.
In carrying out these difficult tasks, sentencing judges enjoy a unique perspective and a superior opportunity to interact with the defendant. See Gall v. United States , 552 U.S. 38, 51–52, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). In this case, the sentencing court sincerely tried to craft a just sentence. In doing so, however, the court placed inadequate weight on the factors required by Congress. Under those factors, the sentence was substantively unreasonable.
Mr. Walker makes two waiver arguments.
First, Mr. Walker urges waiver by the government's failure to object to postponement of the sentencing. This postponement allowed Mr. Walker to obtain substance-abuse treatment.
In postponing the sentencing, the district court indicated that (1) it would sentence Mr. Walker after he attended treatment and (2) a successful recovery might influence the ultimate sentencing decision. The government's failure to challenge the postponement does not mean that the government waived a challenge to the eventual sentence. After all, the government could justifiably acquiesce in the postponement but object to a later sentence of time served.
Second, Mr. Walker argues that the government (1) failed to argue that his recent rehabilitation should be discounted in light of his extensive criminal history and drug and alcohol abuse and (2) acquiesced in a sentence below the guideline range by acknowledging that a sentence of more than ten years would be excessive.
Generally, claims of substantive reasonableness need not be raised in district court. United States v. Torres-Duenas , 461 F.3d 1178, 1183 (10th Cir. 2006). An exception exists if the government invited the error. United States v. Mancera – Perez , 505 F.3d 1054, 1058 (10th Cir. 2007). But the government did not invite error. The government simply agreed that a sentence of more than ten years would be excessive; there was no suggestion that a time-served sentence would be sufficient.
Nor did the government waive its challenge by failing to object to consideration of Mr. Walker's post-offense rehabilitation. Even now, the government does not object to the consideration of Mr. Walker's recent progress. Instead, the government argues that this progress could not justify a time-served sentence. For this argument, the government had no reason to object to any consideration of Mr. Walker's recent progress in drug treatment.
The government did not waive its argument on substantive reasonableness.
The sentencing court's discretion is constrained by Congress, which requires consideration of seven factors:
Rita v. United States , 551 U.S. 338, 347–48, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) ; see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
Our review of this sentence for substantive reasonableness is informed by the district court's consideration of these factors and explanation for the sentence. United States v. Park , 758 F.3d 193, 201 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam). Applying the factors, the district court imposed a sentence of "time served." We conclude that the sentence of time served, 33 days in pretrial detention, was unreasonably short.
Offense and offender characteristics . The district court acknowledged that the offenses were serious, robbery of two banks. This factor weighs against a time-served sentence. See United States v. Friedman , 554 F.3d 1301, 1309 (10th Cir. 2009).
• had a supportive family, and
• had employment.
Appellant's App'x vol. I at 73-74.
These factors could reasonably support leniency. Mr. Walker attributed his history of robbing banks to addiction. And, according to defense counsel, Mr. Walker had remained sober for eighteen months when he appeared for sentencing. See id . at 50 ().2
This factor points both ways: The nature of the offense weighs strongly against a time-served sentence, and the offender's characteristics could reasonably support leniency.
The need for a sentence to reflect the basic aims of sentencing . The court must consider whether the sentence would reflect the seriousness of the offense and promote respect for the law. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). Thus, the length of the sentence should reflect the "harm done" and "the gravity of the defendant's conduct." S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 75 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3258. As noted above, bank robbery is a serious crime.
The district court also had to consider the need for a just punishment. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). Mr. Walker states that he was punished by his 33 days in pretrial detention and 13 months in a residential treatment program. But the pretrial detention and residential treatment did not constitute punishment. Mr. Walker was temporarily detained for 33 days because he had requested postponement of his detention hearing and confinement was statutorily required prior to the hearing. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). And Mr. Walker wanted to attend in-patient treatment; the court simply permitted Mr. Walker to obtain that treatment before he was sentenced. The district court did not provide any punitive sanctions for the two bank robberies.
The district court must consider not only the crime's seriousness and the need for just punishment, but also the need to deter the defendant and others. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B). The district court concluded that a lengthy sentence was unnecessary to deter or rehabilitate Mr. Walker. This conclusion was reasonable. But the district court apparently dismissed the relevance of deterrence to others: "The need to deter others, I don't give much stock in the fact that others are deterred by the fact that you're sent to prison for a long time." Appellant's App'x vol. I at 74.
In our view, this explanation conflicted with Congress's directive to sentencing judges. "General deterrence ... is one of the key purposes of sentencing...." United States v. Medearis , 451 F.3d 918, 920 (8th Cir. 2006) ; see also United States v. Milo , 506 F.3d 71, 76 (1st Cir. 2007) (). This purpose becomes particularly important when the district court varies substantially from the sentencing guidelines. See United States v. Musgrave , 761 F.3d 602, 609 (6th Cir. 2014) ().
The district court gave inadequate attention to this purpose. The court reasonably concluded that no further prison time would be necessary to deter Mr. Walker, but did not "give much stock" in the importance of general deterrence. Federal law required the court...
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