United States v. Womack
| Decision Date | 01 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 2:21-cr-00026 |
| Citation | 546 F.Supp.3d 494 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, v. Markeis WOMACK |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
Before the Court is Defendant Markeis Womack's Motion to Suppress Evidence seized by the Jackson County Sheriff's Department in a warrantless automobile search [ECF No. 29]. I have considered Mr. Womack's Motion and Memorandum in Support [ECF No. 30], the Government's Response in Opposition [ECF No 31], the testimony and arguments heard at the June 21, 2021 pre-trial motions hearing, and the supplemental briefing I ordered the parties to submit at the conclusion of that hearing. [ECF Nos. 37, 38]. For the reasons contained in this memorandum opinion, the Motion is GRANTED .
On the evening of May 24, 2020, Markeis Womack ("Womack") was driving south along Route 68 in Ravenswood, West Virginia near the Ritchie Bridge. At the same time, Jackson County Sheriff's Deputy J.B. Thompson was stationed in his patrol car on Route 68 where he was watching traffic and conducting drug interdiction. As Womack passed the stationed patrol car, Deputy Thompson observed that Womack was driving in a way that he characterized as "hiding." Deputy Thompson reported that Womack had his seat reclined and his arms locked out straight in front of him as if he were bracing for impact. Deputy Thompson also observed that Womack's gold Chevrolet HHR had Michigan license plates. Deputy Thompson noted that in his training and experience doing drug interdiction, Route 68 is a drug artery for Ohio and Michigan traffickers. Armed with that knowledge and his suspicions based on Womack's unusual posture, he decided to follow Womack as he turned left off of Route 68 onto a four-lane highway. After following him for a short distance, Deputy Thompson testified that he saw Womack commit two separate traffic violations: first, Womack changed lanes from left to right without putting on his turn signal; second, Womack briefly crossed the white fog line on the right-hand side of the road that divides the road from the shoulder.
Deputy Thompson decided to initiate a traffic stop. As he approached the car and began speaking with Womack, Deputy Thompson testified that he could smell the odor of burnt marijuana. At the pretrial motions hearing, Deputy Thompson testified that Womack seemed extremely nervous, that his hands were trembling and that he was having trouble speaking as if he had dry mouth. When questioned by Deputy Thompson during the traffic stop, Womack informed Deputy Thompson that he was on his way to Danville to visit his parents. Deputy Thompson did a check of Womack's license and registration which returned no outstanding warrants or criminal history. Shortly after Deputy Thompson began his traffic stop of Womack, Patrolman Colby Bush of the Ravenswood Police Department arrived at the scene and conferred with Deputy Thompson. Officer Bush testified that Deputy Thompson told him "I think I've got a good one," meaning that he believed that Womack might be involved in drug running or other illegal activity. Officer Bush questioned Womack and echoed the Deputy's testimony that Womack was highly nervous. Officer Bush stated that Womack said that he was on his way to see his aunt in Charleston and that he could also smell marijuana in the car.
Deputy Thompson informed Womack that he intended to search his Chevrolet. Womack became agitated as the two officers placed him in custody and patted him down for weapons. Upon searching the vehicle, the officers discovered a package containing nearly 500 grams of heroin.
Womack moves to suppress the fruits of the warrantless search. First, he argues that that Deputy Thompson illegally initiated a traffic stop. And second, he argues that even if the traffic stop itself was proper, the officers did not have probable cause to search the car.
The Fourth Amendment states in relevant part "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "searches and seizures conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions." Minnesota v. Dickerson , 508 U.S. 366, 374, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993). "The exclusionary rule ‘generally prohibits the introduction at criminal trial of evidence obtained in violation of a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.’ " United States v. Stephens , 764 F.3d 327, 335 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Penn. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott , 524 U.S. 357, 359, 118 S.Ct. 2014, 141 L.Ed.2d 344, (1998) ). At a suppression hearing, the Government bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a warrantless search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Matlock , 415 U.S. 164, 177 n.14, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974).
A vehicle stop is a seizure within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment. An officer may initiate a traffic stop on either of two grounds. First, the officer's decision to stop a car is reasonable if he has probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has taken place. United States v. Bowman , 884 F.3d 200, 209 (4th Cir. 2018). Stops are analyzed under an objective test, which asks whether a reasonable officer would have stopped the car for a traffic violation, even if he would not have done so but for his suspicions of other criminal activity. United States v. Hassan El , 5 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir. 1993). Such a limited detention does not become "unreasonable merely because the officer has intuitive suspicions that the occupants of the car are engaged in some sort of criminal activity," as long as the stop was justified at its inception. Id. In other words, the law allows for pretextual traffic stops; the pretext must be based on an actual traffic violation.
Second, an officer may initiate a traffic stop on the basis of a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, even in the absence of probable cause. Such investigatory stops must be supported with "articulable facts indicative of criminal misconduct." Illinois v. Wardlow , 528 U.S. 119, 123–24, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000). While reasonable suspicion is a lower bar for an investigating officer to clear than probable cause, "[t]he officer, of course, must be able to articulate something more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.’ " Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). In evaluating the validity of a stop supported only by reasonable suspicion, the court must evaluate the totality of the circumstances including the information that was known to the detaining officer at the time of the stop. See United States v. Sokolow , 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). In some rare circumstances, even wholly lawful conduct may engender a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. See Sokolow , 490 U.S. at 9–10, 109 S.Ct. 1581 (). So long as "[t]he articulated factors together ... serve to eliminate a substantial portion of innocent travelers," the reasonable suspicion standard may be satisfied. See United States v. Foreman , 369 F.3d 776, 781 (4th Cir. 2004).
Our Court of Appeals has succinctly explained the key difference between the probable cause and reasonable suspicion standards: "probable cause looks for past or present illegalities" whereas the main function of the reasonable suspicion standard as announced in Terry is "to grant officers the ability to prevent future wrongdoing." United States v. Perkins , 363 F.3d 317, 326–27 (4th Cir. 2004).
Once an officer has initiated the traffic stop, probable cause may develop in the course of the stop to search the interior of the vehicle without a warrant. See United States v. Haley , 669 F.2d 201, 203 (4th Cir. 1982). "Sufficient probable cause arises when the officers smell marijuana inside the vehicle." Id. (quoting United States v. Sifuentes , 504 F.2d 845 (4th Cir. 1974) ).
In this case, both officers testified that there was an odor of burnt marijuana emanating from Womack's vehicle. Womack testified that he has never smoked marijuana due to his asthma
and that he never allows anyone to smoke marijuana in his vehicle. Determining whether the officers had probable cause for the warrantless search would require weighing the credibility of the officers versus the defendant and making a factual determination. However, because this motion can be decided on the grounds of whether the traffic stop was valid at its inception, I do not need to do this here.
To determine the validity of the traffic stop, I must examine whether it was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment—either because it was supported by probable cause that a traffic offense had been committed or because he had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. I find that under either standard, the initiation of the traffic stop was an unreasonable seizure.
The Government contends that Deputy Thompson observed Womack commit two distinct violations of West Virginia traffic law. The Government argues that either of these violations suffice to create probable cause to pull him over. I disagree.
The first supposed infraction occurred when Deputy Thompson followed Womack as he turned left off of Route 68 onto the four-lane highway. Deputy...
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...cause. Such investigatory stops must be supported with ‘articulable facts indicative of criminal misconduct.'” United States v. Womack, 546 F.Supp.3d 494, 498 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-24 (2000)). The reasonableness of a traffic stop “is measured in obj......