United States v. Williams
| Decision Date | 26 October 2011 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 9-3473 (JNE),Criminal No. 06-208 (JNE/JJG) |
| Parties | United States of America, Plaintiff, v. James Brock Williams, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
This matter is before the Court upon Petitioner-Defendant James Brock Williams's ("Defendant") pro se motion, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, for an order of this Court to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the motion.
In addition, Defendant filed a motion to amend his § 2255 petition, seeking a sentence reduction under the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010) and proposed permanent Amendment 750 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The Court denies the motion without prejudice.
On March 8, 2007, a jury convicted Defendant on three counts including; conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), § 841(b)(1)(A) and § 846; possession with intent to distribute cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and § 841(b)(1)(A); and possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and § 841(b)(1)(C). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence on direct appeal on July 28, 2008. United States v. Williams, 534 F.3d 980 (8th Cir. 2008). On December 4, 2009, Defendant timely filed the petition and motion presently before the Court to vacate, set aside, orcorrect his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Defendant alleges four grounds for the motion. First, Defendant alleges ineffective assistance of counsel providing numerous examples. Second, Defendant asserts his conviction for conspiracy was in violation of the Due Process Clause. Third, Defendant asserts the jury instructions constituted a violation of his Fifth Amendment right to be charged by a grand jury. Fourth, Defendant alleges ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The United States opposes Defendant's motion.
On August 4, 2011, Defendant filed a motion to amend his § 2255 petition, seeking a sentence reduction under the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub.L. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010) and proposed permanent Amendment 750 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines.
A prisoner may file a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence imposed by a federal district court if (1) the sentence "was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States"; (2) "the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence"; (3) "the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law"; or (4) the sentence is "otherwise subject to collateral attack." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) "is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for a narrow range of injuries that could not have been raised on direct appeal and, if uncorrected, would result in a complete miscarriage of justice." United States v. Apfel, 97 F.3d 1074, 1076 (8th Cir. 1996).
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must show that his counsel's performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced by that deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To satisfy the two-prong test, Defendantmust show (1) trial counsel did not exercise the skills and diligence a reasonably competent attorney would exhibit under similar circumstances, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant such that a reasonable probability exists the result of the trial would have otherwise been different. Id. at 688, 694. To establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant faces a heavy burden. Apfel, 97 F.3d at 1076. "Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential." Strickland, 466 U.S at 689. It is not necessary to "determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies." Id. at 697.
Defendant claims that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance, in part, by not seeking suppression of evidence and admissions made by Defendant following his arrest. This argument is factually incorrect. Defense counsel moved to suppress both the Defendant's statements and challenged the grounds on which the police officers conducted the search of Defendant's vehicle. (Def.'s Mot. Suppress Statement 1; Def.'s Mot. Suppress Evidence 1). The district court held a hearing on these matters on August 15, 2006 and denied Defendant's motions. (Order at 1, Sept. 29, 2006). Defense counsel further objected to the Report and Recommendation from the hearing, but the court denied both motions on February 9, 2007. (Def.'s Objection to Report and Recommendation 2; Order at 2, Feb. 9, 2007).
Defendant also claims defense counsel was ineffective by not moving to strike the testimony of Ronald Melendez—the confidential informant used in obtaining Defendant's arrest—or otherwise demonstrating to jurors that he was unreliable and had a plea agreement. The record shows that Mr. Melendez's plea agreement with the United States was discussed atgreat length during the trial. (Trial Tr. vol. 1, 160-81, March 7, 2007) Further, the district court instructed the jury at the close of the trial on how to weigh the testimony of Mr. Melendez with respect to his plea agreement, his previous abuse of drugs or alcohol, and generally how to treat impeached testimony or testimony of a convicted felon. (Trial Tr. vol. 2, 363-66, March 8, 2007). Therefore, there is no evidence that the attorney's conduct was anything but competent with respect to Mr. Melendez's testimony.
Defendant next contends defense counsel was ineffective by (1) not objecting to the district court's failure to instruct jurors on how to weigh the testimony of the confidential informant, (2) not objecting to jury instructions regarding how to use inadmissible evidence of prior bad acts, and (3) not objecting to jury instructions regarding the conspiracy charge. These contentions are factually incorrect. As previously stated, the court instructed the jury on how to weigh the testimony of Mr. Melendez. (Trial Tr. vol. 2, 363-66, March 8, 2007). Additionally, the court instructed the jury that evidence of Defendant's prior conviction could only show knowledge and intent. (Trial Tr. vol. 2, 366, March 8, 2007). Jurors are presumed to follow the court's instructions. Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 799 (2001). In regard to the conspiracy charge, defense counsel moved for a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 acquittal and in the alternative proposed jury instructions that the court declined to give. (Trial Tr. vol. 2, 322-29, March 8, 2007). The court struck the remarks made regarding prior drug transactions from the record and told jurors to disregard the comments. (Trial Tr. vol. 1, 142, March 7, 2007). The contention that the attorney did not object to jury instructions regarding the conspiracy reduces to a claim that there was insufficient evidence for conviction. This was fully addressed in the Eighth Circuit and this motion points to no new information. Williams, 534 F.3d at 985-86.
Defendant alleges that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by withdrawing the motion for a mistrial after prosecutors had introduced evidence of prior criminal acts by Defendant. There is no evidence Defendant objected to his counsel not renewing the motion for mistrial at the time nor did he address the issue on direct appeal. The trial transcript shows that defense counsel conferred with Defendant before deciding not to renew the motion for a mistrial. (Trial Tr. vol. 1, 127-42, March 7, 2007). Strategic decisions are virtually unchallengeable unless they are based on deficient investigation and the limited investigation was unreasonable. White v. Roper, 416 F.3d 728, 732 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91). Because Defendant has failed to show that his attorney's investigation was deficient or unreasonable, Defendant has failed to demonstrate deficient performance under the Strickland test. 466 U.S. at 688.
Defendant alleges counsel was ineffective by failing to object to the use of Defendant's statements to establish membership in the conspiracy. Again, this allegation is factually incorrect. As previously stated, defense counsel moved for a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 acquittal on the conspiracy charge, in part because it was based on alleged statements by Defendant to the police. (Trial Tr. vol. 2, 322-29, March 8, 2007). Additionally, defense counsel proposed jury instructions that the court declined to give. (Trial Tr. vol. 2, 322-29, March 8, 2007).
Defendant contends counsel was ineffective by failing to object to the court's method of responding to jury inquiries and that Defendant had a right to be present during theseproceedings. The jury asked for transcripts of some of the testimony and for a signed confession by Melendez. (Jury Question and Resp., Mar. 7, 2007, ECF No. 75.) The Court denied the request in writing explaining the jurors were bound to their own recollection. Id. The jury then inquired about the weight of the drug seized and whether they were to consider three Post-It notes attached to the trial evidence. (Jury Question and Resp., Mar. 7, 2007, ECF No. 76; Ct. Ex. A, ECF No. 77.) The Court instructed the jury through written communication that the Post-It notes had not been admitted into evidence and that they were to fully disregard them and that they should determine the total weight of the controlled substance. (Jury Question and Resp., ECF No. 76)...
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