United States v. Wilson

• Decision Date: 12 December 1953
• Docket Number: Crim. A. No. 17977.
• Citation: 116 F. Supp. 911
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. WILSON.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico

116 F. Supp. 911

UNITED STATES v. WILSON.

Crim. A. No. 17977.

United States District Court D. New Mexico.

December 12, 1953.

Paul F. Larrazolo, U. S. Atty., Albuquerque, N. M., for the United States.

Howard F. Houk, Santa Fe, N. M., for defendant.

HATCH, District Judge.

The defendant appears before the court for sentence upon a plea of guilty to an information charging violations of Sections 3290 and 3291, Title 26 U.S.C. We are here concerned with the proper construction of Section 3294, Title 26 U.S.C., which provides penalties for violations of these statutes.

Under subdivision (a) of Section 3294 it is provided:

"Failure to pay tax. Any person who does any act which makes him liable for special tax under this subchapter, without having paid such tax, shall, besides being liable to the payment of the tax, be fined not less than $1,000 and not more than $5,000."

Under subdivision (c) of that section it is further provided:

"Willful violations. The penalties prescribed by section 2707 with respect to the tax imposed by section 2700 shall apply with respect to the tax imposed by this subchapter."

The applicable subdivision of Section 2707 of 26 U.S.C. provides:

"(b) Any person required under this subchapter to pay any tax, or required by law or regulations made under authority thereof to make a return, keep any records, or supply any information, for the purposes of the computation, assessment, or collection of any tax imposed by this subchapter who willfully fails to pay such tax, make such returns, keep such records, or supply such information, at the time or times required by law or regulations, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both, together with the costs of prosecution."

From the foregoing sections of the statutes which must be looked to in order to arrive at the penalties to be imposed it is apparent some confusion might exist as to what the Congress intended. In such a situation it is essential for the court to ascertain, if possible, the will and purpose of the Congress at the time the laws were enacted. It is almost universally held that the intent of the Congress must be determined by the court. In the interpretation of a criminal statute, the United States Supreme Court said in the case of United States v. Alpers, 338 U.S. 680, 70 S.Ct. 352, 353, 94 L.Ed. 457, "The most important thing to be determined is the intent of Congress." In Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 56 S.Ct. 395, 80 L.Ed. 522, the same court held that in the construction of penal statutes that sense of the words should be taken which best harmonizes with the context and the end in view and that the obvious purpose of legislation shall be given effect. And in United States v. Raynor, 302 U.S. 540, 542, 58 S.Ct. 353, 82 L.Ed. 413, the Supreme Court discussed the legislative history of a criminal statute at length in order to determine the Congressional intent. Therefore, as has been said, the differences in the two penalties provided by subdivisions (a) and (c) of Section 3294 require a construction and interpretation of the legislative intent at the time the new law was adopted.

When one provision of a statute omits the word "willful" and imposes a penalty for mere infraction alone and another section of the same law imposes a different penalty for its "willful" violation, it should not be difficult to ascertain the legislative intent or purpose. The word "willful" in a criminal statute or in a law imposing penalties for its transgression has a well-defined meaning. In United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 54 S.Ct. 223, 224, 78 L.Ed. 381, the defendant was charged under Section 1114(a) of the Revenue Act of 1926, the pertinent parts of which are as follows: "Any person required under this title to pay any tax, or * * * make a return, keep any records, or supply any information, * * *, who willfully fails to pay such tax, make such return, * * *." The Supreme Court said that the word "willful" often denotes an act which is intentional, or knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished from accidental, but when used in a criminal statute it generally means an act done with a bad purpose. The court suggested that aid in arriving at the meaning of the word "willfully" may be afforded by the context in which it is used and said further:

"This court has held that, where directions as to the method of conducting a business are embodied in a revenue act to prevent loss of taxes, and the act declares a willful failure to observe the directions a penal offense, an evil motive is a constituent element of the crime."

See also Felton v. United States, 96 U.S. 699, 24 L.Ed. 875; Potter v. United States, 155 U.S. 438, 15 S.Ct. 144, 39 L.Ed. 214; Spurr v. United States, 177 U.S. 728, 19 S.Ct. 812, 43 L.Ed. 1150.

Having in mind the meaning courts have ascribed to the word "willful" I must infer that the Congress included this word in subdivision (c) purposefully and with a definite end in view. It can hardly be supposed the legislative body employed the use of the word without full knowledge of its legal effect. Similarly, I must infer that when the word was omitted from subdivision (a) the omission was purposefully done and with a definite end in view.

The purpose of the legislative body as expressed in subdivision (a) cannot be in doubt. In strong and vigorous, plain and unequivocal language the Congress in subdivision (a) positively prescribes that where "Any person who does any act which makes him liable for special tax under this subchapter, without having paid such tax, shall, besides being liable to the payment of the tax, be fined not less than $1,000 and not more than $5,000." From the language quoted it appears clear the legislative body intended the courts to impose rather severe penalties against all offenders who transgress the law in any respect. A penalty of not less than $1,000 and not more than $5,000 is not insignificant where neither the criminal intent nor the wrongful purpose is made an element of the offense and a mere infraction of the law by doing any act is sufficient to incur such penalty.

I now consider the legislative intent with reference to subdivision (c), but in doing so the mandatory requirements of subdivision (a) must always be kept in mind as both subdivisions are contained within the same law and are of equal weight. Each must be construed in the light of and with reference to the other. Both subdivisions must be construed together and legislative intent and purpose of each must be given full force and effect, if possible. In Helvering v. New York Trust Co., 292 U.S. 455, 54 S.Ct. 806, 808, 78 L.Ed. 1361, it was held, in quoting from another ...