United States v. Watkins

• Decision Date: 11 September 1947
• Citation: 73 F. Supp. 216
• Parties: UNITED STATES ex rel. LINDENAU et al. v. WATKINS, District Director of Immigration and Naturalization.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

73 F. Supp. 216

UNITED STATES ex rel. LINDENAU et al. v. WATKINS, District Director of Immigration and Naturalization.

District Court, S. D. New York.

September 11, 1947.

David Kubble and George C. Dix, both of New York City, for petitioner.

John F. X. McGohey, U. S. Atty., and Harold J. Raby, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of New York City, for respondent.

HOLTZOFF, Justice, District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia, sitting by designation.

This is a writ of habeas corpus issued on the petition of Max Pateau to review an order of the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, directing the petitioner's deportation pursuant to the pertinent provisions of the Immigration law. U.S.C.A. Title 8, §§ 154 and 156. The ground of the projected deportation is that at the time of his entry into the United States, the petitioner was an immigrant not in possession of a valid immigration visa or a proper passport, and was not exempted from this requirement.

The petitioner arrived in the United States at the Port of New Orleans, on September 15, 1946. He came by airplane from Guatemala. It appears that he was expelled from that country by the authorities and placed on an airplane bound for New Orleans against his will. The order of the Guatemalan Government directed his deportation from Guatemala to Germany, and requested all intermediate countries to permit his passage to that country. Upon his arrival at New Orleans, the petitioner was taken into custody by the Immigration authorities and, after a hearing before a Board of Special Inquiry, U.S.C.A. Title 8, § 153, an order was made by the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, excluding the petitioner from the United States on the ground that he was not in possession of a valid immigration visa or passport and was not exempted from the presentation thereof. Presumably, under ordinary circumstances, the petitioner would then have been returned to the place whence he came. Apparently this course was not practicable, as the Government of Guatemala had expelled him and evidently was not willing to permit his return. For some unexplained reason the petitioner was then incarcerated in jail in New Orleans instead of being detained at an immigration station. After several months' confinement in that institution, he was transferred to the Immigration Detention Station at Ellis Island, New York. Deportation proceedings were instituted against him on December 6, 1946, by the issuance of a warrant based on the ground that the petitioner was brought to this country in violation of law, U.S.C.A. Title 8, § 154. After a hearing before an inspector, the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization ordered the petitioner's deportation to Guatemala if that country would accept him, otherwise to Germany. The Board of Immigration Appeals after reviewing the order of the Commissioner, ordered the petitioner's deportation to Germany and on April 9, 1947, a warrant to that effect was issued.

On the petitioner's application, a writ of habeas corpus was granted to review the decision of the Immigration authorities. At the hearing on the return to the writ, it was contended by the petitioner that he was not subject to the immigration laws, in view of the fact that he came to this country against his will and was brought here by compulsion. This contention was overruled. This court held that the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals in United States ex rel. Bradley v. Watkins, 2 Cir., 163 F.2d 328, on which the petitioner relied, related solely to prisoners of war and did not apply to a person in his position. This court further held, however, that insofar as the deportation warrant directed the deportation of the petitioner to Germany, it was invalid on the ground that the petitioner was not subject to deportation to that country, but might be deported only to Guatemala. The Government now moves for reargument of that question.

The selection of the place to which an alien is to be deported is regulated by statute, U.S.C.A. Title 8, § 156, the pertinent provisions of which read as follows:

"The deportation of aliens provided for in this chapter shall, at the option of the Attorney General, be to the country whence they came or to the foreign port at which such aliens embarked for the United States * * * or, if such aliens are held by the country from which they entered the United States not to be subjects or citizens of such country, and such country refuses to permit their reentry, or imposes any condition upon permitting reentry, then to the country of which such aliens are subjects or citizens, or to the country in which they resided prior to entering the country from which they entered the United States." (Emphasis supplied)

It will be observed that deportation may be to the country of which the alien is a subject or citizen, if the country from which he entered the United States rejects him and refuses to permit his reentry. It was on the basis of this provision that the immigration authorities directed the petitioner's deportation to Germany, having first found as a fact that he was a citizen of Germany.

The problem for solution, therefore, is ultimately whether the petitioner is a citizen of Germany, or a citizen of Guatemala. If the former, he is properly deportable to Germany. If the latter, the order of the immigration authorities is invalid. Before considering this question, however, it seems appropriate to determine the principles of law governing the scope of review in this court.

At one time in habeas corpus proceedings brought to review the validity of a deportation order, the court was limited to considering the questions whether the immigration authorities acted within the provisions of the applicable statutes, whether they accorded to the alien a fair hearing, and whether their findings of fact were supported by any evidence. Apparently, if there was any evidence whatever to sustain the findings of fact, they were not subject to further review by the courts. United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Com'r of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 106, 47 S.Ct. 302, 71 L.Ed. 560. The law has been changed, however, by the recent Administrative Procedure Act, Act of June 11, 1946; 60 Stat. 237 et seq., Title 5 U.S.C.A. § 1001 et seq.

That enactment provides that every agency action made reviewable by statute and every final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in any court, shall be subject to judicial review. Sec. 10(c). Any person suffering legal wrong because of any agency action or adversely affected or aggrieved thereby, is entitled to judicial review thereof Id. Sec. 10(a). The Act does not, however, change the forms of proceedings for judicial review previously existing. Section 10(b) provides as follows on this point:

"The form of proceeding for judicial review shall be any special statutory review proceeding relevant to the subject matter in any court specified by statute or, in the absence or inadequacy thereof, any applicable form of legal action (including actions for declaratory judgments or writs of prohibitory or mandatory injunction or habeas corpus) in any court of competent jurisdiction." (Emphasis supplied.)

In other words, the Administrative Procedure Act does not in any way modify the existing forms of proceedings to review final actions of administrative agencies, nor does it create any new remedies if an adequate remedy is in existence.

A different question, however, is presented in dealing with the scope of review as distinguished from the nature of the remedy. Section 10(e), which governs this matter, reads as follows:

"(e) Scope of review. So far as necessary to decision and where presented the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of any agency action. It shall (A) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and (B) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (3) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; (4) without observance of procedure required by law; (5) unsupported by substantial evidence in any case subject to the requirements of sections 7 and 8 or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or (6) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court. In making the foregoing determinations the court shall review the whole record or such portions thereof as may be cited by any party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error." (Emphasis supplied.)

The vital provision of the foregoing section, for the purposes of this proceeding, is found in Clause (5), which empowers the court to determine whether the findings of fact made by the administrative agency are supported by substantial evidence, and to set them aside if its conclusion is in the negative. The statute contains no exception to this provision. Consequently, in those cases in which the scope of judicial review had been restricted within narrower bounds, it was enlarged to that extent. In reviewing administrative findings, the court must always determine whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence. It is no longer sufficient, as has been true in some instances, that the findings be supported by some evidence. The result is that in a habeas corpus proceeding to review a deportation or exclusion order of the immigration authorities, it is not enough that there be some evidence to sustain the findings of fact. They must be supported by substantial evidence. If the court reaches the conclusion that there is no substantial...