United States v. Windsor, Crim. No. 72-40.
| Citation | 351 F. Supp. 215 |
| Decision Date | 20 November 1972 |
| Docket Number | Crim. No. 72-40. |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. Mark Randall WINDSOR. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
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John J. Daley, Asst. U. S. Atty., Jacksonville, Fla., for plaintiff.
Fred C. Isaac, Jacksonville, Fla., for defendant.
The defendant is charged with refusing to submit to induction into the Armed Services in violation of Title 50, United States Code, Appendix, Section 462 (a). He waived his right to trial by jury and was tried before the Court. His only defenses were that the procedures followed by the Selective Service System in denying his claim for conscientious objector classification were defective in the following respects: (1) the explanation given by the Local Board for denying his request for conscientious objector classification was insufficient to meet the requirement for a statement of reasons enunciated in United States v. Stetter;1 (2) the Appeal Board, which failed to announce any reasons for its denial of his claim, is required by Stetter to present the same type of statement as required of the Local Board; and (3) there is no basis in fact in the record for denying his claim. The Government argues (1) there was no obligation on the part of either the Local Board or the Appeal Board to give reasons for denying his request because he failed to present a prima facie claim for conscientious objector classification; (2) even assuming he presented a prima facie claim, the reasons given by the Local Board were sufficient to comply with the requirements of Stetter; (3) Stetter does not require that the Local and Appeal Boards both give reasons, but, rather, a statement from either is sufficient; and (4) there is a basis in fact in the record for denying defendant's claim. The Court agrees with defendant that he presented a prima facie claim to the Board, but holds that the requirements of Stetter were met and finds defendant guilty.
Defendant first registered with his Local Board in May, 1969, while a senior in high school. He was classified I-S (H) until his graduation in June, 1969. He was reclassified I-A in January, 1970, ordered to report for physical examination in September, 1970, and notified that he was fully acceptable for military service in October, 1970. The first indication that defendant desired to be granted conscientious objector classification occurred in January, 1971, nearly one year after his last I-A classification, when he requested the Special Form for conscientious objector classification, hereinafter referred to as "Form 150". He completed and returned the form later that month. In response to the question asking him to describe the nature of his belief and why it is based on religious training, he said:
I believe that killing is wrong for any reason and am prepared to follow this forever as long as I live. I believe if I can prevent the taking of a life, I should do so. Lived with Grandfather and was taught various beliefs. He is a Methodist Minister. Also reading of several religions and found it to be apparent.
In response to the question asking how he acquired the religious belief upon which his claim was based, he stated:
Religious background with both Grandparents (one is a Minister) and Mother, Father, Friends. Always searching for what is not what people want to believe. Never voiced much openly in High School although not satisfied with the average feeling and beliefs. Excerpts from "Bible", Books of Eastern Religion by Alan Watts, Eric Fromm, attending Baptist, Methodist, Episcopalian churches, talking with people from other churches. Brothers and sister, mother and D. Carr, J. Folsom and greatly by P. McCullers.
In response to the Board's request for references who could provide additional information, he listed several names but failed to give their addresses, occupations, or relationships. He did not respond to the Board's invitation to submit evidence beyond that contained in his Form 150. The Local Board reviewed and considered his I-O claim and sent him the following letter notifying him his claim had been denied and giving its reasons for the denial. The entire letter read as follows:
Your claim as a conscientious objector was considered by the Board on February 12, 1971, and in their opinion your professed belief in opposition to war is not a compelling or controlling force in your life, but is simply and sic expedient to avoid military service at this time and that you are not sincere in your professed belief.
Defendant appealed the Local Board's decision and in June, 1971, the Appeal Board gave defendant the same classification as had the Local Board. The Appeal Board gave no reasons for its decision. All that appears in the record is a notice that as a result of "Action by the Appeal Board" the registrant was "Classified in Class 1-A . . . by the following vote: Yes 5 No 0." Defendant reported for induction and refused to take the symbolic step forward in November, 1971, resulting in the indictment in this case.
It is well settled that before either the Local or Appeal Board is obligated to present its reasons for denying an applicant's claim for conscientious objector classification, the applicant must present a prima facie case.2 To meet this threshold test the registrant must supply information sufficient to support two conclusions: first, that his objection to war is based upon religious training and belief, and, second, that his objection encompasses participation in war in any form.3 The test is not a stringent one. All that is required is the presentation of facts which would justify the Board in granting conscientious objector classification, if it were to do so.4
The facts presented to the Board by defendant are reproduced above. Although his was far from an overwhelming presentation, it is clear that he alleged enough at least to meet the threshold prima facie test. The Board could have concluded from his Form 150 that his opposition to war was based on religious training and that he was opposed to war in any form. The Court finds, therefore, that he presented a prima facie case.
It is undisputed here that Stetter requires at least one of the two Boards to give a statement of reasons for denying a registrant's claim for conscientious objector classification. The issues in dispute are, first, how complete and explicit that statement must be, and, second, whether the same type of statement must be presented by both boards.5 These were issues left unclear in Stetter, where a registrant was denied his claim for conscientious objector classification by both the Local and Appeal Boards with neither panel giving any reasons. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that there was no basis in fact in the record for denying his claim and reversed his conviction. Although it could have stopped there, the Court went on to impose the following rule, which it adopted from United States v. Broyles:6
In any case where the board fails to disclose the basis for its decision, we risk blind endorsement of a mistake of law. Where it is clear that a prima facie case was established, we conclude that in conscientious objector cases, it is essential to the validity of an order to report that the board state its basis of decision and the reasons therefor, i. e., whether it has found the registrant incredible, or insincere, or of bad faith, and why.7
Although the rule is occasionally confused with a constitutional requirement,8 it is clear that it is of statutory origin.9
As stated in Broyles:
Congress has imposed upon the courts a statutory duty to review the orders of the local boards . . .. We cannot discharge even this limited duty without a statement of the reasons for the board's adverse conclusion. Therefore, we must hold the local board's order invalid.10
And later in Broyles:
Implicit in the concept of a "hearing" granted by the Selective Service statute, and the right, albeit limited, of judicial review is the opportunity to know the issues so that these procedures are not empty gestures.11
In Stetter the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit states:
Any other rule, in our view, would not only be unfair to the registrant but would result in the abdication of our responsibility of judicial review under the statute.12
Stetter and Broyles were both based on the Court's need to know the reasons upon which the administrative panel based its decision in order to protect the right to judicial review. Stetter, however, went beyond Broyles by also stressing the registrant's need to know the Board's reasons in order to protect his right to an administrative appeal.13 "Without a statement of reasons, a registrant is unable to take advantage of his right under the regulations . . . to appeal to the Appeal Board."14 This shift in emphasis from the judiciary's need for the performance of its role to the registrant's need for taking advantage of his rights to both administrative and judicial review is significant in several respects. First, since the registrant has a right under the statute to both an administrative and a judicial review, he must be informed of the agency's reasons at both the Local and Appeal Board level.15 Second, since the scope of judicial review is extremely narrow,16 while that of the Appeal Board review is extremely broad, the statement of reasons needed from the Local Board in order to prepare an effective administrative appeal must be more complete than that required of the Appeal Board for judicial review.17 Third, since the registrant will usually be represented by counsel at the judicial review but not the administrative review, the statement of reasons required of the Local Board must be more explicit than what is required of the Appeal Board.
Exactly how complete and explicit the indication from each Board must be is a...
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United States v. Windsor, 72-3526.
...Judge: Mark Randall Windsor was convicted under 50 App. U.S.C.A. § 462(a), for failing to report for induction into the United States Army, D.C., 351 F.Supp. 215. On this appeal he challenges the induction order on three grounds: (1) that the local draft board's denial of his request for co......