United States v. Wanless

• Decision Date: 03 April 2020
• Docket Number: Criminal No. 17-107(20) (DWF/TNL)
• Citation: 451 F.Supp.3d 1056
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Waralee WANLESS, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

451 F.Supp.3d 1056

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,

v.Waralee WANLESS, Defendant.

Criminal No. 17-107(20) (DWF/TNL)

United States District Court, D. Minnesota.

Signed April 3, 2020

Laura M. Provinzino and Melinda A. Williams, Assistant United States Attorneys, United States Attorney's Office, counsel for Plaintiff.

Lauren Campoli, Esq., counsel for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DONOVAN W. FRANK, United States District Judge

INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Waralee Wanless's ("Wanless") Motion for Release from Custody pending sentencing. (Doc. No. 1788 ("Motion").) The United States of America (the "Government") opposes the Motion.¹ (Doc. No. 1792 ("Govt. Opp.").) For the reasons set forth below, the Court respectfully denies Wanless's Motion.

BACKGROUND

The Third Superseding Indictment in the above entitled matter charged Wanless with Conspiracy to Commit Sex Trafficking (Count 1), Conspiracy to Commit Transportation to Engage in Prostitution (Count 3), Conspiracy to Engage in Money Laundering (Count 4), and Conspiracy to Use a Communication Facility to Promote Prostitution (Count 5). (See Doc. No. 830.)

Wanless was arrested in Texas and has been in custody since May 24, 2017. An initial detention hearing was held in Texas on May 31, 2017. (Doc. No. 77 at 8.) The Texas court found that Wanless failed to rebut the presumption that she is a danger to the community and "[d]ue to the nature and extent of [the] criminal activity" concluded that "there [was] no condition or combination of conditions of release which could be set which would reasonably assure Ms. Wanless's appearance at future court hearings and protect the safety of the community." (Id. )

Soon after Wanless's initial appearance in Minnesota, she moved this Court to reconsider her detention. (Doc. No. 326.) The Court held a second detention hearing on September 28, 2017. (Doc. No. 391.) After conducting a de novo review of the evidence, the Court denied Wanless's motion for reconsideration. (Doc. No. 394.) The Court stated that "given the seriousness of the allegations, the ongoing nature of the organization, [Wanless's] purported access to illicit funds, and [Wanless's] lack of ties to the United States and many ties to Thailand, the Court concludes that [Wanless] has not overcome the presumption that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure her appearance." (Id. at 6.)

Wanless was one of five defendants who proceeded to trial. On December 12, 2018, the jury returned its verdict, finding Wanless guilty of all counts. (Doc. No. 1001.) Wanless is currently awaiting sentencing. A Presentence Report ("PSR") was filed on June 17, 2019. (Doc. No. 1182.) Wanless faces a guideline sentence range of 324-405 months. (Id. ¶ 172.) Sentencing was scheduled to occur on December 18, 2019; however, Wanless retained new counsel on November 22, 2019, and filed a motion to continue sentencing three days later.² (Doc. Nos. 1490, 1520, 1527.) Sentencing was rescheduled for January 16, 2020; however, Wanless filed a second motion to continue sentencing on January 8, 2020. (Doc. Nos. 1606, 1659.) On February 5, 2020, Wanless filed a motion to vacate her conviction and for a new trial.³ (Doc. No. 1723 ("Motion to Vacate").) Wanless now moves for release pending sentencing. (Motion at 1.)

DISCUSSION

Release of a defendant pending sentencing is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3143. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3143(2), where a defendant has been found guilty of an offense described in § 3142(f)(1)(A), (B), or (C), the judicial officer "shall order" that person detained, unless the judicial officer finds: (1) there is a substantial likelihood that a motion for acquittal or new trial will be granted, or an attorney for the government has recommended that no sentence of imprisonment may be imposed on the person; and (2) by clear and convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee or pose a danger to any other person or to the community. 18 U.S.C. § 3143(2)(A)(B).

Notwithstanding the mandatory detention provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3143, the court may still release a defendant pending sentencing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c). "A person subject to detention pursuant to section 3143(a)(2) ... and who meets the conditions of release set forth in section 3143(a)(1) or (b)(1), may be ordered released, under appropriate conditions, ... if it is clearly shown that there are exceptional reasons why such person's detention would not be appropriate." U.S.C. § 3145(c). In such a circumstance, "[t]he defendant must show by clear and convincing evidence he is not likely to flee or pose a danger to the community and it also must be shown there are exceptional reasons why detention is not appropriate." United States v. Tobacco , 150 F. Supp. 3d 1051, 1053 (D.S.D. 2015).

Under this standard, courts typically deny such claims unless they are "clearly out of the ordinary, uncommon, or rare." See United States v. Schmitt , 515 F. App'x 646, 647 (8th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Brown , 368 F.3d 992, 993 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding that defendant's treatment for depression and risk of suffering violence were not exceptional reasons to permit defendant to self-surrender after sentencing); United States v. Rausch , 746 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1201–02 (D. Colo. 2010) (exceptional reasons did not exist to warrant release of a defendant with severe medical disabilities who needed a kidney transplant

).

Wanless has been convicted of an offense described in § 3142(f)(A), (B), or (C) and is therefore subject to the provisions set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3143(2)(A)(B).⁴ The Government has not recommended that no sentence of imprisonment may be imposed. Accordingly, in order to be released, Wanless must show that: (1) there is a substantial likelihood that her motion for acquittal or new trial will be granted; and (2) by clear and convincing evidence, she is not likely to flee or pose a danger to any other person in the community. 18 U.S.C. § 3143(2)(A)(B).

Wanless reasserts the arguments in her Motion to Vacate and supporting memorandum to argue that she is factually innocent and there is a substantial likelihood that her Motion to Vacate will be granted. (Motion at 2-5; Reply at 1-4; see also Motion to Vacate; Doc. No. 1724.) In short, Wanless argues that "given the significant and systematic trial errors, first by [Wanless's] trial counsel and then by prosecutors, provides extensive and legitimate grounds to grant a new trial, or at a minimum, find that there is a substantial likelihood that one will be granted in the future."⁵ (Id. at 4.) Wanless contends that the Government "concedes that there is a likely possibility that this case will be overturned by discussing their concerns about retrying the case" in its Response. (Id. at 5 (citing Response at 11).) She argues further that the "Government's fear" is indicative of Wanless's likelihood of success. (Id. at 5.) In short, Wanless argues that the "gravamen of [her] case is that she is presently incarcerated during a worldwide pandemic in a case where a manifest injustice occurred at trial." (Reply at 1.)

Wanless also contends that she is not a flight risk or a danger to the community. (Id. 6-7; Reply at 4-8.) Wanless argues that information unavailable at the time of her bail hearing now shows that she should not be detained. (Id. at 6; Reply at 4.) Specifically, she argues that release is appropriate because: (1) she was a victim of the same organization she was convicted of conspiring with; (2) she has no other involvement with the criminal justice system; and (3) and her role in the case is a mitigated one. (Id at 6-7; Reply at 5-8.) Wanless contends that she is a "non-violent person who was not a ‘heavy’ in this case or ever," and no evidence at trial or before shows otherwise.⁶ (Reply at 8.) Therefore, Wanless argues that "there are conditions or a set of conditions that can assure [her] future appearances in this matter." (Id. )

In light of the COVID-19 pandemic and citing increased risk of infection in a prison setting, Wanless asks the Court to reconsider her continued detention. (Id. at 7-9.) Wanless asserts that "the issue with the jail is that social distancing is impossible," and that "Wanless, and any inmate, is at a greater risk for contracting the disease due to the common quarters shared by all inmates and is vulnerable to an outbreak." (Id. at 8.) Wanless argues that "it is truly not a question of ‘if’ COVID-19 will come to Sherburne Jail, but ‘when’." (Reply at 12.)

The Government argues that Wanless's motion fails under § 3143 because she cannot show a substantial likelihood that her Motion to Vacate will be granted when she admitted her involvement in the criminal organization during her PSR interview. (Govt. Opp. at 14-15, 22; Sur-reply at 2,5.) Specifically, the Government contends that Wanless admitted she was a house boss from 2012 to February 2013, that she held bondage debt, and that most but not all of the victims knew what their house fees would be.⁷ (Id. at 14-15 (citing PSR ¶¶ 79-82.) Moreover, the Government contends that both Wanless' Motion and Motion to Vacate are silent with respect to her conspiracy to commit transportation to engage in prostitution and conspiracy to commit money laundering convictions, and that the guilt on these convictions was overwhelming. (Id. at 24.) In short, the Government argues that Wanless's Motion to Vacate is unlikely to be granted because the evidence was overwhelming at trial, she admitted her guilt, and the Court is unlikely to even consider her Motion to Vacate because it was so untimely. (Id. at 25.)

The Government argues further that even if Wanless was able to show that there was a substantial likelihood that her Motion to Vacate will be granted, Wanless's Motion fails because she cannot demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that she is neither a risk of flight nor a danger to the community. (Id. at 25-27; Sur-...