United States v. Wood

• Decision Date: 09 December 2019
• Docket Number: CAUSE NO. 3:19-CR-38 DRL-MGG
• Citation: 426 F.Supp.3d 560
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Henry E. WOOD, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

426 F.Supp.3d 560

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,

v.Henry E. WOOD, Defendant.

CAUSE NO. 3:19-CR-38 DRL-MGG

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division.

December 9, 2019

John M. Maciejczyk, US Attorney's Office, South Bend, IN, for Plaintiff.

OPINION AND ORDER (AMENDED)

Damon R. Leichty Judge, United States District Court

This case involves the warrantless search of a parolee's cellphone. That warrantless search by state officers identified child pornography on the phone, leading federal investigators about a month later to request and obtain a search warrant. The warrant request relied on the evidence from the original warrantless search. Defendant Henry Wood has moved to suppress all evidence obtained pursuant to this warrant, including any information, statements, photographs, and videos, because of the original warrantless search that he views as unconstitutional. The parties have largely stipulated to the facts and have disputed only the proper outcome under the Fourth Amendment. Because Mr. Wood was a parolee and the government complied with applicable Fourth Amendment standards for parolees when state officers searched his phone, the court denies Mr. Wood's motion to suppress.

BACKGROUND

Mr. Wood was originally convicted under Indiana law for dealing methamphetamine in 2013. State v. Wood , 75C01-1303-FB-00012 (Starke County). He received a five-year sentence for this crime. He was later convicted for possessing precursors in 2017 for which he received a two-year sentence. State v. Wood , 75C01-1609-F5-00060 (Starke County).

In 2018, Mr. Wood was released from prison and placed on parole with the Indiana Department of Corrections. ECF 18-1, Ex. A ¶ 5. His Conditional Parole Release Agreement imposed multiple parole conditions. ECF 18-1, Ex. B. Mr. Wood agreed to "not engage in conduct prohibited by federal or state law or local ordinance." Id. ¶ 7. He authorized his "supervising officer or other authorized officials of the Department of Correction to visit [his] residence and place of employment at any reasonable time." Id. ¶ 9(a). The parole regulations further provided:

that [his] person and residence or property under [his] control may be subject to reasonable search by [his] supervising officer or authorized official of the Department of Correction if the officer or official has reasonable cause to believe that the parolee is violating or is in imminent danger of violating a condition to remaining on parole.

Id. ¶ 9(b). Additionally, Mr. Wood consented to "report to [his] supervising officer as instructed and to respond to any and all communications from any authorized employee of the Department of Correction." Id. ¶ 10.

Mr. Wood failed to report to his parole agent in Gary, Indiana for mandatory meetings on both December 14, 2018 and December 26, 2018 in violation of his parole conditions. ECF 18-1, Ex. A ¶ 5. The Parole Board promptly issued an arrest warrant for Mr. Wood based on these violations. Id. ¶ 7. On December 27, 2018, Indiana correctional agents arrived at Mr. Wood's residence and arrested him inside. Id. ¶ 8; see also ECF 18-1, Ex. C.

Once arrested, Mr. Wood kept turning toward his cellphone, so Parole Agent Gentry picked up the cellphone located on top of a "junk pile." ECF 18-1, Ex. C. Mr. Wood became upset and demanded that his phone "be turned off immediately." Id. He also began to resist Agent Gentry physically by attempting to pull away from him. Id. As a result of Mr. Wood's resistance, Agent Gentry—along with Parole Agent Hayes, another team member assisting in the search—restrained Mr. Wood on the nearest wall until he calmed down. Id.

Before the encounter, Parole Agent Gentry handed the phone to Parole Agent Rains. Id. Agent Rains felt what he thought was something "lumpy" in the back of the cellphone cover, so he took the cover off and found a small packet of an unknown substance, which he believed to be methamphetamine. ECF 18-1, Ex. A ¶ 11. Mr. Wood later confirmed that the substance was methamphetamine. Id. ¶ 12. A subsequent search of the home uncovered syringes and other drug paraphernalia. ECF 18-1, Ex. C.

Mr. Wood was charged with possession of methamphetamine. ECF 18-1, Ex. C. At that time, the cellphone was seized pursuant to this arrest and collected as evidence. ECF 18-1, Ex. A ¶ 13. A parole agent attempted to examine the cellphone's data onsite but was unsuccessful. Id. Agent Rains took possession of the cellphone, while Sergeant Ferguson of the Starke County Sheriff's Department took possession of the methamphetamine and syringes. ECF 18-1, Exs. C, D. The Starke County Sheriff's Department transported Mr. Wood to the Starke County Jail. ECF 18-1, Ex. C.

The cellphone was brought to the Indiana Department of Correction's Internal Affairs Correctional Police Officer, Investigator Christopher Dustin, to be forensically examined. ECF 18-1, Ex. A ¶ 14; Ex. D. On January 3, 2019, without a warrant, Investigator Dustin downloaded data from the cellphone. See Ex. D. In the process, Investigator Dustin began looking through the data, observing nude and sexually explicit photographs of minors and video files identifying by title girls under the age of fourteen. ECF 18-1, Ex. A ¶ 16; Ex. D. According to Officer Dustin, he

began seeing files of young girl's [sic] that appear to be in the age range between 8 and 14 years old, some wearing sexual clothing in sexually explicit poses and other files that were nude exposing the breast's [sic] and vagina's [sic], over 50 files of the young girl's [sic] contained over 100 individual photos each, well into the thousands of photos range. Videos were also present in the phone. The title on the video identifying the girls to be 8 years old, 9 years and others under the age of 14.

ECF 18-1, Ex. D. Investigator Dustin informed Agent Rains of this information and forwarded a copy of the extraction report to Agent Rains "to assist his case with the possession of a controlled substance, dealing." ECF 18-1, Ex. E.

Investigator Dustin then contacted the Merrillville Federal Bureau of Investigation. Id. Investigator Dustin informed Special Agent Nikkole Robertson what he found on the cellphone, and "it was decided that [Investigator Dustin would] be gathering the File System Extraction" and submitting it as evidence to Special Agent Robertson. Id. On January 4, 2019, Investigator Dustin conducted a logical full download of the cellphone "so that the opportunity to collect further data would be available to Investigators." Id. Investigator Dustin then forwarded the cellphone and the downloaded information to Special Agent Robertson. ECF 18-1, Ex. A ¶ 17.

On February 2, 2019, Special Agent Robertson applied for a search warrant and supporting affidavit. See ECF 18-1, Exs. A, F. In her application, Special Agent Robertson relied on the results of Investigator Dustin's warrantless cellphone search and the Internal Affairs Division Report of Investigation that Investigator Dustin authored, which also relied on the results of his warrantless cellphone search. Ex. A ¶¶ 5-17. A search and seizure warrant, identifying the cellphone taken at Mr. Wood's home as the item to be seized and searched, was granted by this court in February 2019. See ECF 18-1, Ex. G. The cellphone was searched pursuant to this warrant, and Mr. Wood was subsequently indicted on child pornography charges. ECF 1. His motion to suppress focuses on the legality of Investigator Dustin's warrantless search of the cellphone based on which the FBI obtained a search warrant and the information necessary to his charges.

ANALYSIS

Pre-revolutionary writs of assistance permitted roving searches for contraband, and such general warrants allowed searches without any particularized or oath-based evidence of an offense. Colonial Americans reviled the practice precisely because they "placed the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer." Boyd v. United States , 116 U.S. 616, 625, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) ; see also Maryland v. King , 569 U.S. 435, 466-67, 133 S.Ct. 1958, 186 L.Ed.2d 1 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Indianapolis v. Edmond , 531 U.S. 32, 37, 121 S.Ct. 447, 148 L.Ed.2d 333 (2000). The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution worked to stamp out suspicionless searches and provided the right of the people "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." As the constitutional text suggests, the "touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness."

United States v. Knights , 534 U.S. 112, 118, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001).

The Fourth Amendment constrains searches and seizures that are not justified under the circumstances or that are not conducted in a proper manner. See King , 569 U.S. at 446-47, 133 S.Ct. 1958. The Fourth Amendment generally requires a warrant before the government searches a person's property. Indeed, searches conducted without a warrant "are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Arizona v. Gant , 556 U.S. 332, 338, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009) (quoting Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) ).

A. Fourth Amendment: Reasonableness Based on the Totality of the Circumstances

Within the exceptions, certain warrantless searches have been declared reasonable—for instance, when "faced with special law enforcement needs, diminished expectations of privacy, minimal intrusions, or the like." Illinois v. McArthur , 531 U.S. 326, 330, 121 S.Ct. 946, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001). The government conceded at oral argument that it is not asserting a special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment, see , e.g. , Griffin v. Wisconsin , 483 U.S. 868, 874, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987), or the question often left open in condition-based search cases, namely consent of the parolee (or probationer), see , e.g. , Knights , 534 U.S. at 118,...