United States v. Watkins, 18-3076-cr
| Decision Date | 03 October 2019 |
| Docket Number | August Term 2018,No. 18-3076-cr,18-3076-cr |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Larry WATKINS, Sr., Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Monica J. Richards, Assistant United States Attorney, for James P. Kennedy, Jr., United States Attorney for the Western District of New York, Buffalo, NY, for Appellee.
Alan S. Hoffman, Buffalo, NY, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Cabranes, Wesley, and Livingston, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellant Larry Watkins, Sr. ("Watkins") was charged in a one-count indictment with possession of ammunition as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). On July 19, 2018, Magistrate Judge Michael J. Roemer entered a detention order, which the United States District Court for the Western District of New York (Lawrence J. Vilardo, Judge ) affirmed in an October 9 Decision and Order ("October 9 Order"). On October 18, Watkins appealed the District Court’s October 9 Order, and on December 26, Watkins filed a motion for bail before us. On January 30, 2019, we entered an order denying Watkins’s bail motion and affirming the District Court’s October 9 Order. This opinion sets forth our reasoning.
The central issue on appeal is whether the Government was entitled to a detention hearing under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(f)(1)(A) and 3142(f)(1)(E) of the Bail Reform Act. We conclude that it was. In so doing, we reject Watkins’s vagueness challenge to the residual clause in the Bail Reform Act’s definition of "crime of violence." We further conclude that possession of ammunition by a convicted felon is categorically a crime of violence under the residual clause, and therefore satisfies § 3142(f)(1)(A). Finally, pursuant to a conduct-specific inquiry, we conclude that Watkins’s offense also involved the possession or use of a firearm under § 3142(f)(1)(E) because Watkins discharged the ammunition from a firearm. Accordingly, we AFFIRMED the District Court’s October 9 Order and DENIED Watkins’s motion for bail.
On June 16, 2018, Watkins fired nine bullets at a fleeing vehicle on a residential street in broad daylight. Watkins had only recently been discharged from federal supervised release after serving a ten-year sentence for a drug conspiracy conviction. Watkins claims to have been standing on his front lawn when he observed the vehicle’s occupants target his son in a drive-by shooting. To protect his son, Watkins immediately chased the vehicle into the street and began firing.
Watkins fled the scene after the shooting and deposited the illegally possessed handgun at a relative’s home. He later returned and spoke with investigators from the Buffalo Police Department. Watkins did not immediately admit his involvement in the shooting.
Days later, Watkins was arrested and interviewed by agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"). Determined to recover the missing firearm, the FBI agents promised Watkins that they would not seek to have him charged with possession of the firearm if he revealed its location. Watkins eventually led the FBI agents to his relative’s home, where they recovered a fully-loaded, semi-automatic pistol.
On June 21, 2018, Watkins was charged in a one-count indictment for possession of ammunition as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). At his arraignment, the Government moved to detain Watkins without bail pending trial.
During a July 2 detention hearing, the Magistrate Judge made the unusual decision to order briefing from both parties on the threshold question of whether the Government was entitled to a detention hearing under § 3142(f)(1). Pursuant to § 3142(f)(1), a judicial officer must hold a detention hearing upon motion of the Government "in a case that involves":
The term "crime of violence" is defined, in relevant part, as:
The first clause ("A") is commonly referred to as the "elements" clause, while the second ("B") is referred to as the "residual" clause.4
The Government proffered two theories in support of its right to a detention hearing under § 3142(f)(1). First, despite effectively conceding that possession of ammunition is not itself a "crime of violence," the Government emphasized that Watkins’s charged offense—felon-in-possession of ammunition—stemmed from a shooting, which is indisputably a "crime of violence." Therefore, the government argued, Watkins’s charged offense bears a significant factual nexus to a crime of violence and is thus a case that "involves" a "crime of violence" under § 3142(f)(1)(A). In other words, according to the Government, the prefatory language of § 3142(f)(1) —which provides for a detention hearing "in a case that involves " certain types of offense—means that the charged offense need not itself be a "crime of violence," so long as it bears a significant factual nexus to a crime of violence. Second, the Government argued that Watkins’s charged offense qualifies under § 3142(f)(1)(E) because the underlying conduct "involve[d] the possession or use of a firearm."5
Watkins, in turn, disagreed with the Government’s interpretation of the phrase "in a case that involves." Rather, he maintained that § 3142(f)(1)(A) requires that the charged offense itself constitute a crime of violence. Similarly, he argued that § 3142(f)(1)(E) requires that the charged offense have, as an element, the use or possession of a firearm. Finally, relying on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Johnson v. United States6 and Sessions v. Dimaya ,7 Watkins argued that the residual clause in the Bail Reform Act’s definition of "crime of violence" is unconstitutionally vague.8
At the continued hearing on July 16, 2018, Magistrate Judge Roemer found that the Government was entitled to a detention hearing under both § 3142(f)(1)(A) and § 3142(f)(1)(E), and that it had established by clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions could reasonably assure the safety of any other person and the community were Watkins to be released. Magistrate Judge Roemer thereupon immediately remanded Watkins to the custody of the United States Marshals Service and entered a detention order on July 19, 2018.
On August 28, 2018, Watkins filed a motion for reconsideration of Magistrate Judge Roemer’s July 19 detention order, which the District Court construed as a motion for revocation of the July 19 detention order.9 In the October 9 Order, Judge Vilardo upheld the July 19 detention order for three reasons. First, relying on our decision in United States v. Dillard ,10 he concluded that possession of ammunition is categorically a "crime of violence" under the § 3156(a)(4)(B) residual clause, as incorporated in § 3142(f)(1)(A). Second, Judge Vilardo appeared to agree with the Government that Watkins’s case "involved" a crime of violence under § 3142(f)(1)(A) because the charged offense bore a significant factual nexus to a crime of violence. Third, he concluded that Watkins’s charged offense "involve[d] the possession or use of a firearm" under § 3142(f)(1)(E) because "the ammunition alleged to have been possessed was also alleged to have been actually fired from a firearm."11 Finally, Judge Vilardo rejected Watkins’s argument that the residual clause in the Bail Reform Act’s definition of "crime of violence" is unconstitutionally vague.
On October 18, 2018, Watkins appealed the District Court’s October 9 Order. He subsequently filed a motion for bail on December 26, 2018. On appeal, Watkins maintains that the Government was not entitled to a detention hearing under either § 3142(f)(1)(A) or § 3142(f)(1)(E). He further contends that the Bail Reform Act’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague.12
On January 30, 2019, we entered an order denying Watkins’s motion for bail, "with an opinion forthcoming."13 This opinion sets forth the reasoning for our conclusion that the Government was entitled to a detention hearing under both § 3142(f)(1)(A) and § 3142(f)(1)(E).
Generally, "we apply deferential review to a district court’s order of detention and will not reverse except for clear error, i.e. , unless on the entire evidence we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."14 We review de novo questions of law.15
The Bail Reform Act allows federal courts to detain an arrestee pending trial if, during an adversary hearing, the Government demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that no release conditions "will reasonably assure ... the safety of any other person and the community."16 First, however, the Government must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that it is entitled to a detention hearing.17
Pursuant to § 3142(f), the Government is entitled to a pretrial detention hearing if: (1) the charged offense falls within any of the five subcategories set forth in § 3142(f)(1)(A)–(E) ; (2) the defendant poses a serious risk of flight;18 or (3) there is a serious risk that the...
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