United States v. Welsh
Decision Date | 30 September 1969 |
Docket Number | No. 26702 Summary Calendar.,26702 Summary Calendar. |
Citation | 417 F.2d 361 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles Lee WELSH, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Glen Sutherland, El Paso, Tex., court-appointed, for appellant.
Seagal V. Wheatley, U. S. Atty., Ray Caballero, Asst. U. S. Atty., El Paso, Tex., for appellee.
Before GEWIN, GOLDBERG and DYER, Circuit Judges.
Appellant, Charles L. Welsh, was found guilty by a jury in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas of transporting a stolen automobile in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1964), and transporting two firearms in interstate commerce in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 902(e) (1964). Appellant alleges that the trial court erred in allowing a policeman and an FBI agent to testify concerning certain statements made by him, and that the court erred in charging the jury as to the degree of proof necessary to convict. Finding no merit in these contentions, we affirm.1
The record reveals the following facts. Welsh and three companions traveled by automobile from Phoenix, Arizona to El Paso, Texas where they checked into a motel. The desk clerk became suspicious when Welsh incorrectly described his car and license plates on the motel registration form. The city police were alerted and two officers were dispatched to investigate. The officers went to Welsh's room and asked him to identify himself and his car. He replied that his name was "Nelson" and that he owned a 1963 Chevy II. He identified the car and stated that his ownership papers were in the glove compartment. In fact, the car identified was a stolen 1966 Chevy II, and Welsh was unable to produce ownership papers. The officers then asked Welsh to raise the hood of the car so that they could inspect the engine. When Welsh was unable to successfully operate the hood latch, he was arrested "for suspicion" of possessing a stolen car. After arrest but prior to the time when Miranda warnings were given, he informed the police that his friends in the motel room had a sawed-off shotgun which might be used on the police. He insisted to the officers that his friends were "highly under the influence of narcotics and might come out shooting." The officers testified that Welsh volunteered this information in spite of their insistence that he remain silent. The policemen returned to the motel room, and after receiving permission to search, they found the shotgun and the pistol described in the indictment. Mr. Willard Nelson, who resided next-door to appellant in Phoenix, Arizona, testified that the firearms and car recovered by the police officers had been taken during a burglary of his home.
The first specification of error concerns the propriety of allowing one of the arresting officers to testify to certain statements made by appellant prior to his arrest. He argues that this evidence was erroneously introduced because Miranda warnings had not been given. We have held that an officer does not have to give these warnings until a person is in custody or until a person's freedom is deprived in some significant way.2 In the instant case there had been no deprivation of freedom when the statements were made. The police officer testified that he did not go to the motel to arrest the owner of the car but merely to investigate the motel clerk's suspicion of impropriety.3 His testimony is supported by the fact that prior to Welsh's admissions there was a complete absence of evidence indicating that a crime had been committed. We therefore find that the officer's testimony concerning appellant's statements was properly admitted.
Appellant also contends that the court erred in allowing the officer to testify to certain statements made after arrest and prior to Miranda warnings. We find no error here because the statements were "volunteered." In Miranda v. Arizona, the Court noted that "volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our decision today."4 The record shows that these statements were not the product of police questioning but were made in spite of the fact that police officers repeatedly told Welsh to remain silent.
In his second specification of error, appellant alleges that the trial court erred in allowing an FBI agent to testify regarding certain admissions made on the day following his arrest. Immediately prior to this interrogation, the agent clearly gave the Miranda warnings, and Welsh signed a waiver of his constitutional rights. During interrogation Welsh stated that he "evidently stole the vehicle in Phoenix and evidently in the vehicle were the two weapons." Appellant argues that the admission of this statement was improper because he had been taking Methydrene and was not aware of what he was saying or what had happened. This argument is rebutted by the FBI agent's testimony that Welsh was "coherent" and did not appear to be under the influence of drugs. While a city policeman testified that Welsh appeared to be under the influence of liquor, narcotics or "something" at the time of his arrest, the FBI agent's interrogation occurred on the day following his arrest. We, therefore, find that the record does not support appellant's allegation of mental incompetency.
Finally, the appellant contends that certain instructions given to the jury were improper. His objections relate specifically to the burden of proof, the meaning of reasonable doubt and the court's explanation of the law relating to principals.5 Appellant failed to raise any of these objections in the trial court either orally or in writing. Rule 30 F.R. Crim.P.6 On appeal we do not notice every technical error or defect. The error must affect substantial rights of the appellant. Plain errors affecting substantial rights may be noticed even...
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