United States v. Wilson
| Decision Date | 09 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 19-3471,19-3471 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ADAM DARIUS WILSON, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit) |
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 20a0523n.06
When Andrew Wilson filed the latest appeal of his sentence in 2019, this time under the First Step Act of 2018, he had been continuously incarcerated for eighteen years. After seven years in state prison, he is now serving a sentence of nearly twenty-two years following his guilty plea to possession with intent to distribute controlled substances and being a felon in possession of a firearm. He appeals from the district court's order partly denying relief under the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222 (Dec. 21, 2018) and alleges that the court abused its discretion by reducing his term of supervised release but not his sentence. He raises the following issues: (1) his sentencing had been subject to the mandatory Sentencing Guidelines pre-Booker; (2) he had been incorrectly classified as a career offender at sentencing; and (3) the district court failed to consider his rehabilitation efforts. We reverse the district court's order denying Wilson's petition for relief, and remand for resentencing.
On May 11, 2001, Andrew Wilson pled guilty to the following charges: Count 1, possession with intent to distribute 174.18 grams of cocaine base ("crack" cocaine), in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A); Count 2, possession with intent to distribute 499.44 grams of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C); and Count 3, being a felon in possession of ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Under the 2000 edition of the Sentencing Guidelines, Wilson's base offense level was 34, based on the amount of crack and cocaine. He received a two-level enhancement for possession of a firearm. Wilson had nine criminal-history points, but his two prior felony convictions resulted in his designation as a career offender under USSG §4B1.1, increasing his offense level to 37 and criminal-history category to VI. He received a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under USSG §§ 3E1.1(a) and (b).
After application of enhancements and reductions, Wilson's offense level was 34. According to his Presentence Investigation Report, his statutory sentencing range under 21 U.S.C. § 841 was twenty years to life, while his Guidelines range was 262-327 months. Without application of a career-offender enhancement, his offense level would have been 33 with criminal-history category IV, which would have resulted in a markedly lower Guidelines range of 188-235 months. On August 27, 2001, the district court sentenced him to the low end of the Guidelines range: 262 months, and to ten years of supervised release.
Wilson began serving his federal sentence in 2008, after seven years in state prison. On June 7, 2010, Wilson filed a pro se motion in federal district court to correct a clerical error in a judgment, alleging that the sentencing district court had erred by not requiring his federal sentence to run concurrently with his state sentence. That motion was denied.
On September 4, 2018, Wilson filed another pro se motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Wilson argued that under Amendment 782 (adopted Nov. 1, 2014) to USSG § 1B1.10, which lowered the base offense level in the drug-quantity tables in USSG § 2D1.1, his sentence should be reduced by applying offense level 32. He also argued that under Amendment 788 (adopted Nov. 1, 2014), the new lower Guidelines may be applied retroactively. The district court held that Amendment 782 was inapplicable to Wilson, because it reduced the base offense level but not his ultimate offense level, which was determined by his career-offender status. Thus, Wilson's Guidelines range remained unchanged.
In denying Wilson's motion, the district court cited United States v. Purdue, 572 F.3d 288, 293 (6th Cir. 2009) to support a statement that "[i]t is clear precedent in the Sixth Circuit that Wilson's classification as a career offender renders him ineligible for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based on the retroactive amendments to the [Sentencing Guidelines] regarding crack cocaine." However, this court has since held that "[t]he text of the First Step Act contains no freestanding exception for career offenders," and United States v. Beamus, 943 F.3d 789, 791-92 (6th Cir. 2019).
On March 7, 2019, Wilson filed a motion to reduce his sentence under Section 404 of the First Step Act, claiming that his statutory minimum term was reduced by the First Step Act from twenty years to ten years and requesting a resentencing hearing to consider the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The district court agreed that, under the First Step Act, his mandatory minimum sentence would have been reduced from twenty to ten years, the maximum sentence would have remained as life imprisonment, and the term of supervised release would have beenreduced from ten to eight years. The district court also determined, however, that Wilson's sentence was based on the Guideline range corresponding to his total offense level and criminal-history category and was unaffected by the statutory minimum. In a three-page opinion, the district court mentioned, without elaborating, its justifications for the sentence "by a variety of considerations previously set forth in the plea agreement and discussed at Mr. Wilson's original sentencing, including the nature of the crime, his prior convictions, the need to protect the public, and the amount of drugs involved in this case," as well as the statutory maximum, and concluded that no reduction in sentence was warranted. However, the district court reduced the duration of Wilson's supervised release from ten to eight years under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) Section 2 of the Fair Sentencing Act and made retroactive by the First Step Act.
Wilson appealed timely, alleging that the district court abused its discretion by not considering that Wilson (1) had been sentenced under mandatory Guidelines; (2) had been incorrectly classified as a career offender at the time of his original sentencing; and (3) had shown post-sentencing rehabilitation.
Although neither party challenges this court's jurisdiction, we have an independent duty to ensure that we may review Wilson's appeal. The general appellate-jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, gives circuit courts jurisdiction over "all final decisions of the district courts of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1291. But 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) permits the defendant to file a notice of appeal of a final sentence in only four circumstances:
18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). We have previously held that the limitations imposed by § 3742(a) apply not only to regular appeals of a sentence but also to some post-judgment requests to modify a sentence, including those made under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(f) and those made following changes to the Sentencing Guidelines that are reviewed on appeal under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). See United States v. Smithers, 960 F.3d 339, 343 (6th Cir. 2020); United States v. Bowers, 615 F.3d 715, 720-22 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Moran, 325 F.3d 790, 792-93 (6th Cir. 2003). In other words, "a district court 'impose[s] a new sentence' even when it engages in a limited modification or reduction of an existing sentence—not just when it conducts a plenary resentencing." United States v. Foreman, 958 F.3d 506, 511 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Bowers, 615 F.3d at 719). But under Bowers, "sentence reductions under § 3582(c)(2) and Rule 35(b) cannot be reviewed for reasonableness under § 3742(a)(1)." Foreman, 958 F.3d at 513.
While our precedent does not fully address the impact of § 3742(a) restrictions on First Step Act appeals, after the parties completed briefing in this case, we held that § 3742(a) establishes a non-jurisdictional limit on appellate review and not an exception to general appellate jurisdiction under § 1291. United States v. Marshall, 954 F.3d 823, 829 (6th Cir. 2020); see also Foreman, 958 F.3d at 513. That is, § 3742(a) is a "'mandatory claim-processing rule or a mandatory limit on our authority to grant a certain form of relief." Marshall, 954 F.3d at 826 (quoting Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1849 (2019)). Such rules Ibid. (quoting Fort Bend, 139 S. Ct. at 1848-49). Additionally, we do not have an obligation to raise mandatory...
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