United States v. Williams, CRIMINAL NO. 4:09-CR-346
| Decision Date | 09 November 2012 |
| Docket Number | CRIMINAL NO. 4:09-CR-346 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JERMAINE WILLIAMS |
(Judge Conner)
On October 4, 2012, the court held a detention hearing to determine whether Jermaine Williams ("Williams"), should be detained or released pending his sentencing hearing. The court determined that, for exceptional reasons, Williams's detention pending sentencing is not mandated by statute. This memorandum expands upon the court's ratio decidendi set forth on the record at the hearing.
On October 2, 2012, Williams pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute or possess with the intent to distribute 280 grams or more of cocaine base under 21 U.S.C. § 846. The court held a detention hearing on October 4, 2012, to determine whether Williams should be detained or released pending his sentencing hearing, which is tentatively scheduled for on or about January 11, 2013. At the detention hearing, the government requested immediate detention, arguing that such action is mandated by 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2). Defense counsel asserted that the court may release Williams pending sentencing upon a finding of "exceptional reasons" pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c). In rebuttal, the government asserted that § 3145(c) provides such discretion only to the circuit court of appeals.
In support of Williams's "exceptional reasons" for release pending sentencing, defense counsel presented the following factual background, which the government does not dispute and which the court therefore adopts for purposes of the instant matter. Williams and his wife had a baby a little less than a year ago. As a result of complications during childbirth, Williams's wife requires surgery to repair an umbilical hernia. After surgery, Mrs. Williams will require six weeks of convalescence before she will be able to return to work. During this period of convalescence, Williams's employment income will be the sole means of support for his wife and their three young children. If Williams were incarcerated, his family would not be able to pay for their present residence, and they would become homeless. Defendant's Exhibit 1 is correspondence from a nurse practitioner on behalf of the Rochester General Health System, Department of Surgery, which confirms the medical necessity of Mrs. Williams's surgery. Further complicating their domestic difficulties, the couple has a 14-year-old-son with severe ADHD who is currently in counseling. Mr. and Mrs. Williams have endeavored to place their son into the Big Brother Big Sister program in anticipation of Mr. Williams's incarceration, but these efforts have not yet succeeded.
The court has had the benefit of discussions with the United States Probation Office concerning Mr. Williams's conduct during pre-trial supervision. From all accounts, Williams's conduct under supervision has been exemplary. Williams's Probation Officer confirmed that Williams has been on supervised release, including electronic monitoring, for two years without a single violation.He has communicated regularly with the Probation Officer. He has attended all court proceedings without incident despite residing a considerable distance from the courthouse. In addition, as noted, Williams is gainfully employed.
Eligibility for release pending sentence or appeal is based on the requirements of the Bail Reform Act of 1984. Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II, § 203(a), 98 Stat. 1976 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3156 (1984)). The current detention language and "exceptional reasons" provisions at issue in this case were added to the Bail Reform Act as an amendment to the 1990 Crime Bill. See Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 902, 104 Stat. 4826, 4827 (1990).
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2), the court must detain a person found guilty of certain offenses pending sentencing. One of those offenses is "an offense for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed in the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C § 801 et seq)," including a conspiracy to distribute or possess with the intent to distribute 280 grams or more of cocaine base under 21 U.S.C. § 846 and § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(C). Under this provision, the court may order the person's release pending sentencing if (1) "the judicial officer finds there is a substantial likelihood that a motion for acquittal or new trial will be granted" or "an attorney for the Government has recommended that no sentence of imprisonment be imposed on the person;" and (2) "the judicial officer finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee orpose a danger to any other person or the community." 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2)(A) and (B).
Williams's guilty plea includes a waiver of his right to appeal, so there is virtually no likelihood that Williams will be granted an acquittal or a new trial. It is undisputed that the government will recommend a sentence of imprisonment. Therefore, the court would be required to order Williams's detention pursuant to § 3143(a)(2) in the absence of additional statutory authority. However, 18 U.S.C. § 3145 provides as follows:
(emphasis added). Thus, 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) explicitly provides that a "judicial officer" may release a person subject to detention pending sentencing if the court finds the following circumstances:
Id. The burden of proof with respect to both circumstances appears to be clear and convincing evidence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a) () and 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) ().
Application of § 3145(c) to district courts sitting in original judgment of detention pending sentencing is problematic in that previous applications have resulted in a split of authority, albeit a rather lopsided one. The First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appealhave all indicated that district courts may release a person for "exceptional reasons" subject to § 3145(c). Most have done so with perfunctory analysis. See United States v. Christman, 596 F.3d 870 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Garcia, 340 F.3d 1013, 1014 n.1 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Jones, 979 F.2d 804 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Herrera-Soto, 961 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Rodriguez, 50 F. Supp. 2d 717 (N.D. Ohio 1999); United States v. Devinna, 5 F. Supp. 2d 872 (E.D. Cal. 1998). Several circuits merely accepted, without further discussion, a district court's use of § 3145(c)'s "exceptional reasons" analysis. See United States v. Mostrom, 11 F.3d 93 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Weiner, No. 92-1708, 1992 WL 180697 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. DiSomma, 951 F.2d 494 (2d Cir. 1991).
Many of these decisions rely heavily upon United States v. Carr, 947 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1991).1 In Carr, the court determined that "[w]e see no reason why Congress would have limited this means of relief to reviewing courts." 947 F.2d at 1240. The court noted that although the title of § 3145(c) is "appeal from a release or detention order," it unequivocally states that a "judicial officer" may order release for "exceptional reasons" under the provision. Id. The court explained that Congress added this sentence to § 3145(c) at the same time that it added the mandatory detention provisions of § 3143(a)(2) and (b)(2). Id. (citing Crime ControlAct of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 902, 104 Stat. 4826, 4827 (1990)). The Carr court also noted that §§ 3143(a)(2) and (b)(2) use the term "judicial officer" to refer to a judge initially ordering a mandatory detention. Id. Consequently, the Carr court remanded the case to the district court to determine whether there were "exceptional reasons" warranting release of the defendant pending sentencing.
Similarly, in United States v. Goforth, 546 F.3d 712 (4th Cir. 2008), the Fourth Circuit held that the language of § 3145(c)...
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