United States v. Wilkerson

Decision Date06 March 2023
Docket Number3:23cr9-TKW-HTC
PartiesUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. SHANNON L. WILKERSON, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida

ORDER OF RELEASE

HOPE THAI CANNON, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

On March 3, 2023, the Court held a 4-hour hearing on the Government's oral motion for detention, pursuant to the Bail Reform Act of 1984, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 3141 et seq (the Act). Based upon the information contained in the pretrial services report the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, and the arguments of counsel, the Court finds Defendant Shannon L Wilkerson shall be released pending trial subject to the conditions set forth in the attached Conditions of Release. This is not a rebuttable presumption case,[1] and the Government has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence Wilkerson poses a risk of nonappearance or by clear and convincing evidence Wilkerson poses a danger to the community.

I. The Bail Reform Act

The Act provides a framework for determining whether pretrial detention is appropriate. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142. Under the Act, a court has the choice to either release or detain a defendant. See Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 57 (1995) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a)(2), (a)(3)). In making that choice, courts must keep in mind that “liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).

A court shall detain a defendant if it determines that “no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1); see United States v. Price, 773 F.2d 1526, 1528 (11th Cir. 1985) (the policy of the Act “is to permit release under the least restrictive condition compatible with assuring the future appearance of the defendant). The Government has the burden of establishing a defendant is a risk of flight by a preponderance of the evidence or is a risk of danger by clear and convincing evidence. See United States v. King, 849 F.2d 485, 489 (11th Cir. 1988). “Clear and convincing evidence” entails more than a preponderance of the evidence, but less than evidence establishing a fact beyond a reasonable doubt. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-25 (1979). “To find danger to the community under this standard of proof requires that the evidence support such a conclusion with a high degree of certainty.” United States v. Chimurenga, 760 F.2d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1985).

In determining whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure both the defendant's appearance at trial and the safety of any other person and the community, a court considers the following factors: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the offense is a crime of violence; (2) the weight of the evidence against the person; (3) the history and characteristics of the person; and (4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the person's release. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). The Act, however, says nothing about the relative weight a court should give each factor when deciding whether to release or detain a defendant. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). Instead, the weight given to each factor will inevitably vary from case to case and might even vary depending on whether the inquiry relates to a defendant's danger or to his risk of flight. United States v. Zhang, 55 F.4th 141, 149-50 (2d Cir. 2022).

II. ANALYSIS

Conducting detention hearings is a duty Congress specifically assigned to United States Magistrate Judges, 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(2), and detention decisions are by far the hardest decisions a Magistrate Judge makes. If the decision is to detain, the court is detaining a person who has not yet been found guilty and who may later be found not guilty. Whether that person serves 3 months or 1 year in pretrial detention, those are days and time he or she will never get back. They are forever lost. And if the decision is to release, and the defendant violates the conditions of release, that violation could result in more crimes upon more victims. The Court does not have a crystal ball and can never be certain a defendant will not violate their conditions of release. The Court, however, also cannot be handcuffed by the fear of a possible violation. The question is whether the Court can be “reasonably assured” a defendant will not flee or commit another crime if released. See generally, 28 U.S.C. § 3142.

Having carefully considered the evidence presented, weighed the credibility of the witnesses, and applied the factors below to the evidence, the Court finds Wilkerson should be placed on pretrial release. It is undisputed the crime Wilkerson is alleged to have committed is serious and heinous. It is also undisputed the crime occurred 20 years ago, the evidence relied upon by the Government is circumstantial, and with the exception of recent DNA evidence, none of the other evidence the Government has had over the last 20 years prompted the Government to charge Wilkerson with a crime. It is also undisputed Wilkerson has minimal criminal history, has spent no time in custody, and has the support of his family and two communities.

Thus, in this case, for the Court to find Wilkerson is a flight risk or danger to the community, the Court must also find that the weight of the evidence is strong enough to make the imposition of a life sentence a real motivation for Wilkerson to flee prosecution and leave his family. As discussed below, while the Government's case is not insignificant, the Court simply cannot reach that conclusion, particularly when considering the letter and intent of the Act, the Government's burden, Wilkerson's history and characteristics, and the conditions the Court may impose.

A. Nature and Circumstances of the Offense Charged.

Under § 3142(g)(1), certain offenses, such as crimes of violence, certain drug offenses, and offenses involving minors, by their nature weigh in favor of detention. Here, the Government accuses Wilkerson of killing 19-year-old Amanda Gonzalez through suffocation, strangulation, and blunt force trauma on November 3, 2001. Ms. Gonzalez was pregnant when she was murdered.

The seriousness of the charged offense cannot be overstated. The crime is clearly one of violence. United States v, Coleman, 2001 WL 1249682, at *4 n.2 (N.D.N.Y. July 24, 2001) (Congress has made it clear that the nature of the crime as one of violence is an important consideration, particularly on the issue of dangerousness.”); 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(1). And “in terms of violence, it does not get more serious than murder.” United States v. Massey, 2014 WL 3671885, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. July 23, 2014).

Moreover, several jurisdictions have recognized that a defendant facing life in prison, if convicted, has every incentive to flee. United States v. Nichols, 897 F.Supp. 542, 547 (W.D. Okla. 1995), aff'd 1995 WL 430191 (10th Cir. July 21, 1995) (“The prospect of a lengthy prison term, life imprisonment or the death penalty provides Defendant with a great incentive to flee.”); United States v. Fama, 2013 WL 2467985, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2013) (discussing defendant's possible life sentence as a factor to consider in assessing risk of flight); United States v. Ouedraogo, 2009 WL 3270076, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 8, 2009) (noting Defendant has a much greater incentive to flee” now that he is facing a murder charge and not just financial crimes). Also, while not a death penalty or life imprisonment case, in United States v. Quartermaine, 913 F.2d 910 (11th Cir. 1990), the Eleventh Circuit found the Government had met its burden of showing the defendant was a flight risk, given his ties to a foreign country, significant resources, statements made to officers about fleeing, and possibility of an over 60-year sentence.[2] Id. at 917; see also United States v. English, 629 F.3d 311, 321-22 (2d Cir. 2011) (affirming detention in part because the defendant faced a presumption against release and a mandatory sentence that incentivized fleeing). Thus, as the defense concedes, the nature and circumstances of the offense weigh in favor of detention.

B. Weight of the Evidence.

The second § 3142(g) factor requires the district court to consider evidence proffered by the Government which it intends to use at defendant's trial. “While it is true that the Court's determination of this factor ‘neither requires nor permits a pretrial determination of guilt,' the Court can still weigh the evidence and determine whether it proves that the defendant poses a risk to others and/or is at risk of flight.” United States v. Slatten, 286 F.Supp.3d 61, 67-68 (D.D.C. 2017) (internal citations omitted), aff'd, 712 Fed.Appx. 15 (D.C. Cir. 2018).

The weight of the evidence is a common-sense consideration. If the evidence against a defendant is overwhelming, credible helpful, and important to the Government's case in chief, and the sentence upon conviction is lengthy, a defendant has stronger motives to flee to avoid future court proceedings and may indicate the defendant is a present danger to himself or the community if the Government's allegations later prove to be true. United States v. Blackson, 2023 WL 1778194, at *10 (D.D.C. Feb. 6, 2023); United States v. Iverson, 2014 WL 5819815, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2014) (“When evidence of a defendant's guilt is strong, and when the sentence of imprisonment upon conviction is likely to be long ... a defendant has stronger motives to flee.”) (internal citation omitted). Conversely, if the only evidence against a defendant is circumstantial, contradicted, or unreliable, the...

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