United States v. Wood
| Decision Date | 20 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | Criminal Action No. 20-56 MN |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. ADRIAN WOOD, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Delaware |
Christopher R. Howland, Assistant United States Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Plaintiff.
Janet Bateman, Assistant Federal Public Defender, District of Delaware. Attorney for Defendant.
July 20, 2021
Wilmington, Delaware
Before the Court are Defendant Adrian Wood's two motions (D.I. 22, 25) to dismiss the Indictment (D.I. 14) charging Defendant with violation of 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3). The motions are filed pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, asserting selective prosecution, that the Indictment fails to state a valid offense, and that 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3) is unconstitutional. For the reasons set forth below, this Court DENIES both of Defendant's motions.
The essential facts are not in dispute. On May 25, 2020, George Floyd died while in the custody of the Minneapolis Police Department. As a result, protests were held around the country. One such protest was held in Wilmington, Delaware on May 30, 2020. Defendant participated in the Wilmington protest, which began around 2:00 p.m. near Rodney Square. The protestors split into two groups at around 3:30 p.m., with one group remaining near Rodney Square and the second group moving toward Trolley Square. Defendant was in the second group.
At around 7:00 p.m., several protestors in the second group began to throw rocks at a police vehicle driven by Sergeant Evans of the Wilmington Police Department ("WPD"). Sergeant Evans saw Defendant throw a brick that shattered the back window of his police vehicle. Sergeant Evans described the Defendant to assisting officers but pulled away from the group to prevent further escalation of violence.
Defendant was arrested around 11:00 p.m. by a different WPD officer. This officer recognized Defendant based on Sergeant Evans' earlier description. Thereafter, Sergeant Evans positively identified Defendant as the individual who shattered his back window. Defendant was released the night of his arrest because of computer problems at the WPD station but was told toreturn the following day. When he returned, Defendant agreed to an interview with the FBI, during which he admitted to throwing the brick.
Defendant was charged on June 1, 2020 by the State of Delaware with two felonies and several misdemeanors. On June 8, 2020, the United States lodged a criminal complaint in federal court charging Defendant with one count of Civil Disorder in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3). The United States did not seek to detain Defendant. Delaware dismissed the state charges against Defendant on July 8, 2020. The Grand Jury for the District of Delaware indicted Defendant on September 10, 2020 on the Civil Disorder charge. The Indictment in its entirety states as follows:
On or about May 30, 2020, in the District of Delaware, the defendant, ADRIAN WOOD, did knowingly commit an act to obstruct, impede, and interfere with a law enforcement officer lawfully engaged in the lawful performance of the officer's official duties incident to and during the commission of a civil disorder, which obstructed, delayed, and adversely affected commerce and the movement of articles or commodities in commerce, namely: the defendant, ADRIAN WOOD, incident to and during the commission of a civil disorder, knowingly and willfully caused damage to a police officer's police vehicle by throwing a hard projectile through the back window of the vehicle while the police officer was engaged in the lawful performance of official duties.
In violation of 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3).
(D.I. 14).
Defendant filed his Motion to Dismiss for Selective Prosecution (D.I. 22) on January 21, 2021, claiming selective prosecution based on an asserted "contrast between the treatment of multi-racial crowds protesting largely peacefully against racism in the criminal justice system and the treatment of a mostly white crowd violently storming the Capitol to overturn a peaceful democratic election." (D.I. 22 at 11). Defendant subsequently filed his Motion to Dismiss Indictment (D.I. 25) on January 28, 2021, challenging the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3)and asserting that the Indictment suffers defects that require dismissal. Specifically, Defendant argues that § 231(a)(3) exceeds Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause. Additionally, Defendant argues that § 231(a)(3) is a content-based restriction on expression that fails strict scrutiny, and thereby violates the First Amendment. Defendant also argues § 231(a)(3) violates the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause because it is unconstitutionally vague. Finally, Defendant argues that the boilerplate allegations in the Indictment violate the presentment and notice functions of the grand jury indictment under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments as well as Rule 7(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The United States filed an Omnibus Response to Defendant's Motions to Dismiss (D.I. 28) on March 29, 2021. The United States argues that the Indictment is sufficient and further argues that Defendant fails to carry his burden to show that § 231(a)(3) is unconstitutional on any of the theories proffered. Defendant filed a Reply to Government's Omnibus Response to Defendant's Motions to Dismiss (D.I. 31) on May 12, 2021 maintaining the assertions as to the unconstitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3) and the insufficiency of the Indictment.
"A selective-prosecution claim is not a defense on the merits to the criminal charge itself, but an independent assertion that the prosecutor has brought the charge for reasons forbidden by the Constitution." United States. v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463 (1996). The standard to prove selective prosecution is a "demanding one" as such a claim "asks a court to exercise judicial power over a 'special province' of the Executive." Id. at 464 (citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985)). The Attorney General and the United States Attorneys retain broad discretion to enforce criminal laws. Id. (citing Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985)). "In theabsence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that they have properly discharged their official duties." Id. The decision to prosecute rests entirely in the prosecutor's discretion so long as there exists probable cause to believe that the accused committed the offense. Id.
To demonstrate selective prosecution, a defendant must show that the federal prosecutorial policy was "motivated by a discriminatory purpose" and had a "discriminatory effect." Id. at 465. The defendant "must establish each of these elements with clear evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity that attaches to decisions to prosecute." United States v. Taylor, 686 F.3d 182, 197 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal quotations and citation omitted). The defendant bears the burden to make a "credible showing" that "persons similarly situated have not been prosecuted" and that "the decision to prosecute was made on the basis of an unjustifiable standard, such as race, religion, or some arbitrary factor." United States v. Schoolcraft, 879 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1989).
Compelling discovery in aid of a claim of selective prosecution requires a "correspondingly rigorous standard." Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 468. To compel discovery, the defendant must provide "some evidence tending to show the existence of the essential elements of the defense, discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent." Taylor, 686 F.3d at 197 (quoting United States v. Hedaithy, 392 F.3d 580, 607 (3d Cir. 2004)).
Defendant asserts that the United States' decision to prosecute him was based on his participation in protected First Amendment activity, namely, protesting. (D.I. 22 at 4). Defendant recounts statements made by former-President Donald Trump and former-Attorney General William Barr to bolster his claim. (Id. at 4-5). What Defendant fails to do, however, is demonstrate how these broad statements by public officials relate to the decision to prosecute him. With respect to a claim of selective prosecution, this Court is skeptical of the weight of any evidence that doesnot involve the decisionmakers directly involved in the defendant's case. Indeed, if the standard required for selective prosecution is to be demanding, it cannot be satisfied by statements tangentially related to Defendant made by public officials not directly involved in the decision to prosecute. Furthermore, as the United States notes in its response, the statements by former-Attorney General Barr proffered by Defendant were made months after Defendant's alleged conduct and after the grand jury returned its indictment.
Defendant also argues that because "[t]he State of Delaware has the interest, ability, and willingness to prosecute this case and impose an appropriate sentence if [Defendant] is convicted," that is evidence of discriminatory intent of the United States in prosecuting him. (D.I. 22 at 13). Although Delaware may have the interest, ability, and willingness to prosecute Defendant for his conduct, so does the United States. Defendant fails to cite any authority indicating that the availability of a prosecution by a state would make a federal decision to prosecute improper.
Moreover, by asserting that the United States is prosecuting him because of his participation in "protected First Amendment activity," Defendant overlooks the violent conduct that led to the prosecution. (D.I. 22 at 4). The facts of the case are not in dispute and, to this Court, presented the United States with probable cause to believe that Defendant had committed the offense. This left the decision to prosecute entirely within the prosecutor's...
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