United States v. West Virginia Northern R. Co.

• Decision Date: 15 October 1903
• Citation: 125 F. 252
• Parties: UNITED STATES ex rel. KINGWOOD COAL CO. v. WEST VIRGINIA NORTHERN R. CO. et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

125 F. 252

UNITED STATES ex rel. KINGWOOD COAL CO. v. WEST VIRGINIA NORTHERN R. CO. et al.

United States Circuit Court, N.D. West Virginia.

October 15, 1903

J. W Davis, V. G. Robinson, and J. J. Davis, for relator.

C. G Sprout, P. J. Cragan, and John H. Halt, for respondents.

GOFF Circuit Judge.

This proceeding was instituted under the provisions of the act of Congress of February 4, 1887 (24 Stat. 379, c. 104), amended March 2, 1889 (25 Stat. 855, c. 382), and February 8, 1895 (28 Stat. 643, c. 61 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3154)). On the petition of the Kingwood Coal Company, duly verified, the alternative writ was issued on the 1st day of May, 1903. The answer of respondents was regularly tendered and filed issues joined, testimony heard, and the case argued and submitted. By agreement of all the parties a jury was waived and the questions raised by the pleadings were submitted for the finding and judgment of this court. Many witnesses were examined, documentary testimony offered, and counsel has been fully heard. The court has carefully considered, and at least endeavored to digest, the evidence, and to properly apply it to the law applicable to the facts found.

The relator is a corporation engaged in the mining and shipping of coal in Preston county, W. Va., on the line of the West Virginia Northern Railroad company, one of the respondents. The Irona Coal Company and the Atlantic Coal & Coke Company, also respondents, are likewise engaged in mining and shipping coal, their mines being located on the line of their co-respondent, the West Virginia Northern Railroad Company, the three mines mentioned being the only collieries so located and operated. It is charged in the petition filed by the relator that the respondent railroad company, in the transportation of the coal mined at said mines, and entering into and becoming part of the interstate commerce of the country, has been, and was when the petition was filed, discriminating in favor of the Atlantic Coal & Coke Company and the Irona Coal Company, and against the Kingwood Coal Company. It appears that the West Virginia Northern Railroad Company is not the owner of any of the cars used on its line for the transportation of coal, but that all such cars are furnished by the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, over the tracks of which such coal ultimately reaches its markets. After such cars are delivered to the West Virginia Northern Railroad Company, they are distributed among the mines along its line under the superintendence of its general manager. Under the pleadings the matter to be determined by the judgment of this court is, did the West Virginia Northern Railroad Company, in distributing the cars so received by it from the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, make a just allotment of them among the three mines mentioned, or did it so assign them as to unlawfully discriminate in favor of two of them as against the other one?

It was and is the duty of the West Virginia Northern Railroad Company to so manage its business with all three of the coal mines located on and shipping coal over its line in the same relative and impartial way, so as to show no favoritism to either one of them; thereby exercising the power and discretion confided to it, so as not to act in a manner the result of which would necessarily build up one at the expense of the others, or advance the interest of two to the detriment of the third. It is quite evident that railroad companies can, by the improper distribution of cars among competing coal companies, build up some of them and make them prosper, while at the same time it tears down and eventually destroys others. Hence the wise provision of the law that no favoritism shall be shown, and that no unjust discrimination will be permitted. The relator insists that on May 1, 1903, it was discriminated against by the West Virginia Northern Railroad Company-- that is should then have received at least 33 1/3 per cent. of the tonnage of the cars furnished to said company by the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, when in fact it received much less than that allotment, the other two mentioned mines receiving at the same time much more than their just and equitable share. We are now to deal with conditions as they existed on and subsequent to that date, considering previous incidents only as they may tend to elucidate matters as they, in fact, were when the petition was filed.

It is quite clear that the output of a coal mine is largely controlled by the number of railroad cars available for use in sending its coal to market. Prudent and economical management requires that no more coal be mined at any time than can be promptly sent to market, and hence it follows that the absence of a sufficient number of railroad cars in which to transport its output removes the incentive that otherwise would exist to increase the production of a mine. I find that at the time this suit was instituted the cars distributed by the West Virginia Northern Railroad Company were apportioned on a basis virtually as follows, viz., to the Kingwood Coal Company, 17 per cent.; to the Atlantic Coal & Coke Company, 27 per cent.; and to the Irona Coal Company 56 per cent. This allotment was founded on a rating of the capacity for output per day of the mines as follows, viz., 400 tons to the Kingwood Coal Company, 600 tons to the Atlantic Coal & Coke Company, and 1,250 tons to the Irona Coal Company. Was this method of distribution a proper one? Did it produce that just and equitable result contemplated by the statute applicable thereto? Was it free from unfair discrimination and was it at least approximately correct? The agreed method of car distribution that had existed down to and for a time subsequent to the first shipment of coal from the mines of the Atlantic Coal & Coke Company-- the mine last opened for business-- was no longer in force when at the instance of the relator, this proceeding was commenced, but at that time...