United States v. Williams
| Decision Date | 01 January 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 19 CR 00662-1,19 CR 00662-1 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. NICHOLAS WILLIAMS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
In December 2018, four plainclothes Chicago police officers were driving in two police cars on patrol in the north side of the City. At around mid-day, they pulled alongside Nicholas Williams, who was walking on the sidewalk. As the officers opened their car doors, Williams ran away while clutching his left side. The officers gave chase. Williams dodged around a building security guard (the guard happened to be nearby) and then twice hopped a fence. Eventually, one officer caught up and ordered Williams to the ground. The officer straddled Williams, handcuffed him, and patted him down; a gun was found in Williams's left pocket. When asked, Williams admitted that he did not have a license to carry the gun.
Williams is now charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); R. 1, Indictment.1 Williams moves to suppress the firearm, drugs (which were also found on him), and any post-arrest statements. R. 33, Mot. Suppress at 1. The Court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion, during which only the arrestingofficer testified. R. 64. After the hearing, the parties filed supplemental briefs. For the reasons discussed below, the motion to suppress is denied.
At around 11:45 a.m. on December 8, 2018, Chicago police officers Michael Callahan, William Murphy, Roman Zawada, and Brett Kellam were patrolling Chicago's Near North Side in two cars in the vicinity of the Cabrini-Green Rowhouses, which are part of a Chicago Housing Authority complex. R. 65, Tr. at 27, 29-31. Callahan and Murphy were in the front car; Zawada and Kellam were in the second car following directly behind. Tr. at 51. Both of the police cars were Crown Victorias, which are typical law enforcement vehicles, and both had municipal license plates (including on the front of the cars). Tr. at 59-60. Although the officers were not wearing police uniforms, Callahan wore an outer vest with a police star on it (along with his name and star number), and he also wore a duty belt with a gun and handcuffs. Tr. at 30.
As the officers traveled south along the 900 block of N. Cambridge Avenue, they saw Nicholas Williams walking alone on the sidewalk in the opposite direction. R. 33, Exh. B, Joint Video 1 at 11:48:31 AM.2 Because Williams was by himself, Callahan testified, Williams made an attractive candidate for a field interview; according to Callahan, he typically gets more accurate information when others are not around. Tr. 34-35; R. 33, Exh. A, Arrest Report at 3. The front car pulled to a stop just beyond Williams and the rear car stopped a few feet in front of him. Id. at 11:48:23-35 AM.But as soon as the officers opened their doors to get out, Williams sprinted away from them, running northward down the middle of the street. Tr. at 35:19-23; R. 33, Exh. B, Joint Video 1. Immediately, the officers gave chase on foot. Tr. at 36:16-19.
Just seconds after starting to run, Williams began to make continuous clutching gestures towards the left side pocket of his jacket. R. 33, Exh. B, Joint Video 1 at 11:48:35-42 AM. Officer Callahan testified that, in his experience, this sort of pocket grabbing suggested that Williams was trying to secure an unholstered weapon. Tr. at 35:19-36:15. Based on this behavior, Callahan testified, he believed that Williams was armed. Id. at 36:16-19.
As Williams fled away on the street, he abruptly dodged a Cabrini-Green housing security officer who had run into the street to join the officers' chase. Id. at 81:3-82:3, 54:17-22; R. 33, Exh. B, Joint Video 1 at 11:48:39-43 AM. Williams then veered left into a courtyard within the Chicago Housing Authority complex, with Callahan and Zawada pursuing close behind. Joint Video 1 at 11:48:45-54. From there, Williams scaled a security fence along the west side of the complex, and then ran south along the other side of the fence, parallel to the complex. Tr. 38:24-39:4. Callahan continued chasing Williams along the opposite (internal) side of the fence, running in parallel, until Williams scaled back over the same fence further south. Id. at 39:11-23. Upon Williams's reemergence, Callahan caught up, identified himself as police, and ordered Williams to "get on the ground." Id. at 39:20-25. Williams complied. Id. at 39:24-40:2. As Williams lay down, Callahan heard a "metallic clink" that sounded"like dropping metal on concrete." Id. at 40:11-20. That sound "reconfirmed [Callahan's] suspicions" that Williams was carrying a gun in his jacket pocket. Id. at 42:3-6.
Because no other officers had yet arrived on the scene, Officer Callahan "climbed on top of [Williams]" and placed him in handcuffs to perform a protective pat-down for weapons. Id. at 42:7-19. That search revealed an object in Williams's left pocket that Callahan believed to be a handgun. Id. at 42:18-21. Using gloves, Callahan retrieved a Glock 22 semi-automatic pistol from Williams's pocket, loaded with an extended magazine containing 22 rounds of live munition. Id. at 45:1-5; R. 33, Exh. A, Arrest Report at 3. Callahan then asked Williams whether he possessed a concealed-carry card. Id. at 45:1-24; 92:22-25; 107:25-108:3. Williams replied that he did not. Id. No Miranda warning was provided. Id. at 92:22-25;. Officer Zawada—who by now had joined the encounter—next asked Williams whether he had an FOID card, but Williams again replied that he did not. Id. at 45:1-24; 92:22-25; 107:25-108:3. Callahan then told Williams that he was now under arrest. Id. at 45:25-46:6; 47:9-12. A later custodial search of Williams uncovered 22 bags of crack cocaine on his person. Id. at 47:18-23. It is not disputed that lab testing later revealed the substance to be 2.5 grams of cocaine base (that is, crack cocaine). R. 41 at 3.
Williams argues that the seizure and search violated the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures. Even so, "an investigatory stop, which constitutes only a limited intrusion into an individual's privacy, is reasonable, and therefore permissible, if the officer making the stop is able to point to specific and articulable facts that give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." United States v. Mays, 819 F.3d 951, 955 (7th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up).3 Reasonable suspicion requires "more than a hunch," but need not rise to the more-demanding standard of probable cause. Gentry v. Sevier, 597 F.3d 838, 845 (7th Cir. 2010). "When determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion, courts examine the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the stop, including the experience of the officer and the behavior and characteristics of the suspect." Mays, 819 F.3d at 955 (cleaned up). The evaluation of the circumstances is "based on common-sensical judgments and inferences about human behavior." United States v. Baskin, 401 F.3d 788, 791 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000)); see also United States v. Patton, 705 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 2013) ().
In the course of an investigatory stop, it is also possible that "[p]olice restraint may be so intrusive that, while not technically an arrest, it becomes tantamount toan arrest requiring probable cause." United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004, 1016 (7th Cir. 2011). A police officer possesses probable cause if at the time the "facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge ... are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense." Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979). In ascertaining whether an officer has probable cause, a court must consider the totality of the circumstances from the perspective of a reasonable person in the position of the officer. Chelios v. Heavener, 520 F.3d 678, 686 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Breit, 429 F.3d 725, 728 (7th Cir. 2005).
Williams offers several arguments for suppressing the evidence: (1) the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the purported stop of Williams in the first instance; (2) even after starting to flee, Williams did nothing to generate reasonable suspicion for a seizure; (3) after Williams stopped fleeing, officers still lacked reasonable suspicion and probable cause to seize and to search him. R. 33 at 2-3. In addressing these arguments, because the Fourth Amendment "only protects against unreasonable searches and seizures," Mays, 819 F.3d at 955, the Court's "first task is to ascertain the point[s] at which Fourth Amendment concerns became implicated," United States v. Ford, 333 F.3d 839, 844 (7th Cir. 2003), and next to assess whether any violations occurred.
Williams first argues that the police officers violated the Fourth Amendment by approaching him without reasonable suspicion. R. 33 at 17. But reasonable suspicion is only required when a suspect has been seized. United States v. Douglass, 467 F.3d 621, 623 (7th Cir. 2006). A seizure occurs within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment "if, in the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would not feel free to disregard the police and move along." United States v. Howell, 958 F.3d 589, 597 (7th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). So an "officer can approach individuals on the street or in other public places and put questions to them if they are willing to listen" without implicating the Fourth Amendment. Gentry, 597 F.3d...
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