United States v. Wiggins
| Decision Date | 16 July 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 3:17cv149/RV/EMT,Case No.: 3:15cr45/RV/EMT |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. ROBERT WIGGINS, JR. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
This matter is before the court upon Defendant's "Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody" (ECF No. 89). The Government filed a response (ECF No. 94), and Defendant filed a reply (ECF No. 95). The case was referred to the undersigned for the issuance of all preliminary orders and any recommendations to the district court regarding dispositive matters. See N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). After a review of the record and the arguments presented, it is the opinion of the undersigned that Defendant has not raised any issue requiring an evidentiary hearing and that the § 2255 motion should be denied. See Rules 8(a) and (b), Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases.
On August 19, 2015, Robert Wiggins, Jr., was charged in a single-count indictment with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (ECF No. 3). The charges stemmed from a Confidential Informant's purchase of a .22 caliber pistol from Wiggins in a Pensacola motel room on June 2, 2015. The CI entered the motel room, with Wiggins' consent, and videotaped the exchange. At the time Wiggins was also in possession of a .45 caliber pistol, which he refused to sell (ECF No. 70, PSR ¶¶ 10, 11). On September 25, 2015, represented by appointed counsel Ronald Johnson, Esq., Wiggins entered a guilty plea pursuant to a written plea agreement, statement of facts, and supplement (ECF Nos. 24-26, 56).
On October 5, 2015, the court received a handwritten letter from Wiggins in which he requested to withdraw his guilty plea (ECF No. 28). The following day, Attorney Johnson filed a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea with a signed declaration from Wiggins (ECF No. 29). The general premise of both motions was that Wiggins' plea was not knowing and voluntary because he believed that he was pleading guilty to possession of a firearm, rather than sale of a firearm, and that he did not agree with the facts set forth in the factual basis relating to the sale of a firearm. The district court held a hearing during which it reiterated to Wiggins that he was not charged with selling firearms, but merely with possession (ECF No. 85 at 6, 11). Wiggins stated that he understood this although he continued to argue about entrapment (id. at 12). The court denied his request to withdraw his guilty plea (ECF Nos. 33, 34, 85).
On October 29, 2015, the defense filed a second motion to allow Wiggins to withdraw his guilty plea (ECF No. 35). Wiggins again claimed that he was entrapped into committing the offense conduct, and his handwritten explanation of this position is attached to the motion (ECF No. 35 at 3-4). The motion reflects counsel's belief that Wiggins misunderstood the law and that it was not in his client's interest to pursue the motion. The court denied the motion the same day it was filed (ECF No. 36).
On November 6, 2015, Wiggins' attorney, Mr. Johnson, moved to withdraw from representing Defendant (ECF No. 37). The court granted the motion, and attorney Donald M. Sheehan entered a notice of appearance in Wiggins' behalf on November 18, 2015 (ECF No. 39, 40).
One week later, on November 25, 2015, Mr. Sheehan filed a "Motion to Withdraw/Request for Faretta Hearing" (ECF No. 42). The motion reflects Wiggins' intent to file a third motion to withdraw his guilty plea and counsel's discussions with Wiggins about the possibility of representing himself. The court continued sentencing and scheduled a Faretta hearing for December 8, 2015 (ECF Nos. 43-45, 48). After the hearing, the court granted counsel's motion to withdraw and Wiggins' request to represent himself (ECF Nos. 48, 79).
Wiggins filed another pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea on December 16, 2015, based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel (ECF No. 50). He claimed in the motion that at the October 8, 2015, hearing on his first such motion he "involuntarily decided not to withdraw because Judge Vinson's questions and comments vitiated the defendant's decision to withdraw his guilty plea" and that his second such motion was denied because counsel filed the motion without reviewing it with Wiggins (ECF No. 50 at 1). The court denied the motion, noting again, that whether Wiggins had sold the guns was irrelevant to the question of whether he possessed them, which he had admitted (ECF No. 52 at 1).
On January 5, 2016, Wiggins filed a fifth motion to withdraw his guilty plea in which he argued that he was misled into accepting an erroneous factual basis which mentioned the sale of firearms (ECF No. 53). Wiggins made clear that he understood he was not charged with sale of firearms but again complained about questions from the court at his hearing on the first motion to withdraw (ECF No. 53 at 2). The court denied the motion on January 6, 2016 (ECF No. 54).
On January 11, 2016, Wiggins filed a motion to appoint counsel (ECF No. 57). The court granted the motion and re-appointed attorney Sheehan who promptly filed objections to the Draft Presentence Investigation Report (ECF Nos. 58, 59, 61).
The Final Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR") assessed a base offense level of 20, a two-level upward adjustment because Wiggins possessed at least three firearms, and a two-level upward adjustment for obstruction of justice for a total offense level of 24 (ECF No. 64, PSR ¶¶ 30-39). No reduction for acceptance of responsibility was recommended (ECF No. 64, PSR ¶ 38). Wiggins' criminal history category was VI (ECF No. 64, PSR ¶¶ 49-51). The statutory maximum term of 120 months reduced the applicable guidelines range to 100 to 120-months imprisonment (from 100 to 125-months) (ECF No. 64, PSR ¶¶ 70-71).
At sentencing, the court sustained the defense objection to the two-level increase for the number of firearms and the two-level adjustment for obstruction (ECF No. 70, Revised PSR ¶¶ 31, 35). The revised guidelines range was 70 to 87- months. The court sentenced Wiggins at the mid-point of this range to a term of 78-months imprisonment (ECF Nos. 68, 69, 80).
Wiggins appealed, challenging the district court's denial of his five motions to withdraw his plea, and the denial of a three-level acceptance of responsibility adjustment at sentencing (ECF No. 87). The Eleventh Circuit noted that the record did not support Wiggins' assertions that counsel made numerous errors surrounding his plea or that the district court erred in evaluating the merits of his entrapment defense (ECF No. 87 at 2). It ultimately affirmed Wiggins' sentence and conviction.
In the present motion, Wiggins raises four separate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Government opposes the motion in its entirety.
"Section 2255 does not provide a remedy for every alleged error in conviction and sentencing." Spencer v. United States, 773 F.3d 1132, 1138 (11th Cir. 2014). Collateral review is not a substitute for direct appeal, and therefore the grounds for collateral attack on final judgments pursuant to § 2255 are extremely limited. A prisoner is entitled to relief under section 2255 if the court imposed a sentence that (1) violated the Constitution or laws of the United States, (2) exceeded its jurisdiction, (3) exceeded the maximum authorized by law, or (4) is otherwise subject to collateral attack. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a); McKay v. United States, 657 F.3d 1190, 1194 n.8 (11th Cir. 2011). "Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 'is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for that narrow compass of other injury that could not have been raised in direct appeal and would, if condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice.'" Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). The "fundamental miscarriage of justice" exception recognized in Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986), provides that it must be shown that the alleged constitutional violation "has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent . . . ."
The law is well established that a district court need not reconsider issues raised in a section 2255 motion which have been resolved on direct appeal. Stoufflet v. United States, 757 F.3d 1236, 1239 (11th Cir. 2014); Rozier v. United States, 701 F.3d 681, 684 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. Nyhuis, 211 F.3d 1340, 1343 (11th Cir. 2000); Mills v. United States, 36 F.3d 1052, 1056 (11th Cir. 1994). Once a matter has been decided adversely to a defendant on direct appeal, it cannot be re-litigated in a collateral attack under section 2255. Nyhuis, 211 F.3d at 1343 (quotation omitted). Broad discretion is afforded to a court's determination of whether a particular claim has been previously raised. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 16 (1963) ().
Because a motion to vacate under section 2255 is not a substitute for direct appeal, issues which could have been raised on direct appeal are generally not actionable in a section 2255 motion and will be considered procedurally barred. Lynn, 365 F.3d at 1234-35; Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998); McKay v. United States, 657 F.3d 1190, 1195 (11th Cir. 2011). An issue is "'available' on direct appeal when its merits can be reviewed without further factual development." Lynn, 365 F.3d at 1232 n.14 (quoting Mills, 36 F.3d at 1055). Absent a showing that the ground of error was unavailable on direct appeal, a court may not consider the ground in a section 2255 motion unless the defendant establishes (1) cause for not raising the ground on direct...
To continue reading
Request your trial