United States v. Wilson
| Decision Date | 29 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 19-4732,19-4732 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. JUSTIN MICHAEL WILSON, Defendant - Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
UNPUBLISHED
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Huntington. Robert C. Chambers, District Judge. (3:18-cr-00146-1)
Before NIEMEYER and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and Richard E. MYERS II, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of North Carolina, sitting by designation.
ARGUED: Jonathan D. Byrne, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Joseph Franklin Adams, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Huntington, West Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Wesley P. Page, Federal Public Defender, Rhett H. Johnson, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Michael B. Stuart, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
After a bench trial, Justin Michael Wilson was convicted of carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119, and of brandishing a firearm, specifically, a machinegun, in connection with a crime of violence (the brandishing count), in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A) and (c)(1)(B)(ii).1 The carjacking offense served as the predicate crime of violence required to prove the brandishing count. After convicting Wilson of both offenses, the district court sentenced Wilson to a total term of imprisonment of 30 years and one day.
On appeal, Wilson raises two claims. First, Wilson argues that there was insufficient evidence to support both convictions because he lacked the required intent to cause harm to the carjacking victims. Second, Wilson argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial, which was based on Wilson's assertion that the prosecution improperly withheld oral statements of key witnesses in violation of Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
Upon our review, we conclude that: (1) the government's evidence was sufficient on both counts to prove Wilson's intent to harm the victims; and (2) Wilson failed to establish a Giglio violation. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's judgment.
We state the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the prevailing party in the trial court. United States v. Fall, 955 F.3d 363, 375 (4th Cir. 2020). The two offenses at issue arose from a sequence of events that took place on January 11, 2018. That morning in Jackson County, West Virginia, Wilson stole a white Ford Expedition, a sport utility vehicle (the SUV, or the white SUV) that he purportedly was "test driving" as a prospective purchaser. Wilson drove the SUV to Mason County, West Virginia, where he received a machinegun in a pre-arranged transaction. When Wilson took possession of the machinegun, it was not loaded with ammunition, and there was no evidence suggesting that he loaded the weapon at any point that day. Shortly thereafter, the police responded to a report of a man in a white SUV brandishing a gun at a couple who had stopped their car on the shoulder of a road. A Kanawha County officer eventually spotted Wilson's white SUV and pursued it until the officer lost sight of the vehicle.
Later that day, Wilson approached Justin Clark, an employee working at an Advanced Auto Parts store in Putnam County, West Virginia. Wilson asked Clark to trade the vehicle on which he was working in exchange for the white SUV. After Clark refused, Wilson demanded that Clark provide him with the keys to the vehicle, stating that he was "on the run from the law." Wilson also stated that he had "a fully automatic weapon" but did not "want to have to do anything."
Despite this threat, Wilson did not display the machinegun to Clark. After Clark told Wilson that the car keys were in the store, Clark went inside, locked the door, andplaced a telephone call to the police. When Clark did not return, Wilson left the parking lot without further incident.
Wilson's spree continued when he drove the white SUV to a nearby shopping plaza, where John Thaxton and Mathew Francisco, two Putnam Public Service District employees, were eating their lunch in their employer's vehicle (the company vehicle). Pointing the machinegun at both men, Wilson approached the company vehicle and told the men that this was their "lucky day." Wilson provided Thaxton and Francisco with "two options, to either help him unload the vehicle he was in or [they] could die." Thaxton and Francisco complied with Wilson's demand, helping Wilson transfer his belongings from the SUV to the company vehicle. During the transfer of the items, Wilson placed the machinegun on the front seat of the SUV.
When Wilson demanded the keys to the company vehicle, Thaxton and Francisco informed Wilson that the keys were inside the vehicle. At first, Wilson misunderstood the response and became highly agitated, assuming a threatening posture and threatening to take the keys by force if necessary. Ultimately, Wilson took possession of the company vehicle.
As Wilson began driving away, West Virginia State Trooper J.E. Garren arrived at the shopping plaza. Garren, along with four other officers, pursued Wilson. The pursuit eventually ended when Wilson crashed the company vehicle on the side of a road. During the chase, Wilson had displayed the machinegun outside the driver's side window in the direction of the pursuing officers. The officers arrested Wilson at the scene of the accident.
In Garren's police report, he stated that Wilson was taken into custody after being removed from the vehicle "without further incident." At trial, however, Garren testified that Wilson attempted to fight and to resist the officers as they placed handcuffs on him. Wilson's counsel attempted to impeach this trial testimony based on Garren's prior inconsistent statement in his police report.
Before trial, the government had conducted witness preparation sessions with Thaxton, Francisco, and Garren. No notes were taken during these sessions and the witnesses' oral statements were not memorialized or recorded in any manner. During these sessions, relevant to Wilson's Giglio claim, Garren related that Wilson had resisted being handcuffed upon arrest, and Thaxton and Francisco described Wilson's confrontational demeanor during a misunderstanding about the company vehicle keys.
After completion of the bench trial and sentencing hearing, Wilson moved for a new trial. He argued that his due process rights had been violated by the government's failure to disclose the oral statements made by Thaxton, Francisco, and Garren in the pretrial preparation session. Wilson further argued that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated because he would have requested a jury trial if he had known about the allegedly conflicting statements. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Wilson failed to demonstrate prejudice affecting his substantial rights. Wilson appeals.
We review Wilson's convictions under a mixed standard of review, with the trial court's factual findings reviewed for clear error and its legal conclusions evaluated denovo. United States v. Landersman, 886 F.3d 393, 406 (4th Cir. 2018). We resolve challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence by determining whether substantial evidence supports the convictions, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Fall, 955 F.3d at 375. A conviction is supported by substantial evidence when "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
The offense of carjacking required the government to prove that the defendant "(1) with intent to cause death or serious bodily harm (2) took a motor vehicle (3) that had been transported, shipped or received in interstate or foreign commerce (4) from the person or presence of another (5) by force and violence or intimidation." United States v. Small, 944 F.3d 490, 498 (4th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted); see 18 U.S.C. § 2119. In the present case, Wilson only disputes the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the first element, namely, whether he acted with intent to cause death or serious bodily harm when he took possession of the company vehicle.
Wilson argues that his conduct on January 11, 2018, failed to establish that he had an intent to harm or kill Thaxton or Francisco when he took the company vehicle from their possession. Relying on an out-of-circuit decision, United States v. Fekete, 535 F.3d 471 (6th Cir. 2008), Wilson asserts that his conduct of displaying an unloaded weapon, without more, was insufficient to establish that he had the intent to harm or kill the carjacking victims. We disagree with Wilson's argument.
Under our precedent, the mens rea requirement for carjacking requires the government to show that "at the moment the defendant demanded or took control over the driver's automobile[,] the defendant possessed the intent to seriously harm or kill the driver if necessary to steal the car." Small, 944 F.3d at 498 (quoting Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 12 (1999)) (emphasis omitted). The Supreme Court has clarified that empty threats of violence are insufficient to prove this element of carjacking. Holloway, 526 U.S. at 11. Thus, if the evidence shows that a defendant was unwilling to follow through on an empty threat, then the defendant would have lacked the required intent to commit the carjacking. Small, 944 F.3d at 498.
Although it is difficult to delineate precisely between an empty threat and conduct sufficient to establish the required intent, we have held that the use of a weapon,...
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