United States v. Williams

Decision Date14 December 2015
Docket NumberNo. 14–4049.,14–4049.
Citation808 F.3d 238
Parties UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Charles WILLIAMS, Jr., Defendant–Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

ARGUED:Amber Rae Will, College of William & Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia, for Appellant. Terry Michael Meinecke, Office of the United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:Gregory Davis, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina; Patricia E. Roberts, Brittany Sadler, Andrew L. Steinberg, William & Mary School of Law, Williamsburg, Virginia; Tillman J. Breckenridge, Thomas W. Ports, Jr., Reed Smith LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before KING, KEENAN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge KING wrote the opinion, in which Judge KEENAN and Judge FLOYD joined.

KING, Circuit Judge:

Charles Williams, Jr., was convicted and sentenced in the Middle District of North Carolina for possessing with intent to distribute crack cocaine. In this appeal, Williams pursues a single contention—that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence seized during a traffic stop on Interstate 85. During that stop, a deputy sheriff issued Williams a written warning, and Williams thereafter refused to consent to a vehicle search. The police then conducted a dog sniff of the car and seized crack cocaine from it. Williams maintains that extending the traffic stop for the dog sniff contravened the Fourth Amendment and that the crack cocaine should have been suppressed. As explained below, we vacate and remand.

I.
A.

While traveling by rental car through central North Carolina in the early hours of February 13, 2012, Williams and his girlfriend Elisabeth MacMullen were stopped for speeding by a deputy sheriff. After the deputy issued Williams a written warning and returned his documentation, another deputy conducted a dog sniff of the rental vehicle. The dog alerted, and the ensuing search revealed crack cocaine in the vehicle's trunk. Williams and MacMullen (together, the "Defendants") were then arrested.

Five months thereafter, on July 30, 2012, the federal grand jury in Greensboro indicted the Defendants for possessing with intent to distribute crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The Defendants moved separately to suppress the seized evidence and, on November 20, 2012, the district court conducted an evidentiary hearing (the "initial hearing"). At the initial hearing, the prosecution presented the testimony of the deputies, Justin Russell and Jerry Soles, as well as a video of the traffic stop that was recorded from Russell's patrol car (the "Russell Video"). By its December 11, 2012 memorandum opinion, the court denied the motions to suppress. See United States v. Williams, No. 1:12–cr–00264 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 11, 2012), ECF No. 27 (the "First Opinion").

About three months later, the government produced a second video of the traffic stop, which had been recorded from Deputy Soles's patrol car (the "Soles Video"). The Soles Video directly contradicted an important aspect of the prosecution's evidence at the initial hearing. The Defendants thus sought reconsideration of the suppression denial, asserting that the Soles Video undermined the First Opinion. On March 21, 2013, the court conducted a second evidentiary hearing (the "reconsideration hearing"). Deputies Russell and Soles again testified and, on April 9, 2013, the court issued a new opinion, declining again to suppress the evidence. See United States v. Williams, No. 1:12–cr–00264 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 9, 2013), ECF No. 45 (the "Superseding Opinion").

On April 17, 2013, a jury convicted Williams of the offense charged, but acquitted MacMullen. On January 10, 2014, the district court sentenced Williams to eighty-four months in prison. Williams timely noticed this appeal, and we possess jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

B.
1.

The pertinent facts are for the most part undisputed. As spelled out herein, they are drawn from the First Opinion, the Superseding Opinion, and other aspects of the record.

Deputies Russell and Soles were separately patrolling I–85 near Lexington, North Carolina, during the early hours of February 13, 2012. Just after midnight, Soles observed two cars speeding southbound and traveling close together. At about 12:37 a.m., Soles stopped the lead vehicle, driven by Williams's brother, and Russell stopped the second vehicle, a Hyundai rental car driven by Williams with MacMullen as the passenger.1

After stopping the Hyundai, Deputy Russell informed Williams that he was going 80 mph in a 70–mph zone and requested his driver's license and vehicle registration. Williams then provided a New York license and the rental agreement. The agreement reflected that MacMullen had rented the Hyundai from Hertz in Totowa, New Jersey, on February 10, 2012. According to the agreement, the car was to be returned there by 2:30 p.m. on February 13, 2012 (that afternoon). Russell requested that Williams exit the Hyundai and sit in his patrol car while he checked Williams's documents. Williams did so, and MacMullen remained in the Hyundai.

Inside the patrol car, Deputy Russell engaged Williams in conversation as the license check was conducted. Williams related that he and MacMullen had stopped at his mother's home in Virginia Beach and were traveling to Charlotte—about sixty miles southwest of the traffic stop on I–85—to visit his brother for a couple of days. Russell thought he smelled alcohol and asked Williams if he had been drinking. In response, Williams said he had consumed a beer with supper. Russell then asked Deputy Soles, who had stopped the lead vehicle less than 100 yards away, to administer a breathalyzer test to Williams. As a result, Soles cut short his traffic stop of the lead vehicle, gave Williams's brother a verbal warning, and went to assist Russell. At approximately 12:45 a.m., Soles moved his patrol car, containing the drug dog Dakota, to a point along the shoulder of I–85 behind Russell's patrol car. Arriving at Russell's patrol car, Soles greeted Williams through the open front-passenger-side window at about 12:46 a.m. Soles administered the breathalyzer test as Williams sat in Russell's patrol car.

Deputy Russell then approached the Hyundai to speak with MacMullen. Russell asked MacMullen about Williams's alcohol consumption and the couple's travel plans. She responded that Williams had had very little to drink and that they were on their way to Charlotte. Russell asked why they were going to Charlotte, and MacMullen responded, "I don't know, we are just on vacation." See First Opinion 4.

Back at Deputy Russell's patrol car, Deputy Soles continued to talk with Williams while awaiting the results of the breathalyzer test. Williams told Soles that he was on vacation and was going to visit his brother in Charlotte. He also told Soles that the driver of the lead vehicle was his brother and that the two vehicles were traveling together. At the initial hearing, Soles testified that Williams's statement contradicted the driver of the lead vehicle, who had told Soles that "he wasn't traveling with anybody." See J.A. 75.2

When Deputy Russell returned to his patrol car, Deputy Soles informed him that Williams had passed the breathalyzer test. While Soles listened, Russell advised Williams that he had passed the test and would receive a written warning for speeding. When Russell requested an address from Williams to complete the written warning, Williams gave the post office box address of his place of employment in New York, which differed from the New York post office box address on his driver's license.

As Deputy Russell was writing the warning, Deputy Soles asked Williams where he lived. Williams responded that he lived in both New York and New Jersey and that he and MacMullen had a child and lived together. When Soles asked where they were headed, Williams said, "Charlotte." See First Opinion 4. In response to a question about their planned stay in Charlotte, Williams said that they would stay at a Wyndham hotel and that the length of their stay would depend on how his brother's wife acted. When Russell pointed out that the rental car was to be returned in New Jersey that very afternoon, Williams said he would renew the rental agreement in Charlotte.

Deputy Russell completed the written warning and gave it to Williams at 12:54:59 a.m. Seconds later, as Williams was exiting the patrol car, Russell asked if he could pose a question. After Williams responded affirmatively, Russell asked, "Nothing illegal in the car?" See First Opinion 5. Williams responded that there was not. As Russell and Williams exited the patrol car, Russell persisted—again asking Williams if he could search the Hyundai—and Williams initially equivocated. Williams then walked towards the Hyundai, opened the rear-driver-side door, and gestured that the deputies could look inside. Deputy Soles then asked for a clear yes-or-no answer on whether Williams was consenting to a search of the Hyundai. Williams firmly replied, "[N]o." Id. at 7.

Immediately thereafter, at 12:56:22 a.m.—a minute and twenty-three seconds after Deputy Russell issued the written warning—Deputy Soles advised Williams to "hold on" and that a dog sniff would be conducted on the vehicle. See J.A. 130; First Opinion 7. As a result, MacMullen was removed from the car and Soles walked Dakota around it. Dakota alerted at the driver's side of the trunk after completing a full circle of the vehicle. The dog's alert was at 12:59:02 a.m.—two minutes and forty seconds after Soles instructed Williams to hold on so that Soles could conduct the dog sniff. Crack cocaine was thereafter found and seized from an unlocked safe in the Hyundai's trunk.

2.

On December 11, 2012, the district court denied the Defendants' ...

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