United States v. White
| Decision Date | 27 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | NO. 3:21-mj-04070,3:21-mj-04070 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. WILLIE WHITE |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending before the Court is the Government's "Motion for Revocation of Release Order and Motion for Leave to File Brief in Support of Motion (Doc. No. 52, "Motion for Revocation"). Via the Motion for Revocation, the Government asks the Court1 in pertinent part and pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3145(a)(1), to revoke the Magistrate Judge's release order and conditions of release that the Magistrate Judge announced in open court on May 12, 2021 and thereafter explained in writing in a memorandum opinion (Doc. No. 60). That is to say, via the Motion for Revocation, the Government seeks both the revocation of the Magistrate Judge's order to release Defendant and the corresponding grant of the Government's motion for detention (Doc. No. 6, "Motion for Detention") that was denied via the Magistrate Judge's release order.
The Government here moved for detention2 pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(A), which provides:
Thus, the Motion for Detention was based solely on the notion that Defendant's case "involve[d] a serious risk that [Defendant] would flee,"3 i.e., that Defendant posed a serious "flight risk."4 And even though the Government, at the detention hearing granted by the Magistrate Judge pursuant to the Motion for Detention, could have asserted danger to other persons or the community as an alternative basis to detain Defendant even without having grounded its motion for detention on that basis,5 the Government ultimately did not do so. Unsurprisingly, the Court does not find that it somehow would be justified in sua sponte finding detention warranted under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) & (f) on the ground that there was clear and convincing evidence that Defendant posed a danger to other persons or the community. The Motion for Detention, and thusthe Motion for Revocation, is solely about risk of flight and the related but (as discussed below) distinct notion of risk of non-appearance (and the mitigation thereof).
In denying the Motion for Detention and ordering Defendant's release, the Magistrate Judge found, in summary, that the Government had "not met its burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that any risk that [Defendant] would not appear at future court proceedings cannot be addressed by conditions of release." (Doc. No. 60 at 13). She announced conditions of release that, in her view, would reasonably assure the appearance of Defendant at future court proceedings. (Id. at 13-14).
The Court will not begin by setting forth a boilerplate framework for the adjudication of motions for detention. That is because, given the issue(s) raised by Defendant, this opinion will explore in considerable detail what that framework actually is. The Court's initial observations regarding the law will be limited to a notation of the standard for the Court's review of the Magistrate Judge's decision. The applicable standard of review is de novo. "Review of the Magistrate Judge's decision is de novo, 'although the district court "may conduct its review and base its decision on the evidence presented to the magistrate at the detention hearing."'" United States v. Zapien, No. 3:14-CR-00037-1, 2014 WL 1028435, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 17, 2014) (quoting United States v. Stokes, No. 3:06-cr-00204, 2006 WL 3843589, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 22, 2006) (citation omitted)).
The Court next proceeds to identify the issue(s) raised herein concerning the applicable framework for the Court to use in deciding, de novo, whether the Motion for Detention should be granted.
In ruling in Defendant's favor by denying the Motion for Detention, the Magistrate Judge described the analytical framework as follows:
The Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3141 et seq., governs the federal courts' decisions to release or detain a defendant before trial. Under the Act's terms, a "judicial officer shall order the pretrial release of [a defendant] on personal recognizance, or upon execution of an unsecured appearance bond in an amount specified by the court, . . . unless the judicial officer determines that such release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required or will endanger the safety of any other person or the community." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b). If the court finds personal recognizance or an unsecured bond "will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required or will endanger the safety of any other person or the community, such judicial officer shall order the pretrial release of the person" subject to the conditions that she or he not commit another offense while on release, submit a DNA sample if required by law, and "the least restrictive further condition, or combination of conditions, that such judicial officer determines will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community[.]" Id. § 3142(c), (c)(B). Section 3142(f) of the Act identifies seven categories of offenses for which the court, on the United States' motion or its own motion, shall hold a detention hearing to make this determination.
(Doc. No. 60 at 1-2). As the Magistrate Judge further noted, (Doc. No. 60 at 3 n.1), one of the categories of offenses (or, to be more precise, categories of circumstances)6 in which a detention hearing is authorized is when there is a "motion of the attorney for the Government . . . in a case that involves a serious risk that such person will flee." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(A).7 Significantly and perhaps surprisingly, the structure of the applicable statutory sentence indicates that the "motion" to which the statute here refers is probably more accurately considered primarily a motion for a detention hearing—which, essentially, in turn encompasses an implicit underlyingmotion for detention8—rather than a motion for detention as such; as suggested below, this observation is not mere hair-splitting, because the Government actually needs first to show entitlement to a detention hearing before even having a shot at prevailing on the underlying request for detention.
Defendant takes issue with none of what the Magistrate Judge said. But Defendant essentially focuses much greater attention than did the Magistrate Judge upon the threshold issue of whether a detention hearing was even authorized to begin with. Defendant effectively raised this issue before the Magistrate Judge, arguing that the Government was not authorized to seek detention in the first place, because it had not even claimed in its motion (let alone demonstrate in advance of the hearing) that Defendant posed a serious risk of flight. (Doc. No. 59 at 5-6).9 The Magistrate Judge seemingly assumed that a detention hearing was authorized, and accordingly held a detention hearing before deciding the ultimate issue implicated in the detention motion (i.e., obviously, whether Defendant should be detained under 18 U.S.C. § 3142) in Defendant's favor. Defendant asserts, however, that Defendant should prevail alternatively (and primarily) for a different reason: that the Government is not entitled to a detention hearing to begin with and thus loses its bid for detention before even having an opportunity to satisfy the standards that it would need to satisfy were it actually entitled to a detention hearing.
Defendant's assertion contemplates the existence of a very significant step in the analysis in cases in which the Government has filed a motion for a detention hearing (which theGovernment typically phrases as a motion for detention itself) under Section 3142(f)(2)(A): explicitly answering the question of whether the Government is even entitled to a detention hearing in the first place. The question is whether Defendant's assertion is correct. To support his assertion, Defendant appropriately cites United States v. Gibson, 384 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Ind. 2019), which the Court quotes below. But he goes off track in relying on a particular quote from United States v. Berrios-Berrios, 791 F.2d 246, 250 (2d Cir. 1986) and on United States v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758, 765 (7th Cir. 1985). As discussed below in a footnote, these cases actually do not stand for the proposition that the Government, to even get a detention hearing in the first place, must establish that a risk (or serious risk of likelihood) that the defendant will flee. The question is whether the Court should accept the proposition set forth in Gibson, a single, non-precedential, district court decision. To answer that question, the Court has reviewed a swath of additional case law. The Court answers that question in the affirmative, for the reasons set forth below.
1. To prevail on a motion for detention under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(A), the Government must (1) first properly predicate the motion on a "serious risk of flight" and (2) then establish by a preponderance of the evidence that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant as required i.e., reasonably mitigate the risk of non-appearance.
To that question, a recent decision from a district court within this circuit answers a resounding "yes."
The Court is authorized to conduct a detention hearing (i.e., to consider whether to detain Defendant) only if the Government first establishes that one of the circumstances listed in Title 18, United States Code, Section 3142(f) exists. See United States v. Byrd, 969 F.2d 106,...
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