United States v. Washington, Virginia & Maryland Coach Co.

• Decision Date: 13 April 1967
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 1172-63,2874-63.
• Citation: 268 F. Supp. 34
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. WASHINGTON, VIRGINIA & MARYLAND COACH COMPANY, Inc., Defendant, and D. C. Transit System, Inc., Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission, and Virginia State Corporation Commission, Intervenors-Defendant. WASHINGTON, VIRGINIA & MARYLAND COACH COMPANY, Inc., Plaintiff, and D. C. Transit System, Inc., Intervenor-Plaintiff, v. Stewart UDALL, Secretary of the Interior et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

268 F. Supp. 34

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. WASHINGTON, VIRGINIA & MARYLAND COACH COMPANY, Inc., Defendant, and D. C. Transit System, Inc., Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission, and Virginia State Corporation Commission, Intervenors-Defendant.

WASHINGTON, VIRGINIA & MARYLAND COACH COMPANY, Inc., Plaintiff, and D. C. Transit System, Inc., Intervenor-Plaintiff, v. Stewart UDALL, Secretary of the Interior et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. Nos. 1172-63, 2874-63.

United States District Court District of Columbia.

April 13, 1967.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Thomas L. McKevitt, Dept. of Justice, Henry J. Monahan, Asst. U. S. Atty., for United States of America and Stewart Udall, Secretary of the Interior.

Manuel J. Davis, Washington, D. C., for Washington, Virginia & Maryland Coach Co., Inc.

Wilmer S. Schantz, Jr., Washington, D. C., for D. C. Transit System, Inc.

Russell W. Cunningham, Arlington, Va., for Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission and Virginia State Corporation Commission.

OPINION

SIRICA, District Judge.

This litigation involves a complex factual background and numerous legal issues; however, one issue stands out as paramount. That issue is whether the Secretary of the Interior through his delegate, the Director of the National Park Service, has discretionary power to limit suburban commuter bus traffic on part of the George Washington Memorial Parkway while not limiting such traffic on other parts of the Parkway. This litigation involves only those parts of the Parkway which are on the Virginia side of the Potomac River. Included in this issue is whether the Secretary has exercised his discretion in a reasonable and non-discriminatory manner under the circumstances and whether the Secretary has the authority to exact a fee from suburban commuter bus companies for such use of the Parkway as is permitted.

Annexed hereto as Appendix A is a map showing most of the Parkway. Included are the sections of the Parkway which are involved in this litigation, the site of the Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.), and all bridges, access roads and intersecting roads which shall be referred to in this opinion.

Also annexed hereto as Appendix B are detailed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

PLEADINGS AND PARTIES

The first of these two consolidated actions was initiated by the United States, requesting injunctive relief against the Washington, Virginia & Maryland Coach Company, Inc. (W. V. & M.), restraining it from continuing its unauthorized operation of a suburban commuter bus service over the Parkway between the Key Bridge and the C.I.A. site, the newest section of the Parkway. The United States complained that W. V. & M. only has limited permission to use the Parkway — to carry passengers to and from the C.I.A. — and therefore it is violating Park Service Regulations by adding a wide network of commuter service to and from areas of northern Virginia beyond the C.I.A. Building and by routing this commuter traffic onto the Parkway. The government contends that W. V. & M.'s use of the Parkway is substantially more extensive under its unauthorized use than it would be if the Parkway were used only as authorized to serve the C.I.A. and direct return to Key Bridge. The government asserted that the regulations which grant to suburban commuter buses only limited access to the Parkway above Key Bridge are reasonable and necessary to preserve the scenic values of the Parkway.

In answer to this complaint, W. V. & M. denied the validity of the regulations upon which the United States requested this injunctive relief, claiming that the regulations are discriminatory in that they permit all buses except suburban commuter buses to use this portion of the Parkway in connection with services rendered off the Parkway, and by permitting all kinds of buses, including suburban commuter buses, to use the portion of the Parkway below the Arlington Memorial Bridge in connection with services rendered off the Parkway. The government's contention that suburban commuter buses detract from the Parkway's scenic values was answered by a denial that such buses have any noticeable effect upon prevailing aesthetic standards on the Parkway, and that even if there is such an effect it would still be unreasonable and discriminatory to insist on the preservation of scenic standards on the Parkway above the Key Bridge but not below the Arlington Memorial Bridge. W. V. & M. also counterclaimed for a return of fees paid under protest to the National Park Service of one cent per vehicle mile. These fees, for prior use of the Parkway, amounted to $2,284.16 at the time of trial.

The D. C. Transit System, Inc., the parent corporation of W. V. & M., intervened as a defendant. Also intervening as defendants were the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission (hereinafter referred to as the WMATC) and the State Corporation Commission of the Commonwealth of Virginia (hereinafter referred to as the Virginia State Commission). Although limited, the interventions of the two commissions was for the purpose of joining with the bus companies in emphasizing the legislative aspects of this litigation. The legislative element in this case concerns the issue of whether the act of September 15, 1960, (74 Stat. 1031) authorizing The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Regulation Compact has any effect upon the powers and authority of the Secretary of the Interior or the National Park Service to regulate the kind and amount of suburban commuter bus traffic on the Parkway. The interests and contentions of the commissions and D. C. Transit are substantially identical with those of W. V. & M.

The second suit, brought by W. V. & M., raised substantially the same issues with three minor additions: first, W. V. & M. sought review of Park Service Regulations to the extent that they do not permit suburban commuter buses to travel on the Spout Run "neck" of the Parkway (a short deviation from the main Parkway route northwest of Key Bridge into Arlington proper), and between Key Bridge and Memorial Bridge (Route 50); second, W. V. & M. requested that the Secretary and the Park Service be enjoined from collecting fees for any use of the Parkway by commuter buses; and, third, D. C. Transit intervening as plaintiff sought review of Park Service Regulations to the extent that such regulations do not permit suburban commuter buses to use the northernmost part of the Parkway from the Beltway southward to the C.I.A., a stretch of about two miles. D. C. Transit presently carries suburban commuters from Maryland, who work at the C.I.A., across the Potomac River via the Cabin John Bridge on the Beltway (Interstate Route 495). Because present regulations preclude D. C. Transit from using the two-mile "shortcut" on the Parkway from the Beltway to the C.I.A., a longer and more indirect route must be taken by continuing west on the Beltway past the entrance to the Parkway, on to Route 193, then doubling back on Route 193 to the other C.I.A. entrance.

The parties are slightly different in the second suit. Rather than the United States, the Secretary of the Interior and the Director of the National Park Service were named as defendants. The WMATC and the Virginia State Commission were named defendants in the second action although the positions taken by them are almost identical with those taken by the plaintiff bus companies. Whatever procedural advantages may have been obtained by naming the two commissions as defendants in the second suit, the Court will now treat both bus companies and both commissions as being aligned on the same side against the United States, the Secretary of the Interior, and the Director of the National Park Service.

BACKGROUND AND FACTUAL SUMMARY

The Parkway is owned and controlled by the Federal Government. In Virginia it consists of an elongated national park running parallel to the bank of the Potomac River with a multi-lane highway as its most distinctive feature. From Mount Vernon, at its southern end, it stretches northwestward through Fairfax County, the City of Alexandria, Arlington County, and again, Fairfax County, Virginia. On its northwestern end it terminates at Interstate Route 495, the circumferential highway which forms a beltway around the major portions of the Washington metropolitan area.

For purposes of this litigation the Parkway has been referred to by various sections according to the sequence in which it was constructed. First, there is the southeastern part running from Mount Vernon through the City of Alexandria, past the National Airport, and terminating at the Arlington Memorial Bridge (Route 50). This part of the Parkway was once known as the "Mount Vernon Memorial Highway" and was completed in 1932. The Parkway above the Arlington Memorial Bridge was added section by section. In 1937, a short stretch was completed between Memorial Bridge and Key Bridge. In December 1950, the "Spout Run" section of the Parkway was completed. This section runs northwestward from Key Bridge but after less than one mile it deviates southwestward, away from the Potomac River and goes into Arlington proper.

The final stretch of the Parkway was completed in early 1960. It begins where the Spout Run portion deviates away from the Potomac, and continues northwestward along the Potomac Gorge, terminating at the Beltway.

The building which houses the Central Intelligence Agency was completed and opened in the fall of 1961. The C.I.A. site is adjacent to the Parkway, about two miles southeast of where the Parkway terminates at the circumferential highway. The C.I.A. site is served with an access road to and from the Parkway. The C.I.A. site is also served on its opposite side by State Routes 123 and 193, which join when they reach the C.I.A. site and continue toward Washington as Route 123. Going toward the District of Columbia and after passing the C.I.A. site, Route 123 goes over the Parkway at a...