United States v. Williams
| Decision Date | 12 November 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 18-3995,18-3995 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SLADE A. WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 19a0566n.06
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
Before: MOORE, McKEAGUE, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.
LARSEN, Circuit Judge. Slade Williams pleaded guilty without a plea agreement to receiving and distributing child pornography. The district court sentenced him to 120 months' imprisonment, well below the original Sentencing Guidelines range of 210 to 240 months. The district court also ordered Williams to pay $10,000 in restitution. Williams now challenges the reasonableness of his sentence and the ordered restitution. We AFFIRM both the sentence and the restitution order.
Pursuant to an investigation in California, agents of the Department of Homeland Security seized the cellular phone of Angel Hernandez because it had been used to distribute child pornography. Forensic examination of Hernandez's phone revealed that, via the mobile application Kik Messenger, he had exchanged fifty-three files containing child pornography with someone using the username "The_Blader25." Upon further investigation, federal agents discovered that Williams operated under the "The_Blader25" username. Williams received twenty-nine files from Hernandez (eighteen images and eleven videos) and sent twenty-four files (sixteen images and eight videos). In addition to the files, the agents also discovered twenty-seven pages "of conversation . . . between Williams and Hernandez."
Williams was indicted for receiving and distributing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2). After his arrest, Williams "admitted to previously obtaining child pornography." He pleaded guilty to the charges without a plea agreement. The presentence investigation report (PSR) calculated Williams' total offense level at thirty-seven, which resulted in a Guidelines range of 210 to 240 months.
At sentencing, the district court and the parties agreed with the PSR's total offense level calculation. The district court noted that Williams' base offense level was twenty-two, but the Guidelines called for several enhancements: a two-level increase because the pornographic images at issue depicted prepubescent minors; a five-level increase because Williams distributed child pornography in exchange for valuable consideration (in this case, more child pornography); a four-level increase because the images depicted sadistic, masochistic, or sexually abusive conduct; a five-level increase because Williams possessed more than 600 images1 of child pornography; and finally, a two-level increase because Williams used a computer to receive and distribute those images. With those enhancements, the Guidelines called for an adjusted offense level of forty. The district court then reduced Williams offense level by three levels for acceptance of responsibility, arriving at the PSR's calculated total offense level of thirty-seven. But the districtcourt declined to credit the two-level increase for "the use of the computer" to carry out the offense because "every single case [he had] encountered as a [j]udge in 20 years involved the use of a computer." With that reduction, Williams' Guidelines range was 168 to 210 months (14 to 17.5 years).
Williams argued that the district court should exercise its discretion to vary downward from the Guidelines and instead impose the statutory minimum sentence of five years, see 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), because he was a first-time offender, "has been deaf since birth," and "has a very close and supportive relationship" with his family. The district court disagreed that five years was the appropriate sentence but agreed that even a sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines range—fourteen years—was too long. Instead, the district court imposed a sentence of ten years with five years of supervised release. The district court also ordered Williams to pay $10,000 in restitution to "Violet,"2 one of the children depicted in at least two videos that Williams possessed.
Williams then timely appealed, challenging both the reasonableness of his sentence and the district court's restitution order.
"A criminal sentence must be both procedurally and substantively reasonable." United States v. Parrish, 915 F.3d 1043, 1047 (6th Cir. 2019). A sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court "properly calculate[d] the guidelines range, treat[ed] that range as advisory, consider[ed] the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), refrain[ed] from considering impermissible factors, select[ed] the sentence based on facts that are not clearly erroneous, and adequately explain[ed] why it chose the sentence." United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436, 440 (6th Cir. 2018). A challenge to substantive reasonableness focuses on the length of the sentence,Parrish, 915 F.3d at 1047, particularly whether "the court placed too much weight on some of the § 3553(a) factors and too little on others in sentencing the individual," id. (quoting Rayyan, 885 F.3d at 442). "We review claims of both procedural and substantive unreasonableness for an abuse of discretion," while reviewing the district court's underlying factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. Id.
Williams makes no objection to the trial court's calculation of the Guidelines range—168 to 210 months in prison. Instead, Williams' challenges to both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence center around the district court's selection of the ultimate sentence. That sentence varied downward from the Guidelines range, resulting in a prison sentence of 120 months.
Procedural Reasonableness. In deciding whether, and how much, to vary downward from the Guidelines range, the trial court considered the factors required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The court considered, for example, testimony from both Williams and his mother, letters Williams' family sent on his behalf, Williams' disability, and his lack of prior criminal history. It also considered the nature of the crime—receipt and distribution of "images that brutalize children and torment them . . . so long as the[] images" exist, images that revictimize children every "time they're viewed, downloaded, or shared." He also noted that the Guidelines ranges for this conduct are "pitched very, very high," in part to deter producers and dampen demand. In the end, the district court determined the need to "strike a balance" between the competing considerations.
As one factor in this balance, the district court expressed concern that Williams would be a danger to children. Williams argues that that determination was clearly erroneous, rendering his sentence procedurally unreasonable. In concluding that Williams could be a danger to children, the district court relied on a text exchange between Williams and Hernandez, which we reluctantlyrecite here. After Hernandez and Williams had initially exchanged pornographic images, Hernandez expressed his desire to perform a sex act on the child in the image sent by Williams; the following conversation ensued:
Williams argued at sentencing that he did not mean what he said. His counsel argued that Williams was just trying to "puff the goods," to make himself look more credible to Hernandez. Williams, through his interpreter, agreed, stating that he was "just trying to make a connection," by which he meant that he was "just trying to get more information in tradings [sic] from [Hernandez], not actually do anything." The court listened to these explanations. It considered the fact that there was no evidence that Williams had previously carried out any sexual violence toward children and that his sisters had vouched for his treatment of children. But the court still concluded Williams presented a danger to children:
I've got his own words [in the chat]. Mr. Williams has given an explanation, but if I don't credit that explanation, I'm left with his own words, which has only one explanation that I can discern or has a—a lot of implications or inferences, but there's one pretty direct one . . . .
We cannot say that the district court clearly erred. The district court's factual findings are given considerable deference—we can only overturn them if the record leaves us with a "definite and firm conviction" that they were mistaken. See United States v. Greco, 734 F.3d 441, 449 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Boudreau, 564 F.3d 431, 435 (6th Cir. 2009)). No definite and firm conviction exists here, given the "graphic and vile nature" of the images and videosWilliams possessed (as described by the district court) and the abhorrent nature of the acts Williams said he would like to commit. The district court heard, but was not convinced by, Williams' contrary explanation for the statements. We cannot say that the district court based his sentence on a clearly erroneous fact.3
Substantive Reasonableness. Williams next argues that his claim is substantively unreasonable—"that his sentence was longer than it should have been." United States v. Pyles, 904 F.3d 422, 426 (6th Cir. 2018). "That is a difficult claim to support because we give considerable deference to a district court's decision about the appropriate length of a sentence." Id. (citing Gall v. United...
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