United States v. White, No. 19-6176
| Decision Date | 09 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 19-6176 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JONATHAN EDWARD WHITE, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 20a0334n.06
Defendant Jonathan White gave an undercover law enforcement agent a makeshift explosive device that he created. Afterwards, the government charged him with various offenses related to unlawfully making, possessing, and transferring a firearm.1 White pursued an entrapment defense, and to support it, he wanted to present evidence concerning (1) the genesis of the government's investigation of him and (2) his grievances against government officials. The district court, however, excluded the evidence as irrelevant. The jury then convicted White on each count, and the district court entered judgment against him. On appeal, defendant argues that the district court's exclusion of his proposed evidence violated his constitutional right to ameaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. For the reasons expressed below, we disagree and affirm.
Vance Dennis—an assistant district attorney for Tennessee's 24th Judicial District—orally requested that the Tennessee Bureau of Investigations (the Bureau) investigate White. The Bureau agreed and sent two agents to a property adjacent to White's to conduct surveillance. One of the agents, Joseph Hudgins, "was posing as [an] electrical contractor" and appearing to "work[ ] on flood light[s]." That afternoon, Hudgins and White struck up a conversation.
Eventually, Hudgins "b[r]ought up . . . having an issue with beaver dams at a family farm," and discussed potentially shooting the beavers to see if White would mention explosive devices as a way to destroy the dams. After more discussion, White gave the agent an explosive device made from firecrackers, gun powder, a candle, an end cap, and duct tape. Eventually, White was arrested.
The United States indicted White for several firearm offenses that arose out of his manufacture, possession, and transfer of the explosive device, commonly known as a pipe bomb. Before trial, defendant issued a subpoena to Assistant District Attorney Dennis. White sought to have Dennis testify to the origins of the investigation. According to defendant, that testimony would have been relevant to his entrapment defense. The State of Tennessee moved to quash the subpoena. The district court granted the motion, concluding that Dennis's proposed testimony was irrelevant.
During trial, defendant's attorney told the district court that he anticipated defendant testifying—in support of his entrapment defense—about various grievances he had filed against government officials. The district court ruled that White was not permitted to present his grievance evidence because it was not relevant to his entrapment defense.
The jury found defendant guilty on all counts in the indictment. The district court sentenced White to twenty months of imprisonment on each count, to be served concurrently, followed by three years of supervised release. Defendant timely appeals.
We review interpretations of the Constitution de novo. See United States v. Blackwell, 459 F.3d 739, 752 (6th Cir. 2006). And "we review all challenges to district court evidentiary rulings, including constitutional challenges, under the abuse of discretion standard." Id. "[T]he abuse of discretion standard is not at odds with de novo interpretation of the Constitution inasmuch as [the] district court does not have the discretion to rest its evidentiary decisions on incorrect interpretations of the Constitution." Id. (emphasis omitted). "A district court abuses its discretion when it relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact, improperly applies the law, or uses an erroneous legal standard." Bormuth v. Cty. of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 502 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
Defendant contends that the district court denied him his right to "a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense" by excluding proposed evidence. Rockwell v. Yukins, 341 F.3d 507, 512 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986)). However, "the Supreme Court has made it perfectly clear that the right to present a 'complete'defense is not an unlimited right to ride roughshod over reasonable evidentiary restrictions." Id. "A defendant 'does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.'" Id. (quoting Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988)).
Defendant claims that the district court abused its discretion by improperly applying the law when it excluded evidence that he wanted to use for his entrapment defense as irrelevant. The initial question, therefore, is whether the district court misapplied the Federal Rules of Evidence and therefore abused its discretion by excluding the proposed evidence as irrelevant. As we explain below, we hold that it did not.
"A valid entrapment defense requires proof of two elements: (1) government inducement of the crime, and (2) lack of predisposition on the part of the defendant to engage in the criminal activity." United States v. Khalil, 279 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 2002); see also Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988).
An improper inducement occurs when the government "repeated[ly] and persistent[ly] solicit[s]" a person to commit a crime. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932); see also United States v. Dixon, 396 F. App'x 183, 186 (6th Cir. 2010) . The predisposition inquiry involves assessing whether a defendant was "inclin[ed] to commit the crime with which he is charged." United States v. Kussmaul, 987 F.2d 345, 349 (6th Cir. 1993); Predisposition, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) ("A person's inclination to engage in a particular activity; esp., aninclination that vitiates a criminal defendant's claim of entrapment."). To determine whether the defendant was predisposed to commit the charged crimes, the following factors are pertinent:
(1) the character or reputation of the defendant; (2) whether the suggestion of the criminal activity was originally made by the government; (3) whether the defendant was engaged in criminal activity for a profit; (4) whether the defendant evidenced reluctance to commit the offense but was overcome by government persuasion; and (5) the nature of the inducement or persuasion offered by the government.
Defendant contends that the district court abused its discretion when it excluded his grievance evidence. We disagree.
"Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action." Fed. R. Evid. 401; United States v. Chalhoub, 946 F.3d 897, 905 (6th Cir. 2020). The fact of consequence here is whether defendant was predisposed to commit the crimes with which he was charged. See United States v. Clark, 957 F.2d 248, 250 (6th Cir. 1992) (). Therefore, for the grievance evidence to be relevant, it would have to have a tendency to make it more or less probable that defendant was inclined to commit the offenses with which he was charged. Kussmaul, 987 F.2d at 349 (). White's criticisms of government officials, however, say nothing about whether he was more or less likely to be inclined to build, possess, or transfer pipe bombs. Thus, the grievance evidence was irrelevant, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding it.
White argues that the grievance evidence bears on the character and reputation factor. But even if there were some relationship between defendant's criticisms of government officials and his character, he has not explained how that relationship, in turn, suggests that it is more or less likely that he was inclined to commit the crimes with which he was charged. That lack of a causal connection renders defendant's argument unpersuasive.
Defendant also contends that the district court abused its discretion when it excluded the investigation evidence. We are not persuaded.
For the investigation evidence to be relevant, it would have to have a tendency to make it more or less probable that White was inclined to commit the offenses with which he was charged. Id. The reason the government began its investigation of White, however, is unrelated to White's inclination to build, possess, or transfer pipe bombs; therefore, it is irrelevant. Cf. United States v. Robinson, 763 F.2d 778, 783 (6th Cir. 1985) . White argues that the investigation evidence is pertinent to the nature-of-the-inducement factor, but his arguments are unavailing.
The nature-of-the-inducement factor concerns the means the government used to persuade its target to violate the law. See United States v. Barger, 931 F.2d 359, 361, 367 (6th Cir. 1991) (...
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