United States v. Williams

Decision Date31 March 1982
Docket NumberNo. CR-2-81-45.,CR-2-81-45.
Citation557 F. Supp. 616
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Joe Sam WILLIAMS, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee

Guy W. Blackwell, Asst. U.S. Atty., Greeneville, Tenn., for plaintiff.

J. Wayne Wolfenbarger, Rutledge, Tenn., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM TO COUNSEL

NEESE, District Judge.

The Court has under advisement its pretrial determination, Rule 12(d), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, of the admissibility or unadmissibility, Rule 12(c), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, of evidence relating to the crimes with which the defendant is charged. He has moved for its suppression, Rules 12(b)(3), 41(f), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, on grounds that it was obtained in violation of the Constitution, Fourth Amendment, and that its use against him herein would infringe his immunity against self-incrimination, Constitution, Fifth Amendment.

For purposes of the former objection and this memorandum only, these facts and circumstances are crucial:

The disputed evidence was obtained by federal officers for use herein without a search-warrant from a state officer who had safekept it for use in a potential state-prosecution which has never come-about on a different charge. United States v. Gargotto, C.A. 6th (1973), 476 F.2d 1009, 10148 (such is permissible constitutionally). Other state officers had acquired it warrantlessly from a car which Mr. Williams had occupied when it was wrecked at a place other than the place of their search-and-seizure of it, and he had not then (or since) been arrested on its account except herein. Preston v. United States (1964), 376 U.S. 364, 368, 84 S.Ct. 881, 883, 11 L.Ed.2d 777, 781, as explicated and distinguished in Cooper v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 58, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730; Chambers v. Maroney (1970), 399 U.S. 42, 51, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 1981, 26 L.Ed.2d 419, 4289; Texas v. White (1975), 423 U.S. 67, 67-68, 96 S.Ct. 304, 305, 46 L.Ed.2d 209, 211-2121, 2; Colorado v. Bannister (1980), 449 U.S. 1, 4, 101 S.Ct. 42, 44, 66 L.Ed.2d 1, 4; Washington v. Chrisman (1982), 455 U.S. 1, 5-7, 102 S.Ct. 812, 816-17, 70 L.Ed.2d 778.

The prosecution has not carried its burden of showing that the impoundment of the wrecked vehicle at the place on the embankment of a highway it had come to rest, Cardwell v. Lewis (1974), 417 U.S. 583, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (summary, at (2)), was necessary and reasonable; and, these officers' seizure of it by impoundment was, accordingly, "unreasonable in violation of the federal Constitution, Fourth Amendment * * *," Drinkard v. State (1979), (248 Tenn.), 584 S.W.2d 650, 6531, 653-6542. Mr. Williams, obviously in need of it, was being aided when these officers had arrived in response to the emergency from those better equipped and with greater expertise than the officers could offer. No reason was assigned for the summoning of a wrecker to the scene of this accident, which the highway-patrolman had done immediately upon observing the position of the wrecked-car by radio-transmission available in the departmental-cruiser present.

After the wrecker had been summoned, 1 of the officers saw in his own plain view near the open front-door of, and both officers saw in their own plain view inside, the wrecked-car, a large — in the aggregate — volume of what the only witness described as "bookie-slips" as well as other documents indicative that they were being utilized in the carrying-on of the business of accepting wagers on the outcomes of professional football-games. Cf. Bohn v. United States, C.A. 8th (1959), 260 F.2d 773, 776, certiorari denied (1959), 358 U.S. 931, 79 S.Ct. 320, 3 L.Ed.2d 304, rehearing denied (1959), 360 U.S. 907, 79 S.Ct. 1283, 3 L.Ed.2d 1258.

The possession of any gaming device by any person was then unlawful under Tennessee law. T.C.A. § 39-2006. It was reasonable for the state officers to believe that the contents inside the car constituted gaming devices. Van Pelt v. State (1952), 193 Tenn. 463, 468(1), 246 S.W.2d 87 ("policyslips" are such gaming-devices); Storey v. State (1960), 207 Tenn. 326, 339 S.W.2d 485 (current "butter-and-egg slips" are such gaming-devices).

If it was reasonable for them to believe such contents offended against the law, as they had an entirely legitimate reason to be in the position to see immediately outside and inside the car, Milcey v. Arizona (1978), 437 U.S. 385, 392-393, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2413, 57 L.Ed.2d 290, 3006, 7, then they were provided with probable-cause, not only to apprehend Mr. Williams as then a person "* * * known * * *" to them, "* * * upon their own view to be presumptively guilty * * *" of violating the gaming-laws, T.C.A. § 39-2007, but they had probable-cause as well "* * * to seize the incriminating items without a warrant. Footnote reference omitted. * * *" Colorado v. Bannister, supra, 449 U.S. at 4, 101 S.Ct. at 44, 66 L.Ed.2d at 4 1b. They, "* * * had the right to act as soon as * * *" "they observed the documents inside the car. * *" Washington v. Chrisman, supra, 455 U.S. at 7, 102 S.Ct. at 818.

The officers were under a duty, under these circumstances, not only to apprehend a person guilty of violating the gaming-laws of their state but also to incarcerate him or her until the time of his or her trial. T.C.A. § 39-2007, supra. Mr. Williams was in a semi-conscious condition on September 1, 1978, and they neither arrested nor incarcerated him on-the-spot or afterward. (Mr. Williams has not been prosecuted for such alleged violation in the more than 3 years since intervening.)

The search-and-seizure of the wrecked car while it was at the garage in the custody of the officers cannot be justified as reasonable as an incident to an administrative-inventory of its contents. They had not impounded it because it was interfering with traffic or constituted a hazard to some element of public safety, cf. South Dakota v. Opperman (1976), 428 U.S. 364, 368, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3096, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000, 10054; their impoundment was to "* * * preserve evidence * * *," idem., by actually searching the car and seizing the law-offending evidence therefrom after impounding it and having it towed and safeguarded at the garage whence the wrecker had been summoned.

Thus, their intrusions into the car at the garage had no purpose of making and keeping the car and its contents secure for its disabled occupant and taking an administrative-inventory of its contents in compliance with any standard procedure. Ibid., 428 U.S. at 365-367, 96 S.Ct. at 3095, 49 L.Ed.2d at 10091b. Rather, they were engaged at that later time in a criminal contact with the vehicle to seize physically and preserve evidence of criminality with which to prosecute Mr. Williams.

The failure of the officers to seize the contraband they had seen inside the car where it was at rest after wrecking when they had probable cause so to do constitutionally; their impounding it unconstitutionally for their own convenience in furthering their investigation thereafter; their making a subsequent search, after having violated Mr. Williams' constitutional right under the Fourth Amendment by an illegal seizure; and their seizure of the disputed evidence at another time and place, complicates factually the issue to be determined. There are no "* * * per se rules * * *" by which the reasonableness of the search-and-seizure of the car at the garage may be tested; "* * * each case must be judged on its own facts. * * *" Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), 403 U.S. 443, 509-510, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2060, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 608 (separate concurring and dissenting (and his final) opinion of the late Justice Black).

The question is whether, under all the peculiar facts and circumstances presented, the intrusions of the officers into the constitutionally-protected effect (automobile), Cady v. Dombrowski (1973), 413 U.S. 433, 439, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 2527, 37 L.Ed.2d 706, 714, of its occupant, and his (presumably, here) effects inside it, which offended against the law, supra, were reasonable or unreasonable. Ibid., 413 U.S. at 439, 93 S.Ct. at 2527, 37 L.Ed.2d at 7131. Mr. Williams' "* * * right of privacy * * * at the various and respective times implicated * * * is the touchstone of our inquiry. * * *" Cardwell v. Lewis, supra, 417 U.S. at 591, 94 S.Ct. at 2469, 41 L.Ed.2d at 3358.

Accordingly, counsel for the adverse parties will submit simultaneously to the Court through the clerk within 7 working-days herefrom respective briefs addressing (at least) these collateral issues:

I

A. (1). Did the officers have probable-cause reasonably to believe Mr. Williams was in violation of the law when neither of them ever saw him in the actual possession of items which offended against the law? Cf. inter alia: Cardwell v. Lewis, supra, at 591, n. 6, 94 S.Ct. at 2470, n. 6, 41 L.Ed.2d at 335, n. 69?

(2). How is any such probable-cause affected herein by the arrest in Cardwell and no arrest herein?

(B)(1). Did the exposure by the occupant to public view of contents in the vehicle, which eliminated its occupant's privacy-interest therein, eliminate also his privacy-interest in such car? Cf. inter alia: United States v. Chadwick (1977), 433 U.S. 1, 16, n. 10, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2486, n. 10, 53 L.Ed.2d 538, 551, n. 10.

(2). How is the rule in Chadwick affected herein by the arrest in Chadwick and no arrest herein?

C. What is any effect on the search-and-seizure at the garage of the fact that the vehicle unconstitutionally impounded was not lawfully in the indirect custody of the officers who seized it? Cf. inter alia: Texas v. White, supra; South Dakota v. Opperman, supra, 428 U.S. at 368, 96 S.Ct. at 3096, 49 L.Ed.2d at 10054; Preston v. United States, supra; Cooper v. California, supra; Chambers v. Maroney, supra; Colorado v. Bannister, supra; Drinkard v. State, supra; and Mincey v. Arizona, supra.

...

To continue reading

Request your trial
1 cases
  • IN RE BUTCHER, Misc. No. 2-82-01.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee
    • 1 Junio 1982
    ...nature of a pretrial conference. Reference to this Court's memorandum opinion and direction of March 31, 1982 in United States of America v. Williams, 557 F.Supp. 616, 623 thereof, should have provided counsel with an indication that this Court adopted as feasible the method of requiring th......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT