United States v. Williams
| Decision Date | 11 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | 91-cr-1219-1 (DRH),16-cv-3355 (DRH) |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. CRAIG WILLIAMS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
BREON PEACE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Andrew D. Grubin, Esq. on the Motion to Vacate
Adam R. Toporovsky, Esq. on the Motion to Reduce Sentence
Craig Williams, pro se
Attorneys for Defendant/Petitioner on the Motion to Vacate
Allegra Glashausser, Esq.
DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP
Attorneys for Defendant/Petitioner on the Motion to Reduce Sentence
John Gleeson, Esq.
Marissa R. Taney, Esq.
Lauren Dolecki Kober, Esq.
Johanna-Sophie Dikkers, Esq.
Presently the before the Court are Defendant/Petitioner Craig Williams's motions (i) to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) and Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), and (ii) to reduce sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).[1] For the reasons stated below, Williams's motion to vacate is denied, and his motion to reduce sentence is granted to the extent that his term of imprisonment is reduced to 40 years.
Between May 1, 1991 and October 1, 1991, Craig Williams and his coconspirators committed multiple armed post office and bank robberies, often engaging in extremely threatening and brutal conduct. By way of one example, during the robbery of the European Bank on Jamaica Avenue in Brooklyn, New York on June 27, 1991, the bank manger advised coconspirator Campbell that she was unable to immediately open the vault as instructed due to a fifteen minute timer. In an effort to cure that perceived problem, Williams told Campbell “to ‘blow [her] f****** head off.'” (Presentence Investigation Report dated Oct. 18, 1993, ¶ 38).
Williams's disregard for human life is further evidenced by his conduct concomitant with his arrest on October 10, 1991. When agents pulled over the vehicle he was driving, he bolted from the car and fled on foot. “After being pursued by the arresting agents for approximately [one] mile, . . . Williams shot a pursuing agent three times, once in the stomach and twice in the leg.” (Id. ¶ 26). Fortunately, the agent survived.[2] Williams himself was hit once during the exchange of gunfire and was thereupon taken into custody.
On July 29, 1993, after a three-month trial, a jury convicted Williams of nineteen counts: conspiracy to commit bank and postal robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count 1); postal robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2114 (Count 12); armed bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (Counts 14, 20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30); attempted murder, 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (Count 31); assault on a United States Deputy Marshall (Count 32); and use of a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (Counts 13, 15, 21, 23, 25, 27, 29, and 33).
On May 11, 1994, this Court sentenced him to 160 years and 8 months in prison, followed by 5 years of supervised release. The Second Circuit affirmed Williams's conviction and sentence on April 30, 1996. United States v. Williams, 101 F.3d 683 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied 519 U.S. 900 (1996).
Williams moved for leave to file a successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition, consisting of the instant motion to vacate, on June 21, 2016. [DE 705]. The Second Circuit granted leave on April 9, 2021. Motion Order at 2, Williams v. United States, No. 16-2067 (2d Cir. Apr. 9, 2021) [ECF 53] ( ). The Federal Defenders filed a memorandum in support of Williams's motion on May 26, 2021, [DE 780], and the Government responded on June 25, 2021, [DE 784].
Williams requested the warden of FCI Butner, North Carolina file a motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). (See Def. Reduce Sent. Mem. at 3 [DE 793-1]). When thirty days elapsed without a motion filed, counsel for Williams brought it directly to this Court on July 13, 2021. (Id.). The Government responded on December 18, 2021. . Williams's counsel replied on October 11, 2021. .
The Court first addresses Williams's (I) motion to vacate followed by his (II) motion to reduce sentence.
Williams's successive § 2255 petition moves the Court to vacate seven of his eight § 924(c) convictions, for which he was sentenced to 60 months under Count 13 and a total of 1440 months under Counts 15, 21, 23, 25, 27, and 29, alleging that the cumulative consecutive sentences are unconstitutional. Specifically, he argues that the predicate offenses-one for postal robbery and six for bank robbery-are not “crimes of violence, ” in that they do not require physical force necessary under § 924(c)(3)(A)'s “Elements Clause” and that the Supreme Court in United States v. Davis, 139 S.Ct. 2319 (2019), held § 924(c)(3)(B)'s “Residual Clause” void for vagueness.
The Court begins its analysis by explaining the steps necessary to assess the constitutionality of these § 924(c) convictions. Then, it applies those steps first to the § 924(c) conviction predicated on postal robbery and second to the six § 924(c) convictions predicated on bank robbery.
Section 924(c) of the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (“ACCA”) mandates an enhanced sentenced for a defendant using or carrying a firearm during, or possessing a firearm in furtherance of, a “crime of violence, ” defined as:
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3). Following United States v. Davis, § 924(c)'s enhancements trigger only from offenses fitting the criteria in Subsection (A), the “Elements Clause.” 139 S.Ct. 2319 (2019) (). Accordingly, a felony “offense is a crime of violence, for ACCA purposes, [only] if it has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” United States v. Figueroa, 2021 WL 1191615, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Physical force” in this context connotes “violent force” or “force capable of causing physical pain or injury.” Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010).
To assess whether the predicate offenses underlying Williams's § 924(c) convictions are “crimes of violence, ” the Court must identify their elements. That entails analyzing the extent to which the predicate offense statutes are divisible. An indivisible statute “creates only a single crime, ” even if it “spells out various factual ways of committing some component of the offense”; a divisible statute lists its elements “in the alternative and, in doing so, creates a separate crime associated with each alternative element.” Harbin v. Sessions, 860 F.3d 58, 64 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Mathis v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 2243, 2249 (2016)).
To determine whether an indivisible statute's elements reflect a “crime of violence, ” courts take a “categorical approach.” Id. Under this approach, the court “identif[ies] ‘the minimum criminal conduct necessary for conviction” under the statute by analyzing “how the law defines the [predicate] offense” and not “how an individual offender might have committed it on a particular occasion.” Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 141 (2008); United States v. Hill, 890 F.3d 51, 55 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Acosta, 470 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam)). If “reality, logic, and precedent” illustrate “‘a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility,' that the statute at issue could be applied to conduct that does not constitute a crime of violence, ” then § 924(c) does not apply. Id. at 56 (quoting Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007)). Otherwise, the predicate offense reflects a crime of violence, and § 924(c) applies.
To determine whether a divisible statute's elements reflect a “crime of violence, ” courts take a “modified categorical approach.” Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 260 (2013). Because divisible statutes create separate crimes, a court first “looks to a limited class of documents, ” e.g., the indictment, “to determine” which of the divisible statute's “crime[s], with what elements, a defendant was convicted of.” Mathis, 136 S.Ct. at 2249 (); Descamps, 570 U.S. at 257 (same). Once determined, a court applies the categorical approach to that crime. Mathis, 136 S.Ct. at 2249.
Williams contends a 18 U.S.C. § 2114 postal robbery conviction “no longer qualifies as a ‘crime of violence'” under § 924(c)(3)(A)'s Elements Clause because it does not necessarily require “either (1) the presence of violent physical force or (2) the intentional employment of such force.” Def. Vacate Mem. at 5 [DE 705]. Section 2114(a) reads:
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