United States v. Wolrich
| Decision Date | 08 February 1955 |
| Citation | 129 F. Supp. 528 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Isidor WOLRICH, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
J. Edward Lumbard, U. S. Atty. for the Southern Dist. of N. Y., New York City, for plaintiff, Richard Owen, Asst. U. S. Atty., New York City, of counsel.
Corcoran & Kostelanetz, Louis Bender, Arthur Block, New York City, for defendant, Arthur Block, Boris Kostelanetz, Louis Bender, Jules Ritholz, New York City, of counsel.
Defendant, for a second time, moves for reargument of a motion to suppress evidence alleged to have been obtained from him under a consent to a search of his records and papers alleged to have been obtained by fraud.
In my decision of the original motion, which is reported at D.C., 119 F. Supp. 538, I held, in substance, that an income tax examiner's representation that the examination was a "routine audit" was not such a fraudulent representation as would vitiate the consent that defendant's books and papers be examined. I said that a statement that the purpose of an investigation was a "routine audit" was not the equivalent of a promise that only civil liability would be considered regardless of what the examination revealed. The Government's affidavits in opposition to the original motion contained statements that the investigation had resulted from the fact that examination of other taxpayers' affairs had revealed that checks to the order of defendant in very large amounts had been cashed rather than credited to any account. Nevertheless, the same affidavits were to the effect that such an examination was a "routine examination" and that it often appeared that the cashing of checks for large amounts was a legitimate business practice. There was presumably, therefore, no reason why defendant should have been advised of any extraordinary character of this particular investigation. This state of facts did not indicate to me that defendant, even if he had been told that the examination was a routine examination, had been in any way misled, so the motion was denied.
No new facts were shown on the first motion for a reargument.
After my denial of the motion for reargument, the case was tried. The trial resulted in a disagreement of the jury and this second motion for reargument was then made. Defendant now says that material was elicited on the trial which indicates that the investigation, at the time of the alleged statement that it was only routine, was of...
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Austin v. United States
...we do think that enough has been alleged to require a hearing, with findings of fact and conclusions of law. See United States v. Wolrich, 129 F.Supp. 528 (D.C.S.D.N.Y., 1955); United States v. Wheeler, 149 F.Supp. 445 (D.C.W.D. Pa., 1957), reversed on other grounds, 256 F.2d 745 (3rd Cir.,......
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United States v. Achilli
...with defendant's consent. Cf. Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 151, 75 S.Ct. 194, 99 L.Ed. 192. The case is unlike United States v. Wolrich, D.C., 129 F.Supp. 528, in which there was evidence that the treasury agents secured defendant's consent upon the assurance that the investigation......
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Biggs v. United States
...against him. In re Fried, supra, 2 Cir., 161 F.2d 453, 1 A.L.R.2d 996; United States v. Abrams, D.C.Vt., 230 F. 313; United States v. Wolrich, D.C.S.D.N.Y., 129 F.Supp. 528. Appellant contends that the same rule is applicable if he made a voluntary disclosure in reliance upon promises of im......