United States v. Wilson
Decision Date | 31 May 1915 |
Docket Number | 301. |
Citation | 225 F. 82 |
Parties | UNITED STATES v. WILSON. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee |
Hubert F. Fisher, U.S. Dist. Atty., and W. D. Kyser, U.S. Asst Dist. Atty., both of Memphis, Tenn.
Clarence Friedman, of Memphis, Tenn., for defendant.
The defendant was indicted under the act of Congress, approved December 17, 1914, known as the Harrison Anti-Narcotic Law, and arraigned, pleaded not guilty, and was tried by a jury. There are three counts in the indictment. The district attorney recommended a verdict of not guilty under the first and third counts. The jury found the defendant guilty under the second count.
The case is now before me upon a motion for a new trial. Several grounds are assigned, but I shall consider only those based upon the proposition that the second count charges no offense, and that none was proven. The others are overruled.
The second count charges the defendant with having violated the eighth section of the act, which is as follows:
It was admitted, at the trial, that the defendant had at her house, in her possession and under her control, an opium pipe and an outfit necessary for smoking purposes, including a small quantity of opium prepared for the pipe, at the time charged in the indictment. The defendant testified in her own behalf that she had for several years been an addict to opium smoking, and that the opium prepared for smoking found in her possession was obtained by her from a Chinaman, and that she had it for her own personal use and consumption; that she never sold, gave away, nor dealt in it in any form, except to buy and smoke it. This evidence was uncontradicted, and presents the question, whether it is an offense under the act, for a person to have in his or her possession any of the drugs named in the act for personal use. If it is an offense, Congress has not in terms so declared, and it must be worked out by a construction of the language of the act. It is a criminal statute, and must be strictly construed. Such portions of the act as are pertinent to the inquiry must be considered. The first section is as follows:
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