United States v. Weed Et Al

Decision Date01 December 1866
PartiesUNITED STATES v. WEED ET AL
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

APPEAL from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana; the case being thus:

On the 15th of April, 1864, the steamer A. G. Brown was boarded in the Atchafalaya River, while on her way to Brashear City, by the United States gunboat Wyanza, Captain Washburne, and after some investigation the cargo of the Brown was pronounced prize of war. She followed the gunboat into Brashear City, her cargo was landed there, and put on the railroad which connects that place with New Orleans, and sent to the latter city in charge of a person calling himself a prize-master. No attempt was made to detain the A. G. Brown. About a week afterwards she landed at Brashear City, on her return from another expedition, and as soon as she touched the shore Captain Washburne came on board of her, declared her cargo prize of war, and sent that also to New Orleans by railroad. These cargoes consisted of sugar and molasses.

At New Orleans the first cargo arrived in two instalments. On the arrival of the first a libel was filed against it, in prize, in the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, by the attorney of the United States for that district. Shortly after this the second instalment of the first capture, and all of the second capture, arrived at New Orleans, whereupon an amended or supplemental libel, equally in prize, was filed against all the goods of both seizures.

The property, on its arrival, was placed in the hands of prize commissioners, depositions in preparatorio were taken, and the litigation pursued and ended as if it were a single capture. It was only by the most diligent search of the record that one was enabled to discover what goods were taken in the first capture and what in the second.

As soon as the case was fairly begun in the District Court, C. A. Weed filed his claim for the sugar and molasses of the first capture, alleging that he was the owner of it; that he was a loyal citizen of New Orleans; that he had purchased the property in the Parish of St. Mary, Louisiana, under a license from the proper treasury agents, and was transmitting it to New Orleans, when it was seized. F. Blydenburgh filed a claim, with similar statements, for the sugar of the second capture, stating, however, that he had bought it under a license which authorized him to 'transport the same from the Parish of St. Martin's.' Both claims, which were sworn to, were quite full in stating the circumstances conrected with the purchases and loyalty of the region where made and through which the property passed.

During the progress of the case the claimant made a motion to dismiss the proceedings in prize, and transfer the case to the instance side of the court. This motion was disregarded; but, on final hearing, the District Court dismissed the libel and ordered restitution of the property. From that decree the United States appealed to this court.

The vessel on which the goods were seized was the property of the government of the United States, in the employment and control of the quartermaster's department of General Banks's army at the time of the seizure,—the government receiving $3000 for the use of the vessel. An officer of this department accompanied the expedition, which went from Brashear City for the goods, and was on board when she was overhauled by the gunboat. The vessel was manned by officers and men in the service of the government. There was also on board a file of United States soldiers, under the command of a captain of the army, who were detailed for the expedition by order of the colonel in command. The only person known to be on board not in the service of the government was the person who acted as agent for the claimant of the goods. Brashear City was in possession of our forces, and had been for several months, and the vessel was only returning to her proper place when she was captured in the first instance, and was lying there when boarded, in the second. Her voyage did not, in either case, extend beyond the region of country which was under the control of the military authorities of the government at that time.

As to the cargoes.

Weed's had been brought from the parish of St. Mary. Blydenburgh's came from the parish of St. Martin, on the shore of the Grand River, a little below a place called Butte la Rose. The Grand River was apparently the boundary between the two parishes. The district is on the Gulf of Mexico, and is indented on the Gulf side by several bays, with numerous islands, creeks, &c., divided by two or three navigable rivers, broken by swamps and lakes, and traversed in every direction by numberless bayous and watercourses; facts which rendered the absence of a public enemy a fact not so easy to be ascertained.

It appeared, however, in this case that the district was in the control of the United States; that the President had designated by proclamation, on the 1st of January previous, the parish of St. Mary and apparently the whole region through which that cargo was to pass, as not in rebellion. Various places in the parish of St. Mary had been named by the commanding general as the places where delegates from the State were to assemble on the 22d February, 1864, to appoint State officers, and on the first Monday of April following, to make a State constitution.

The licenses, which were produced in court, and had all usual indicia of regularity, were to purchase within 'the country known as the parish of St. Mary, Louisiana,' and both had at the top of them the words, 'This permit will accompany the shipment, and be surrendered at the customhouse.' No papers were found with the goods.

Mr. Ashton, Assistant Attorney-General, for the United States, appellants:

Conceding, for the sake of argument simply, that the property was not enemy property, and so liable to confiscation as prize of war, it is yet so for violation of municipal law, and the court below should not have ordered restitution.

Licenses of this character are strictly construed. The rule against constructive license is probably the sternest principle known to the law.1 Even where the licensee was deceived by the course of the captor's government, a persuasive equity could not relieve him.2 The party who uses a license 'engages not only for fair intentions, but for an accurate interpretation of the permit.'3 The claimant in a prize court is an actor, and must make out his case.4 Durint the late rebellion, for the best of reasons, the doubt seems to have gone in this court against the individual, in deference to controlling public objects.5

Now in this case there are various difficulties.

1. The first words of the documents are these: 'This permit will accompany the shipment and be surrendered at the customhouse.' The case shows that the license did not accompany the merchandise; nor did any other papers. This was a violation of the conditions of the license, which, by its own terms, was thus avoided.

2. The merchandise in suit is not identified with the alleged permits, or as the property of the claimant. The onus of an intervenor is nowhere more pressing than on this point. Quantity is one of the elements of identity where a lot of merchandise is in question. In this case the property claimed here by Weed is of a quantity precisely stated in the libels.

3. As respects Blydenburgh's license. The permit was to purchase in and transport from 'St. Mary's parish.' Blydenburgh's own statement in his claim shows that the whole transaction was in 'St. Martin's parish.' For this he does not pretend to have had any license.

Mr. Coffey, contra, for the claimant.

Mr. Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court.

If this case is to be disposed of here, upon the answer to be given to the question of prize or no prize, there can be no doubt that the decree of the District Court must be affirmed.

There can on the facts be no pretence that there was any attempt to break a blockade, nor can it be held that the cargoes were enemy property. No person hostile to the United States is mentioned in argument or otherwise as probable owner of any part of them. Can the places from which the goods were brought impress upon them the character of enemy property? They were the products of those islands of Louisiana found in the bayous of that region, and were undoubtedly taken by the vessel from near the places of their production. These places, as we have seen, were under the military control of our authorities; and the parishes of St. Mary and St. Martin were then represented in a convention of loyal citizens, called to frame a constitution under which a government was organized for the State, hostile to the rebellion, and acceptable to the military commander of that department.

The regularly authorized agents of the Treasury Department were also issuing licenses to trade in these parishes, under the act of July 13th, 1861, and the regulations of the Treasury Department made under that act and other acts of Congress. It is not possible to hold, therefore, that property arriving from these parishes was, for that reason alone, to be treated as enemy property, in the sense of a prize court.

Whether it is liable to forfeiture for an illegal traffic, as being in violation of those regulations and acts of Congress, will be considered hereafter; but the question must be determined upon other considerations than those which govern a prize court.

The question of prize or no prize must therefore be answered in the negative.

But it is said, in behalf of the government, that if the property in controversy is not subject to condemnation as prize of war, it is liable to confiscation as having been purchased in violation of the acts of Congress, and the trade regulations established in pursuance of those acts.

Before entering upon this inquiry a preliminary question of some importance presents itself, which must be first...

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