United States v. Wilson

• Decision Date: 08 June 1908
• Citation: 163 F. 338
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. WILSON et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

163 F. 338

UNITED STATES v. WILSON et al.

United States Circuit Court, S.D. New York.

June 8, 1908

Henry L. Stimson, U.S. Atty., and Thomas D. Thacher, Asst. U.S Atty.

Hugh Gordon Miller, for defendants.

CHATFIELD District Judge.

The defendant Wilson was under arrest in the Southern district of New York. Upon his person were found certain chattels, among them a trunk check. Upon presentation of this check to the railroad company, the trunk was delivered to the United States attorney for the Southern district of New York. Certain papers found in this trunk by the United States attorney are held by him as evidence to be used in the case now about to go to trial, upon an indictment filed in this district. The defendant has therefore moved for a return of the trunk and its contents upon a claim that they are his personal property, taken from him after a search alleged to be contrary to the provisions of the fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, thus compelling the defendant to testify against himself, contrary to the fifth amendment of the Constitution.

The provisions of the Constitution are as follows:

'Amend. 4. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

'Amend. 5. No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall he be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.'

Recovery of personal property must ordinarily be the subject of an action at law. Similarly, objection against the use of evidence can ordinarily be urged only upon a trial, at a time when the evidence is offered. But inasmuch as the case has been called for trial, and a demurrer argued and overruled, the papers to be used as evidence could be impounded, and it seems to the court that the question raised is one of general principle, not entirely covered by the rules as to the admissibility of evidence. The question therefore can be better disposed of on the merits than left until the evidence shall be offered on the trial and in the presence of a jury.

The only questions to be then considered would be those of materiality and relevancy, which would not be affected by this question, and competency, which would usually be determined by the conditions under which the documents offered as evidence came into existence, rather than the way in which the government obtained them. It is true that, under objection on the trial, a statement or confession by the defendant is inadmissible, unless the court is satisfied that it was voluntary and made under such conditions that no coercion or inducement could be said to have influenced the defendant to vary from a truthful recital. Bram v. U.S., 168 U.S. 543, 18 Sup.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568. But upon the offer of such a statement or confession, an objection on behalf of the defendant will raise the direct question of the voluntary character of the transactions under the provisions of amendments 4 and 5.

So, upon the trial of this particular case, an offer of the testimony and an objection on the part of the defendant must be ruled upon by the trial judge, and any determination now cannot preclude a decision upon the facts appearing at that time, nor can it now be known whether objection will be made; but if, as claimed, a great and unconstitutional wrong has been done the defendant by the district attorney, who is now urging the trial of the charge, it would seem that this court (in protecting the rights of defendants actually on the eve of trial and presumed to be innocent) should consider whether the property found on the defendant at the time of his arrest is to be returned to him before that trial.

Without any forced assumption of jurisdiction, it would seem that this court can consider the right of the defendant to the return before trial of such personal property as the contents of his trunk, obtained at the time of his arrest by means of a check taken from his pocket, all of this property being within the control of the court, if it is to be used as evidence. If objection is made during trial to the use of papers and documents, upon the ground that they have been unlawfully seized, and in that sense that the defendant has been compelled to testify against himself, contrary to the provisions of the amendments above cited, the decision in the case of Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 630-631, 6 Sup.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746, and the general language of the court throughout that opinion would seem to indicate that such an objection could not only be considered, but, if well founded, could be sustained.

But it is evident from many decisions upon the subject that upon the trial of an action the manner of obtaining documentary evidence or specific chattels will not be looked into, and any objection because of trespass will be overruled, unless the defendant has been compelled to produce papers in the case, and thus testify against himself. This proposition is stated by the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 594, 24 Sup.Ct. 372, 48 L.Ed. 575, and is so well recognized that it cannot be the subject of much discussion. Further, property found upon the defendant, or in his immediate possession, at the time of his arrest, has always been considered properly usable as evidence, and no action for trespass will lie for the retention of such property by the officers of the law, for the purpose of using that property as evidence. The distinction would seem to be that the property must be material, or seem to be material, as evidence on the charge which is made against the defendant. The old case of Dillon v. O'Brien & Davis, 16 Cox, C.C. 245, and other cases cited by the district attorney, viz., Spalding v. Preston, 21 Vt. 15, 50 Am.Dec. 68, Reifsnyder v. Lee, 44 Iowa, 101, 24 Am.Rep. 733, Rex v. O'Donnell, 7 C.P. 138, and Rex v. Burgiss, 7 C.P. 488, hold substantially to the same effect. The language used by the Supreme Court in the case of Boyd v. United States, supra, is substantially the only foundation for this particular application. That case arose from a seizure under the internal revenue laws, followed by an action for the forfeiture of the property seized, and an attempt was made, under a statute of the United States, to compel the claimant of the goods to produce his books. The court, holding that the action was in its nature criminal, came to the conclusion that such a compulsory production of books and papers would be contrary to the provisions of amendment 5 of the Constitution, and that to allow the district attorney, under such compulsion, to search through the papers of the claimant for evidence, would as well be a violation of amendment 5 of the Constitution.

A great deal of discussion is had in the case over the English statutes and declarations of the courts of England upon rights of search. A search for stolen goods is expressly excepted. Upon page 630 of [163 F. 341] 116 U.S.and page 532 of 6 sup. Ct. (29 L.Ed. 746), in the Boyd Case, the court uses the following language:

'It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and private property, where that right has never been forfeited by his conviction of some public offense-- it is the invasion of this sacred right which underlies and constitutes the essence of Lord Camden's judgment. Breaking into a house and opening boxes and drawers are circumstances of aggravation; but any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or of his

...