United States v. Weaver
| Decision Date | 18 November 1953 |
| Docket Number | No. 14476.,14476. |
| Citation | 207 F.2d 796 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES v. WEAVER et al. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Melvin Richter, Atty. Dept. of Justice, Paul A. Sweeney, Atty. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., John D. Hill, U. S. Atty., Birmingham, Ala., Frank M. Johnson, Jr., U. S. Atty., Jasper, Ala., Warren E. Burger, Asst. Atty. Gen., William L. Hogue, Asst. U. S. Atty., Birmingham, Ala., Herman Marcuse, Marvin C. Taylor, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., of counsel, for appellant.
Manuel Levine, Birmingham, Ala., C. B. Snow, George H. Butler, Jackson, Miss., George J. Thornton, Kosciusko, Miss., Junior O'Mara, Jackson, Miss., Butler, Snow & O'Mara, Jackson, Miss., of counsel, for appellees.
Before HOLMES and RIVES, Circuit Judges, and KENNAMER, District Judge.
This is an action by the United States to recover from the defendants the total sum of $10,000, or $2,000 for each of five separate fraudulent acts allegedly committed by the defendants in obtaining surplus property of the United States. In an opinion reported in 107 F.Supp. 963, the district court upheld the contention that the claim of the United States was barred by the five-years statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2462. The court ruled further that the claim was not within the war-time suspension of limitations provided by section 28 of the Surplus Property Act, 58 Stat. 781.1
For the purposes of this appeal, the following facts must be admitted: In September, 1946, the War Assets Administration, an agency of the United States in Atlanta, Georgia, pursuant to the Surplus Property Act of 1944, as amended, conducted sales of certain surplus property of the government, consisting of new and used motor vehicles, which were available for purchase exclusively by duly certified veterans of World War II who certified that the vehicles sought to be purchased were for their own personal use or for the maintenance of their established businesses, professions, or agricultural activities. It must further be admitted, under the present state of the pleadings, that the defendants used or engaged in fraudulent tricks and schemes, in connection with said sales, and conspired among themselves and with certain of said veterans to acquire said property at said sales; that pursuant to the aforesaid conspiracy, the defendants purchased from said veterans five "certifications for veterans' preference," above referred to, which had been issued to said veterans by said Administration; and that, by fraudulent use thereof, the defendants obtained five motor vehicles and titles of ownership to the same, in separate and several acts, from said War Assets Administration.
This is not a criminal prosecution; it is not a civil action for a penalty; it is a civil action to recover an award of damages of a compensatory nature, payable to the United States for injuries to its property rights. In view of the difficulty of computing exactly the damages suffered by the government, it was within the province of Congress to choose a measure of damages, including a specific sum, that would give full restitution to the United States. The statutory language of Section 26(b) (1) of the Surplus Property Act of 1944, 50 U.S.C.Appendix, § 1635(b),2 and in particular the selection of measures of damages held by the Supreme Court, United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 63 S.Ct. 379, 87 L.Ed. 443, to be of a remedial and compensatory nature only shortly before the enactment of the Surplus Property Act, indicate that it was not the legislative intention to impose penal sanctions. The United States is not limited to penal sanctions in order to protect its property rights. Cotton v. United States, 11 How. 229, 232, 13 L.Ed. 675.
Every law must have its sanction, that is, its means of enforcement, or it will be nothing more than a precept or working rule. Without such sanction it can hardly be called a law. Sanctions are of two kinds: those that redress civil injuries and those that punish crimes. The first are called civil sanctions, the second, penal sanctions. Commiss...
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United States ex rel. Carter v. Halliburton Co.
...States....”). Further, all but one court, United States v. Weaver, 107 F.Supp. 963, 966 (N.D.Ala.1952), rev'd on other grounds,207 F.2d 796 (5th Cir.1953), to have considered the issue of whether the WSLA applies to civil claims have found that it applies. See, e.g., United States v. Wither......
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United States v. BNP Paribas SA
...support for this argument defendants cite United States v. Weaver, 107 F.Supp. 963, 966 (N.D.Ala.1952), rev'd on other grounds,207 F.2d 796 (5th Cir.1953), for its statement that “the history of the [WSLA] ... as reviewed in United States v. Smith, 342 U.S. 225, 72 S.Ct. 260, is persuasive ......
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United States v. Fraser
...219, 350 U.S. 148, 100 L.Ed. 149; Meeker v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Co., 236 U.S. 412, 35 S.Ct. 328, 59 L.Ed. 644; and United States v. Weaver, 5 Cir., 1953, 207 F.2d 796. In my opinion all of these cases are distinguishable. They involved contractual relations in which the Government was a ......
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Daniel v. United States
...v. Comstock Extension Mining Co., 9 Cir., 214 F.2d 400, 402. 11 This Circuit had previously so construed the statute in United States v. Weaver, 207 F.2d 796, 798, wherein it held "There can be no doubt that the property rights of the United States were injured as a result of the acts alleg......