United States v. Wood

• Decision Date: 18 April 2022
• Docket Number: 20-1454
• Citation: 31 F.4th 593
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Aston WOOD, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

31 F.4th 593

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Aston WOOD, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 20-1454

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued November 29, 2021

Decided April 18, 2022

Meredith P. Duchemin, Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Madison, WI, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Thomas W. Patton, Attorney, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Peoria, IL, Colleen McNichols Ramais, Attorney, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Urbana, IL, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before Easterbrook, Scudder, and St. Eve, Circuit Judges.

St. Eve, Circuit Judge.

Aston Wood stole money from homeowners in foreclosure by promising to provide financial services which he did not render. Wood pleaded guilty to various fraud charges and was sentenced to an above-Guidelines term of imprisonment. During sentencing and without fore-warning, the district court referenced Sally Iriri, an unrelated defendant in a separate case. Wood appeals, arguing this comparison rendered his sentencing procedurally infirm and that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. We affirm Wood's sentence.

I. Background

Aston Wood preyed upon and defrauded homeowners facing foreclosure between September 2015 and July 2019. Using lists of homes in foreclosure, Wood solicited clients by offering to refinance or modify their mortgages so they could stay in their homes. Wood convinced his clients to make their mortgage payments payable to him or his company, assuring the homeowners he would apply the money to their loans.

In some instances, Wood convinced his clients to stall foreclosure proceedings by manipulating the bankruptcy process. Wood directed his clients to file for bankruptcy but refuse to pay the attendant filing fees or otherwise cooperate with the bankruptcy proceeding. A client's noncompliance would ultimately result in the petition's dismissal, but the intervening period allowed Wood to extract additional mortgage payments from homeowners. On October 24, 2017, this practice caused a bankruptcy judge in the Western District of Wisconsin to permanently enjoin Wood from soliciting, offering to perform, or performing services for the general public relating to mortgage foreclosures and debt relief. Wood utterly disregarded this court order and continued to engage in such practices for almost two more years.

When clients eventually lost their homes to foreclosure, Wood blamed lender malfeasance, greed, or neglect. Wood— adopting the role of negotiator, financer, or buyer—offered to help some clients repurchase their foreclosed homes. In doing so, Wood continued to solicit and receive money from these clients on the understanding the funds would be used to repurchase their homes.

In fact, Wood deposited his clients' money into accounts he controlled. He used the funds to cover his personal expenses, including trips to Miami and a vacation in New Orleans. All told, Wood defrauded approximately 73 victims of almost $400,000. Many were evicted from their homes.

The government indicted Wood on nine counts arising from his scheme: six counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 ; one count of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 ; one count of bankruptcy fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 157 ; and one count of criminal contempt of court, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 401(3). Although Wood was initially released on pretrial supervision, the district court revoked his bond when the government discovered he was violating the conditions of release by contacting his victims, soliciting money for mortgage services, and discouraging his victims from cooperating with the government.

Wood ultimately pled guilty to one count of wire fraud and one count of bankruptcy fraud pursuant to a plea agreement. The presentence investigation report recommended a within-Guidelines sentence of 72 months' imprisonment based on a Guidelines range of 70 to 87 months. Wood responded with a sentencing memorandum that highlighted mitigating characteristics, such as his decision to plead guilty, his medical ailments, his age, his close family and community ties, and his ability to find and hold legitimate, gainful employment.

At sentencing, the district court adopted the facts in the presentence report and affirmed it would consider the advisory sentencing Guidelines and the enumerated factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The district court expressed skepticism as to the legitimacy of Wood's allocution, citing Wood's previous fraudulent crimes and the duration of the present scheme. When the district court asked Wood's counsel for an explanation for Wood's behavior, Wood's counsel replied, "I'm not sure I can really answer the question except that it was a way to make money."

After taking live testimony from several victims, the district court articulated the basis for Wood's sentence. Citing the victim impact statements, the district court emphasized the "heartlessness" of Wood's actions and the absence of mitigating explanations. Wood used a specialized skillset to "prey[ ] on particularly vulnerable victims," developed a relationship with them, gained "intimate knowledge" of their finances and "particular personal vulnerabilities," and abused this position of trust for his own financial gain. Although the number of victims and amount of damages were known, the district court stressed the profound, non-monetary harm Wood wrought upon his victims. Wood's victims were humiliated, lost treasured property, suffered ruined credit scores, and lost trust in institutions and in the government, while Wood's abuse of the bankruptcy process also harmed legitimate creditors. The district court characterized Wood's behavior as "relentless" based on both the duration of his scheme and his refusal to stop even after a court order. In the district court's assessment, Wood was driven purely by greed, and his last-minute expression of remorse merited "little credence."

In the district court's estimation, the Guidelines inadequately accounted for Wood's behavior and the vulnerability of his victims, so the district court decided to "vary[ ] completely" from the recommended range. Shortly before announcing Wood's sentence, the district court observed Wood's "crime stands apart from any financial crimes that I have had in my nearly six years on the bench." The closest comparator was a fraudulent scheme carried out by Sally Iriri, a woman the district court sentenced previously in an entirely separate case. The district court observed that Iriri was induced to commit fraud by others, whereas Wood committed his crime completely unprompted and on his own. The district court then sentenced Wood to an above-Guidelines sentence of 144 months' imprisonment and 3 years' supervised release. After discussing conditions of supervision and restitution, the district court asked, "Is there anything else I need to address today?" Wood's counsel raised some minor administrative matters, which the district court resolved before concluding the sentencing hearing.

II. Discussion

Wood appeals his sentence on procedural and substantive grounds. Both challenges fail.

A. Procedural Reasonableness

Wood claims the district court procedurally erred by comparing him with Iriri without forewarning, thereby relying upon inaccurate information and depriving him of the opportunity to challenge the comparison. Before reaching the merits of Wood's challenge, we must first resolve a dispute over the applicable standard of review. Wood argues he is entitled to de novo review. See United States v. Ballard , 12 F.4th 734, 740 (7th Cir. 2021) ("We review procedural challenges de novo. "). The government claims plain error review applies because Wood did not raise the basis for his challenge—the comparison with Iriri—before the district court. See United States v. Pankow , 884 F.3d 785, 790–91 (7th Cir. 2018) (reviewing inadequately preserved procedural challenges for plain error). The parties' dispute presents us with an opportunity to resolve an apparent tension within this Circuit's caselaw regarding what standard applies in such situations.

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 51 guides preservation of error. Rule 51(a) states in no uncertain terms: "[e]xceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary" to preserve a basis for appeal. Fed. R. Crim. P. 51(a). An exception is a complaint about a judicial choice, such as a ruling or an order, after it has been made. United States v. Bartlett , 567 F.3d 901, 910 (7th Cir. 2009). A district court's explanation of its sentencing decision, regardless of whether it precedes or follows the announcement of the sentence itself, is a ruling to which an exception is not required. United States v. Pennington , 908 F.3d 234, 238 (7th Cir. 2018) ("Pennington's arguments on appeal challenge the district court's explanation of its sentencing decision," which are "the kind of post-decision exceptions that Rule 51(a) provides a party need not raise to preserve her appellate rights."); see also United States v. Farrington , 783 F. App'x 610, 612 (7th Cir. 2019) (declining to require an exception where "[t]he contested remarks ... came just moments before the judge set Farrington's 240-month prison term" because "[t]he judge had made a decision and definitively announced the sentence") (internal quotations omitted).

Rule 51(b) instructs, to preserve a claim of error, that the party must "inform[ ] the court—when the court ruling or order is made or sought—of the action the party wishes the court to take, or the party's objection to the court's action and the grounds for that objection." Fed. R. Crim. P. 51(b). However, "[i]f a party does not have an opportunity to object to a ruling or order, the absence of an objection does not later prejudice that party." Id.

In the present case, the district court compared Wood's crime with Iriri's moments before announcing Wood's sentence. After announcing the sentence, the district court asked whether there was "anything else" he...