United States v. Wilson, CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 14–cr–209–1 & –2

CourtUnited States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Pennsylvania)
Citation216 F.Supp.3d 566
Docket NumberCRIMINAL ACTION NO. 14–cr–209–1 & –2
Parties UNITED STATES of America v. Marquis WILSON, Malcom Moore.
Decision Date27 October 2016

Salvatore L. Astolfi, U.S. Attorney's Office, Philadelphia, PA, for United States of America.

Alan J. Tauber, Lindy & Tauber, Patricia McKinney, McKinney & George, Philadelphia, PA, for Marquis Wilson, Malcom Moore.

OPINION

Legrome D. Davis, J.

I. Introduction

On April 24, 2014, a grand jury returned an indictment against Marquis Wilson and Malcom Moore alleging one count of conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery, two counts of armed bank robbery, and two counts of using a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. Indictment (Doc. No. 27). The charges arise out of two armed robberies of Wells Fargo bank branches in November 2013. Id. During the course of investigating these robberies, both state and federal law enforcement separately obtained cell site location information for Wilson's cellular phone. Gov't's Omnibus Resp. (Doc. No. 165), at 3. The defendants were arrested on state warrants in January 2014, and the case was subsequently adopted by federal authorities. Gov't's Omnibus Resp., at 5.

After the defendants' initial appearance in May 2014, Min. Entries (Doc. Nos. 41 and 43), both defendants requested continuances in order to prepare for trial, as well as to negotiate with the government about a possible plea agreement. Moore's Mot. to Continue Trial (Doc No. 57); Wilson's Mot. to Continue Trial (Doc. No. 72). These negotiations eventually proved successful; the government and the defendants agreed to plea agreements under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) in which the government would dismiss one of the firearms charges—reducing the applicable mandatory minimum by twenty-five years—and Wilson and Moore would be sentenced to seventeen and fifteen years, respectively. Moore and Wilson's Plea Agreements (Doc. Nos. 86 and 89). A change of plea hearing was held in April 2015, and the Court accepted both defendants' guilty pleas. Min. Entry (Doc. No. 88). Unbeknownst to the Court, the agreement between the government and the defendants was a package plea agreement—both defendants had to plead guilty for the offer to be valid. Gov't's Omnibus Resp., at 20.

Two months after the entry of the guilty pleas, Wilson filed a pro se motion to withdraw his plea agreement and to replace his counsel. Wilson's Pro Se Mot. to Withdraw Guilty Plea and Removal of Counsel (Doc. No. 95). The Court granted Wilson's request to replace counsel and appointed new counsel. July 29, 2015, Order (Doc. No. 99). New counsel then raised the failure of the government to disclose the package plea agreement, and the Court issued a briefing schedule to allow all parties to litigate the issue. See Sept. 18, 2015, Order (Doc. No. 102). But before briefing could be completed, Moore requested new counsel, and then Wilson requested new counsel for the second time. Orders Replacing Counsel (Doc. Nos. 109 and 110). After new counsel was appointed for both defendants, Moore also sought to withdraw his guilty plea. Moore's Pro Se Mot. to Withdraw Guilty Plea (Doc. No. 119). The Court allowed both defendants to withdraw their pleas in April 2015. Orders Granting Mots. To Withdraw Pleas (Doc. Nos. 134 and 135).

After the pleas were withdrawn, the newly appointed defense lawyers requested a delay to prepare for trial, and so trial was set for—and in fact commenced on—September 26, 2016. Notice of Hearing (Doc Nos. 139 and 140); Min. Entry (Doc. No. 184). In July 2016, the defendants filed a number of pretrial motions, and the Court permitted the defendants to join in each other's motions. The defendants' pretrial motions included a motion to suppress evidence obtained from a car stop (Doc. Nos. 143 and 160), a motion to dismiss the indictment (Doc. No. 142), a motion to dismiss Counts Three and Five of the Indictment (Doc. No. 159), a motion to sever the defendants (Doc. No. 149), and a motion to suppress cell site location information (Doc. No. 161). The Court denied these motions in a September 20, 2016, Order (Doc. No. 182). Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law for the car stop motion have been issued separately. This opinion sets forth the reasons for the Court's denial of the remaining motions (Doc. Nos. 142, 149, 159, and 161).

II. Dismissal of Indictment

Moore, joined by Wilson, moved to dismiss the indictment. Def. Moore's Am. Mot. to Dismiss Indictment ("Am. Mot. to Dismiss Indictment") (Doc. No. 142). The defendants argue the indictment should be dismissed because (a) the package plea agreement was coercive and violated their rights under the Due Process Clause and United States v. Hodge , 412 F.3d 479, 491 (3d Cir. 2005) ; (b) the government committed prosecutorial misconduct that interfered with the defendants' relationships with their attorneys, in violation of their Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights; and (c) their right to a speedy trial under both the Sixth Amendment and the Speedy Trial Act was violated. On September 20, 2016, this Court denied the motion.

A. Package Plea Agreement

Dismissal of the indictment is not warranted as a result of the package plea agreement. The defense did not present any credible evidence of specific incidents of coercion. Nor does the fact that the defendants' plea agreements were linked together in a package plea agreement establish coercion, as package plea agreements are not inherently coercive and do not violate Due Process. The only valid issue raised by the defendants with regard to the plea is the parties' failure to inform the Court that the plea agreements in this case were linked, in violation of United States v. Hodge. But the defendants have already received the remedy they were due for that violation—the withdrawal of their guilty pleas. No further remedy is justified.

Due process requires that a guilty plea be "knowing, voluntary and intelligent." United States v. Tidwell , 521 F.3d 236, 251 (3d Cir. 2008). When challenging a plea, the defendant bears the burden of establishing that one of these factors is missing. See United States v. Stewart , 977 F.2d 81, 85 (3d Cir. 1992). In addition to these constitutional requirements, a guilty plea must also be entered in accordance with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which lays out a specific procedure to assist the judge in determining if a plea is voluntary. McCarthy v. United States , 394 U.S. 459, 465, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969). If a plea is accepted in violation of Rule 11, the appropriate remedy is to provide the defendant with an opportunity to plead anew. Id. at 472, 89 S.Ct. 1166.

Package plea agreements—where the government's plea offer is contingent on multiple defendants accepting the offer—do not violate a defendant's constitutional rights. United States v. Hodge , 412 F.3d 479, 490 (3d Cir. 2005). However, there are additional procedural requirements for package pleas during the Rule 11 colloquy: the parties must inform the Court that the plea is a package plea, and the Court must take "special care... to ensure that the defendant is pleading voluntarily." Id. at 491. Like the other requirements of Rule 11, these procedures are not constitutionally mandated, but rather are "designed to assist the district judge" in determining voluntariness. McCarthy , 394 U.S. at 465, 89 S.Ct. 1166 ; see also United States v. Wilson , 429 F.3d 455, 460 n.4 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining that the procedure for package pleas laid out in Hodge is not a constitutional rule).

The defense argues that linking the two defendants' plea agreements coerced them into pleading guilty. The defendants' motion does not, however, point to any coercion beyond the linked nature of the package plea itself. Am. Mot. to Dismiss Indictment. Package plea agreements "are not inherently coercive," and "[t]here is no question" of their constitutionality. Hodge , 412 F.3d at 490–92. (emphasis added). Although the Court was not informed of the package plea agreement, both defendants were aware that the pleas were linked. Am. Mot. to Dismiss Indictment, at 4. The Court inquired of both defendants at the change of plea hearing as to whether "anyone promised you, threatened you, or did anything to you to cause you to [plead guilty] against your wishes." Apr. 9, 2015, Tr. of Guilty Plea, at 29–30 (Doc. No. 104). Both defendants testified under oath that there had not been any such coercion. Id. at 30.

The defense also argues that the government's failure to inform the Court that the guilty plea was a package plea agreement violated the Due Process rights of the defendants. Am. Mot. to Dismiss Indictment, at 5. It is true that the failure of either party to disclose the linked nature of the plea may have resulted in an inadequate Rule 11 plea colloquy. See Hodge , 412 F.3d at 491. But the requirement of disclosure is not a constitutional one, thus the failure to disclose the packaged nature of the plea did not violate the Due Process Clause. See Wilson , 429 F.3d at 460 n.4. The remedy for an inadequate colloquy is to allow the defendants to withdraw their pleas. McCarthy , 394 U.S. at 472, 89 S.Ct. 1166. This is the remedy the defendants requested when they initially raised the issue with the Court. See Def. Moore's Mot. to Withdraw Guilty Plea (Doc. No. 119); Def. Wilson's Am. Mot. to Withdraw Guilty Plea (Doc. No. 113). And this is the remedy the defendants received when the Court granted both of their motions to withdraw their pleas. Apr. 11, 2016, Orders Granting Mots. to Withdraw Pleas (Doc. Nos. 134 and 135). The defendants have made no showing that the failure to disclose the package plea to the Court should result in any additional remedy.

B. Attorney–Client Relationship

The defendants also claim that dismissal of the indictment is warranted because the government violated their Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights by interfering with their relationship with cou...

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