United States v. Williams, CASE NO. 4:06-cr-63-RH-GRJ-3
| Decision Date | 16 August 2012 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 4:06-cr-63-RH-GRJ-3 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent, v. MARCOLYNN GERMAINE WILLIAMS, Petitioner |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
This matter is before the Court on Doc. 133, a motion to vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The motion stems from Defendant's convictions for conspiracy to distribute and to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(ii), 846; distribution of a mixture and substance containing cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C); possession with the intent to distribute marijuana and a mixture and substance containing cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), (b)(1)(C); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C §§ 922(g), 924(a)(2).
The Court sentenced Defendant to 108 months' imprisonment. (Doc. 84.) In the instant motion, Defendant contends that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. Defendant also claims that his convictions and sentence violate the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Government has filed a response in opposition to the motion. (Doc. 140.) Defendant has filed a reply to the response. (Doc. 141.) Upondue consideration of Defendant's motion to vacate, memorandum in support, the Government's response, and Defendant's reply, the undersigned recommends that the motion to vacate be denied.1
The charges against Defendant stem from a series of controlled buys, in which an informant working for the Tallahassee Police Department purchased cocaine from Defendant. See United States v. Williams, 259 F. App'x 281, 282 (11th Cir. 2007) (affirming convictions). Police searched Defendant's residence and discovered drugs, drug paraphernalia, and a loaded firearm. Id. The police also found drugs in Defendant's vehicle. Id. After his arrest, Defendant admitted to the police that he had been selling cocaine for the past five years and that he kept a firearm for protection. Id.
At trial, Defendant was found guilty of conspiracy to distribute cocaine, distribution of cocaine and marijuana, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Defendant was acquitted of the charge of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C §§ 924(c)(1). Defendant had also been charged with distribution of more than 500 grams of cocaine, but pursuant to a special interrogatory, the jury found him guilty of distribution of less than 500 grams of cocaine.
The Presentence Investigation Report (PSI) calculated a total offense level of 32, adjusted to 34 because Defendant was a career criminal, and a criminal history category of VI, also based on career criminal status. Id. at 285. Defendant's counsel filed written objections to the calculation of the drug weight for which Defendant washeld responsible, the two-level enhancement for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug crime, and the categorization of Defendant as a career criminal. (Doc. 77.) She also requested clarification as to whether the PSI's two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice related to Defendant's in-court testimony or out-of-court statements to police.
The Court concluded that Defendant was not a career offender, but overruled the objections to drug quantity and the firearm enhancement. Williams, 259 F. App'x at 286. The Court also stated that the two-level obstruction of justice enhancement was justified based on Defendant's "willfully false testimony" at trial regarding a drug deal he had made without the government's knowledge, while simultaneously acting as a confidential informant. (Trans. Vol. 7, at 30.) The Court calculated a total offense level of 30 and a criminal history category of II, for a guideline imprisonment range of 108 to 135 months. (Doc. 87.) Defendant was sentenced on February 16, 2007 to a 108-month term of imprisonment, followed by six years of supervised release. (Doc. 84.) Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence to the Eleventh Circuit. See United States v. Williams, 259 F. App'x 281 (11th Cir. 2007). On appeal, Defendant unsuccessfully argued that the government had committed a Jencks Act violation in failing to disclose one of the controlled buys of cocaine, and that the district court had violated his Sixth Amendment rights in considering acquitted conduct when it calculated his sentence.
Defendant filed the instant motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on April 13, 2009. Defendant contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance (1) for failing to warn Defendant prior to histestimony at trial that he could receive a sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice, if he were found guilty; and (2) for cumulative errors before and during trial, at sentencing, and on appeal. Defendant also claims that his convictions and sentence violate the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
A prisoner is entitled to relief under § 2255 if the court imposed a sentence that (1) violated the Constitution or laws of the United States, (2) exceeded the court's jurisdiction, (3) exceeded the maximum authorized by law, or (4) is otherwise subject to collateral attack. 28 U.S.C. § 2255; United States v. Phillips, 225 F.3d 1198, 1199 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Walker, 198 F.3d 811, 813 n.5 (11th Cir. 1999). Collateral review is not a substitute for direct appeal, and therefore the grounds for collateral attack on final judgments pursuant to § 2255 are extremely limited. "Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 'is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for that narrow compass of other injury that could not have been raised in direct appeal and would, if condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice.'" Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Further, disposition of a claim of error on direct appeal precludes further review in a subsequent collateral proceeding. See, e.g., Mills v. United States, 36 F.3d 1052, 1056 (11th Cir. 1994).
To prevail on a constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate (1) that his counsel's performance was below an objective and reasonable professional norm, and (2) that he was prejudiced by this inadequacy. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). The court may dispose of theclaim if a defendant fails to carry his burden of proof on either the performance or the prejudice prong. Id. at 697. The court need not address the adequacy of counsel's performance when a defendant fails to make a sufficient showing of prejudice. Id.; see also Tafero v. Wainright, 796 F.2d 1314, 1319 (11th Cir. 1986).
With regard to the performance prong of Strickland, a defendant must provide factual support for his contentions that counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient. Smith v. White, 815 F.2d 1401, 1406-07 (11th Cir. 1987). The court must consider counsel's performance in light of all of the circumstances at that time and indulge in a strong presumption that counsel's conduct fell within the wide range of reasonably professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90. To show counsel's performance was unreasonable, a defendant must establish that "no competent counsel would have taken the action that his counsel did take." Grayson v. Thompson, 257 F.3d 1194, 1216 (11th Cir. 2001) (emphasis omitted).
The prejudice prong of Strickland focuses on whether the trial was unreliable or fundamentally unfair due to counsel's deficient performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Unreliability or unfairness is not established if counsel's assistance did not deprive the defendant of a constitutionally protected right. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 393 n.17 (2000). To show prejudice, a defendant must show more than simply that counsel's unreasonable conduct might have had "some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. Instead, a defendant must show a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694.
Defendant claims that his attorney was ineffective because she failed to inform him that if he testified at trial and was not believed by the jury, he could receive a two-level enhancement of his sentencing guidelines for obstruction of justice. The government has not submitted an affidavit from the attorney disclosing whether or not she informed Defendant of the risk of a sentencing enhancement, and there is no other evidence on the record that supports a finding that Defendant was or was not so informed. For the purposes of this analysis, then, the Court assumes that Defendant's counsel did not inform him that he could receive a sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice if his trial testimony was not believed. Even with such an assumption, Defendant fails to carry his burden of showing that his counsel's performance was deficient or that he suffered prejudice as a result of any deficiency.
The obstruction of justice enhancement was based primarily—though not exclusively—on Defendant's conflicting testimony regarding a purported debt of $1800. The PSI noted that Defendant had been cooperating with police, making controlled buys of cocaine from his co-defendant Richard Bennett. (PSI, at 6.) In August 2006, Defendant told the Tallahassee Police Department investigator with whom he had been working that he owed Mr. Bennett $1800, which he had borrowed to pay his bills. Id. Defendant later confessed that he had made a cocaine purchase without informing law enforcement, and had...
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