United States v. Weil, 13518.

Decision Date14 August 1942
Docket NumberNo. 13518.,13518.
PartiesUNITED STATES v. WEIL.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas

Leon B. Catlett, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Little Rock, Ark. (Sam Rorex, U. S. Atty., of Little Rock, Ark., on the brief), for plaintiff.

A. F. House (of Rose, Loughborough, Dobyns & House), of Little Rock, Ark., for defendant.

TRIMBLE, District Judge.

The defendant Eugene Weil is now incarcerated in the U. S. Penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas, under a judgment and sentence of this court, upon a plea of guilty to an indictment for violation of Section 588b of Title 12, U.S.Code, 12 U.S.C.A. § 588b. Upon motion of the defendant an order to vacate the judgment and sentence was entered on the 9th day of February, 1942.

The facts involved in the matter are as follows:

On February 18, 1941, an indictment was returned by the grand jury of this district, charging that on or about June 29, 1940, and on or about October 14, 1940, at the City of Little Rock, Arkansas, the defendant violated the provisions of Section 588b of Title 12, U.S.Code, 12 U.S. C.A. § 588b, by knowingly, wilfully and feloniously entering a national bank with the unlawful and felonious intent to commit a felony in said bank by violating Section 3092 of Pope's Digest of the Statutes of Arkansas of 1937, which section made it a felony to forge a promissory note for the payment of money.

On April 7, 1941, the defendant was brought before the court and entered a plea of guilty to the charges in the indictment and was sentenced by this court to a term of two years in the U. S. Penitentiary. Subsequently thereto, and after the expiration of the term of the court at which the judgment was entered, the defendant filed a motion to vacate the judgment and sentence against him upon the grounds that this court had no jurisdiction to enter judgment and sentence against him, inasmuch as the allegations of the indictment did not state an offense against the laws of the United States, and that Congress in enacting that statute did not intend to and did not include therein "felonies under the state law."

This motion was filed with the court, was submitted to the United States Attorney's office, and that office appeared and advised the court that the government had no contention to make and did not resist the granting of the motion. At that time defendant was without counsel and none was appointed by the Court. The Court of its own motion considered the grounds of the motion and the law, and entered an order on February 9, 1942, that the prayer of the motion be granted, the judgment vacated, the case be dismissed for want of jurisdiction, and the defendant Eugene Weil be released from the penitentiary and further custody. No question was raised at that time by the government of the want of jurisdiction to enter the order, either by reason of the lapse of the term at which the judgment was entered or otherwise.

Thereafter on June 4, 1942, the government, by its attorney, filed a motion to vacate the order of February 9, 1942, which vacated the judgment, and for its ground stated:

"Movant states that the order of the Court made and entered on February 9, 1942, is of no effect and void, for the reason that the said Court was without jurisdiction to enter such order. Movant further states that the order of the Court entered herein on February 9, 1942, should be rescinded as being contrary to the law in (the) view of the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals of the United States for the Tenth Circuit rendered November 12, 1941, in the case of Hudspeth v. Melville 10 Cir., 127 F.2d 373, and the opinion of the same court rendered May 5, 1942 in the case of Hudspeth v. Tornello 10 Cir., 128 F.2d 172." The prayer of the motion was for the rescission, vacation and setting aside of the order of February 9, 1942.

The defendant Weil, being in prison under sentence of this Court, and the government refusing to obey the order of the Court and release him, and the defendant having filed a pauper's oath the court appointed Mr. A. F. House, an able attorney of Little Rock, Arkansas, to represent him in this matter. Counsel for the government and counsel for the defendant have filed able briefs and the matter is now before the court upon the questions of law, all matters of fact being admitted for the purpose of this motion and by defendant's plea of guilty.

Certain propositions of law have been stated by counsel for the government, and admitted by counsel for defendant, hence need no decision in this case. It is admitted that the cardinal rule of construction of legislative acts is to determine the intent of an act from its text, tenor, spirit and occasion and necessity for the law; that the gist of the offense charged is the "entering" with an intent to commit a felony, the actual commission of the felony not being a part of the offense charged, and only persuasive in considering the question of intent; that if two constructions of a statute are permissible the court...

To continue reading

Request your trial
6 cases
  • Orme v. Atlas Gas & Oil Co.
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • March 24, 1944
    ...is all-comprehensive. Unless modified by the context, it includes all persons and things referred to indiscriminately. United States v. Weil, D.C., 46 F.Supp. 323, 325; Haworth v. Hubbard, 220 Ind. 611, 44 N.E.2d 967, 144 A.L.R. 887. The word "other" means in addition to and different from ......
  • State for Benefit of Workmen's Compensation Fund v. E. W. Wylie Co., 7288
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • March 19, 1953
    ...meaning but the textual exegesis may indicate a restricted connotation. Dowd v. Sullivan, 217 Ind. 196, 27 N.E.2d 82; United States v. Weil, D.C., 46 F.Supp. 323. Under Sec. 65-0108 the complying employer is relieved of liability for injuries or death sustained only by his employees and und......
  • Burke v. United States, 1439.
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • March 12, 1954
    ...provisions of a statute, by virtue of which appellant is now imprisoned." The court then quoted from and relied on United States v. Weil, D.C.E.D.Ark., 46 F.Supp. 323, 326, where it was stated: "* * * counsel for the government contends that the Court was without jurisdiction to enter its o......
  • In re La Flamme
    • United States
    • U.S. Bankruptcy Court — District of Rhode Island
    • May 1, 1981
    ...741 (1918); Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558, 35 S.Ct. 287, 59 L.Ed. 717 (1915), and the context in which it is used. United States v. Weil, 46 F.Supp. 323 (D.Ark.1942). It is a well-known rule of statutory construction5 that where particular words of description are followed by general terms,......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT