United States v. Woods

Decision Date12 September 1973
Docket NumberNo. 72-2217.,72-2217.
Citation484 F.2d 127
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Martha L. WOODS, Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Robert B. Barnhouse and Robert E. Cahill, Baltimore, Md. Court-appointed counsel, for appellant.

Charles G. Bernstein, Asst. U. S. Atty. (George Beall, U. S. Atty., and Thomas L. Crowe, Asst. U. S. Atty., on brief), for appellee.

Before WINTER, FIELD and WIDENER, Circuit Judges.

WINTER, Circuit Judge:

Martha L. Woods was found guilty by a jury of murder in the first degree1 and seven other charges of assault with intent to murder, attempt to murder, and mistreatment2 of her eight-month-old pre-adoptive foster son, Paul David Woods. She had also been indicted and went to trial on three counts of assault, attempt to murder, and mistreatment of Judy Woods, her two-year-old adopted daughter, but the district court granted a judgment of acquittal on these charges. Mrs. Woods was sentenced to life imprisonment on the conviction of first degree murder, and she received various sentences on the other convictions, some to run concurrently with one another, and others to run consecutively.3

In this appeal, Mrs. Woods contends first that the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the corpus delicti of murder, both because the evidence concerning the death of Paul Woods failed to supply that proof and because evidence about her nine other children was not admissible for that purpose;4 second, that even if such evidence of prior acts was admissible to prove corpus delicti, the evidence in this case was inadmissible because it was too insubstantial to prove that defendant caused the prior incidents; and third, that even if it was otherwise admissible, the jury was improperly instructed by the district court with regard to the consideration it might give to such evidence. A final contention is that on the conviction of first degree murder Mrs. Woods could have been sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a) — a sentence the district court indicated that it was disposed to consider but was powerless to adopt — instead of receiving a "straight" sentence for life. We find no merit in any of these contentions, and we affirm.

I.

The issues before us arise from the manner in which the government, by necessity, undertook to prove its case. The government showed that Paul was born February 9, 1969, and that he spent the first five months of his life in a foster home. During that time his physical health was uneventful and he never suffered from any breathing problems or cyanosis (a blue color, principally around the lips, due to a lack of oxygen). At the time he was placed in Mrs. Woods' home, he was a normal, healthy baby.

Beginning August 4, 1969, a bizarre series of events occurred. Twice on that date, and once again on August 8, August 13, and August 20, Paul suffered instances of gasping for breath and turning blue from lack of oxygen. Each time he responded to mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, except on August 20, when he went into a coma which persisted until September 21, when he died at an age of slightly more than seven months. On each of these occasions the evidence indicated that Paul had been in Mrs. Woods' custody, and only Mrs. Woods had had access to him. On each occasion, prior to August 20, Paul was taken to the hospital. On the first occasion, he was immediately released because an examination disclosed that he was apparently well. On the other occasions, even after several days' observation, no reason for his cyanosis or respiratory difficulties could be discovered.

To prove that Paul's death was neither accidental nor the result of natural causes,5 the government presented the testimony of a forensic pathologist, Dr. DiMaio, who, based upon Paul's medical history, the records of his various hospitalizations, and the results of an autopsy which the pathologist had performed after Paul's death stated that Paul's death was not suicide or accident and that he found no evidence of natural death. Dr. DiMaio expressed his opinion as one of seventy-five percent certainty that Paul's death was homicide caused by smothering. Dr. DiMaio explained his twenty-five percent degree of doubt as being the possibility that Paul died naturally from a disease currently unknown to medical science, and he agreed that his doubt was a "reasonable doubt" within the standard definition given by the court.6

Next, the government showed that beginning in 1945 Mrs. Woods had had custody of, or access to, nine children who suffered a minimum of twenty episodes of cyanosis. Seven children died, while five had multiple episodes of cyanosis. Three of the children were her own natural born children; two were children she had adopted; one was a niece; one was a nephew; and two were children of friends.

There follow a listing of the nine other children and a summary of the evidence, favorable to the government, concerning them:

Judy Woods

Judy was adopted by defendant and her husband, and while under the age of two, had at least six episodes of blueness and breathing difficulties. Two episodes occurred on December 12, 1967, and Judy was hospitalized for six days. Another occurred March 22, 1968, and another on February 10, 1969. On March 16, 1969, Judy turned blue but responded to mouth-to-mouth resuscitation. On September 9, 1969, there was another episode and Judy was admitted to Kirk Army Hospital and later The Johns Hopkins Hospital. During no hospitalization, nor as a result of any other medical examination or test, was any cause for cyanosis and breathing difficulties discovered. On each occasion that Judy experienced cyanosis she was alone with defendant. When Judy was removed from defendant's custody after her last discharge from the hospital, she never again suffered from any type of cyanotic condition.

Charles Lewis Stewart

Charles was defendant's first natural child and although born prematurely in 1946, was born without congenital malformation. When he was one month old, he experienced two episodes of cyanosis while being held in defendant's arms. When taken to the hospital, Charles appeared to be in no apparent distress and his hospital course was normal. Two days after he was released from the hospital, he died after an episode of coughing, choking, and turning blue. Although defendant presented alibi evidence to show that she was not present when he died, the government's proof was to the contrary. The cause of death listed on the death certificate ("enlarged thymus" and "status lymphaticus") was shown to have been a medical impossibility.

Mary Elizabeth Huston

Mary was defendant's second born natural child and she was born in 1950. She died at the age of one month and twenty-seven days. Born prematurely, she spent the first three weeks of her life in a hospital and upon her release to defendant's care, she suffered four or five episodes of cyanosis at times when Mary was alone with her mother or in her care. She was hospitalized twice, and no medical reason for her cyanosis could be discovered. Her death occurred while she was in defendant's arms. The causes of death listed on her death certificate ("asphyxiation due to a mucous plug" and "patent foramen ovale") were shown to have been medically impossible or extremely unlikely.

Carol Ann Huston

Carol was the defendant's third natural child. She was born January 22, 1952, and died at the age of three months and twenty-one days. She was shown to be a normal, healthy baby, but she experienced cyanosis on the day of her death when she was in the care and custody of her mother. The government's evidence showed that the cause of death listed on her death certificate ("epiglossitis" and "bronchopneumonia") must have been diagnosed after death without an autopsy and that the diagnosis was medically impossible under these circumstances.

John Wise

John was defendant's nephew who died December 26, 1946, at the age of three years and seven months and who was suffering from diphtheria at the time of his death. The government's evidence was that John died while he was in bed with the defendant and that three other children from the home who also suffered from diphtheria all survived.

Lilly Marie Stewart

Lilly was defendant's niece who died May 18, 1958, at the age of fourteen months. The child's parents awoke one night to find the child in defendant's arms making a gurgling noise and appearing to be blue around the mouth. When rushed to the hospital, she was dead on arrival. No autopsy was performed.

Eddie Thomas

Eddie, an eighteen-month-old child, and his seven or eight-year-old brother, David, were left with defendant while the mother visited her husband in the hospital. Eddie experienced cyanosis and was taken to the hospital. There he appeared well and was released. His mother observed a bruise on his neck when she bathed him later in the day. Defendant conceded that she had been alone with Eddie when he experienced breathing difficulties. Her explanation of the cause of the difficulty, i.e., a mucous block, was shown to have been a medical impossibility.

Marlan Rash

Marlan was a child of a friend, who died on May 3, 1964, at the age of eighteen months. During the last five months of his life, he suffered three cyanotic attacks while in defendant's care. After the first attack he was hospitalized five days and suffered no seizures while in the hospital. An initial diagnosis of epilepsy was made. The second episode occurred four months later and he was again hospitalized. The third episode occurred on the day he was released from the hospital from the second episode, and the child died. An autopsy failed to reveal a cause of death. The preliminary diagnosis of epilepsy was largely disproved.

In its rebuttal, the government presented the testimony of another pathologist who testified that, in his opinion, Paul was the victim of homicide by smothering.

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