United States v. Wilburn, 2:18-cr-115
| Decision Date | 17 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | 2:18-cr-115 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. JEROME WILBURN, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
Defendant Jerome Wilburn, who is facing a three-count indictment for heroin distribution and illegal firearms possession, is being held in pretrial detention in the Butler County Jail. Based on his age and history of acute pulmonary embolism, Wilburn seeks temporary release under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i) due to the ongoing coronavirus pandemic. While Wilburn's concerns are genuine, when considered in conjunction with the danger he poses to the safety of the community or his risk of flight, they do not provide a sufficient basis for his temporary release. Wilburn's long history of criminal convictions for serious crimes—which includes illegal firearm possession, drug distribution, and two (2) violent sexual assaults—coupled with his prior parole violations and the potentially lengthy prison sentence he faces if convicted in this case, strongly counsel against granting him temporary release. Accordingly, Wilburn's Emergency Motion for Temporary Release (ECF No. 97), is DENIED without prejudice.
As part of a DEA investigation into suspected heroin trafficking between the greater Detroit and Pittsburgh regions, the Pennsylvania State Police ("PSP") stopped a vehicle believed to be transporting heroin shortly after it travelled over the Ohio-Pennsylvania state line. Defendant Jerome Wilburn was in the vehicle's passenger seat when the PSP conducted the stop. Though the parties dispute the lawfulness of that stop, no one disputes that a search of the vehicle uncovered a substantial quantity of heroin and a firearm. And, following the later execution of a search warrant at an apartment allegedly linked to Wilburn, the DEA uncovered more heroin and firearms. The yield from the vehicle stop and apartment search led a federal grand jury to indict Wilburn for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; possession with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(i); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). (Indictment, ECF No. 15.)
Shortly after Wilburn's arrest, he made an initial appearance before Magistrate Judge Pesto in this District. (ECF No. 4.) The United States requested detention, which Magistrate Judge Pesto granted on a temporary basis pending a later detention hearing. (ECF Nos. 5 and 6.) At the detention hearing, before Magistrate Judge Lenihan, the United States argued that Wilburn should be detained pending trial because the charges against him raise a rebuttable presumption of detention under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3). The United States argued that Wilburn's criminal history, potential sentence if convicted on these charges, limited ties to the community, and past parole violations evidence both his danger to the safety of the community and his risk of flight. (Detention Hr'g Tr., ECF No. 45, at 18:18-19:22.)
At the detention hearing, Judge Lenihan reviewed the factors set out in the Bail Reform Act. First, Judge Lenihan found that Wilburn's alleged "offense . . . involves both very dangerous drugs, heroin, and also firearms, not just one, but two." (Id. at 21:8-10.) Second, that "[t]he weight of evidence against the Defendant is fairly strong," since he was in the car where the heroin and handgun were found (albeit with another person in the car) and there was indicia of his found at the apartment searched by the DEA. (Id. at 21:11-22.) As for Wilburn's history and characteristics, Judge Lenihan noted Wilburn's "at least three, maybe four violations while [he was] on parole," and that Wilburn's prior felony drug convictions meant he faced a lengthy prison sentence if convicted. (Id. at 22:1-7.) In addition, Judge Lenihan observed Wilburn's lack of (Id. at 22:8-10.) As a result, Judge Lenihan found that Wilburn did not rebut the presumption of detention under § 3142(e)(3). (Detention Order, ECF No. 12.)
Following the detention order, Wilburn filed several pretrial motions, including a motion to suppress evidence. (ECF Nos. 49-52.) The Court held an evidentiary hearing on Wilburn's suppression motion in September 2019, and the parties filed post-hearing briefs. (ECF Nos. 78, 86-87, 90, 93, and 97.) While the Court was considering Wilburn's suppression motion, the coronavirus pandemic altered virtually every aspect of modern life, which relevant to the Court's task here, includes federal criminal litigation. Wilburn, who is currently being held at the Butler County Jail, filed an Emergency Motion for Temporary Release Under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i) seeking temporary release to the custody of his mother in Detroit, Michigan. (ECF No. 97.) The Court ordered Wilburn and the United States to confer to see if they could reach an agreeable outcome with respect to Wilburn's motion. (ECF No. 98.) The parties could not reach an agreeable outcome, and the United States responded in opposition to Wilburn's motion seeking temporary release. (ECF Nos. 99 and 100.) Wilburn filed a reply and the Court held telephonic oral argument on Wilburn's motion.1 (ECF Nos. 102 and 106.) With that, Wilburn's Emergency Motion for Temporary Release is ripe for disposition.
Wilburn does not seek to reopen his detention hearing under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f), but rather seeks temporary release under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i). (ECF No. 97.) Section 3142(i) provides: "[t]he judicial officer may . . . permit the temporary release of the person, in the custody of a United States marshal or another appropriate person, to the extent that the judicial officer determines such release to be necessary for preparation of the person's defense or for another compelling reason." Id. § 3142(i). In making the motion, the burden rests with Wilburn to show that § 3142(i) permits his temporary release. See, e.g., United States v. Stephens, No. 15-cr-95, 2020 WL 1295155, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2020) (citing United States v. Dupree, 833 F. Supp. 2d 241, 246 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)). And to meet this burden, the defendant should present an individualized argument why temporary release is appropriate; generalized or speculative arguments are insufficient.2 See, e.g., United States v. Lee, No. 19-cr-298, 2020 WL 1541049, at *6 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2020).
In short, Wilburn must demonstrate the presence of two (2) factors. First, that his temporary release is necessary for the preparation of his defense or another compelling reason. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i). Second, that he could be released to the custody of the United States marshal or another appropriate person. Id.
As for the first inquiry, because Wilburn does not argue that temporary release is necessary to prepare for his defense, his motion hinges on his ability to establish that temporary release is necessary for "another compelling reason." (ECF No. 97, at 1-2.) Section 3142(i) does not define "compelling reason"; a term with substantial ambiguity. To resolve ambiguity in a statute's terms, the Court should consider the "language [of the statute] itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole." Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997). In doing so, the Court should endeavor to interpret the ambiguous provision so that "no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant." TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)). And rather than examining the provision isolation, the Court should examine related provisions in other parts of the U.S. Code. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 776, (2008).
Starting at the most granular level, courts should give an ambiguous term its ordinary meaning. See Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 537 (2015). Here, "compelling," as defined in dictionaries contemporaneous with § 3142(i) becoming law, means "[t]o urge irresistibly, to constrain, oblige, force." See Compel, Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989). What's more, because the § 3142(i) states: "preparation of the person's defense or for another compelling reason," preparation for one's defense provides an example of a compelling reason. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i) (emphasis added). Beyond that, however, the § 3142(i) does little to put the term "compelling" in context.
As other courts have observed, until the emergence of the coronavirus pandemic, there was relatively little case law on interpreting § 3142(i)'s "compelling reason" prong. See Lee, 2020 WL 1541049, at *3 (). In the few cases that had interpreted "another compelling reason," courts tended to grant temporary release only to defendants suffering from terminal illnesses or truly severe injuries. See id. at *3 & n.3. In the Court's estimation these prior decisions interpreting "compelling reason" to include a defendant's serious medical needs or condition are consistent with the term's ordinary meaning. The question then becomes, should the Court look only at the "compelling reason" that is advanced to the Court or which is otherwise present, or do other considerations play a role in the temporary release determination?
To answer this, the Court's should zoom out, so to speak, and consider § 3142(i) in conjunction with the rest of that statute. One particularly critical issue in interpreting "compelling reason" is how § 3142(i) interacts with factors considered in the initial bail determination under § 3142(g). One line of coronavirus-related cases hold that "section 3142(i) provides a distinct mechanism for temporarily releasing a...
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