United States v. Woods

• Decision Date: 18 June 2015
• Docket Number: 14-0783
• Parties: UNITED STATES, Appellee v. Marshand A. WOODS, Lieutenant Junior Grade, U.S. Navy, Appellant
• Court: United States Court of Appeals, Armed Forces Court of Appeals

74 M.J. 238

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Marshand A. WOODS, Lieutenant Junior Grade, U.S. Navy, Appellant

No. 14-0783

United States Court of Appeals, Armed Forces

June 18, 2015

Argued: February 25, 2015.

Crim. App. No. 201300153. Military Judge: Marcus Fulton.

For Appellant: Lieutenant Gabriel K. Bradley, JAGC, USN (argued); Lieutenant David W. Warning, JAGC, USN (on brief).

For Appellee: Lieutenant Ann E. Dingle, JAGC, USN (argued); Brian K. Keller, Esq. (on brief); Lieutenant Commander Keith Lofland, JAGC, USN.

BAKER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ERDMANN, RYAN, and OHLSON, JJ., joined. STUCKY, J., filed a separate opinion concurring in the result.

OPINION [74 M.J. 239]

BAKER, Chief Judge.

Contrary to his pleas, a general court-martial composed of officer members convicted Appellant of aggravated sexual assault, in violation of Article 120, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 920 (2012). He was sentenced to confinement for five months, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and dismissal. The convening authority approved the sentence as adjudged, and suspended forfeitures for a period of three months. The United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) affirmed. United States v. Woods, No. NMCCA 201300153 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. June 26, 2014). On Appellant's petition, we granted review of the following issue:

WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ERRED BY DENYING A CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE AGAINST THE COURT-MARTIAL PRESIDENT, WHO SAID THE " GUILTY UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT" STANDARD IS " ESSENTIAL" TO THE MILITARY'S MISSION

In the military justice system, panel members are chosen by the same individual -- the convening authority -- who decides whether to bring criminal charges forward to trial. Article 25, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. 825 (2012). In this case, the convening authority selected Captain (CAPT) Martha Villalobos as the senior member of the panel that would try Appellant for sexual assault, despite having access to her preliminary member's questionnaire, in which CAPT Villalobos stated her belief that " enforcement of 'you are guilty until proven innocent' (just the opposite as in the civilian sector) is essential because the military needs to be held to a higher standard just for reasons of our mission." During voir dire, CAPT Villalobos elaborated on this response, but reasonable observers could interpret her responses as confusing rather than clarifying her views. After voir dire, the military judge denied trial defense counsel's motion to strike CAPT Villalobos for cause. Given the specific facts of this case and the unique structure of the military justice system, a reasonable member of the public might well question the fairness of including CAPT Villalobos on the panel. United States v. Peters, 74 M.J. 31, 36 (C.A.A.F. 2015). As a result, we reverse on the ground of implied bias.

BACKGROUND

On October 5, 2012, in advance of Appellant's trial, CAPT Villalobos completed a court-martial member questionnaire. In response to an open-ended question regarding her view of the military justice system, CAPT Villalobos provided the response at issue in this appeal:

[Q.] What is your opinion of the military's criminal justice system

[A.] There is not [a] perfect system, and I understand why the enforcement of 'you are guilty until proven innocent' (just the opposite as in the civilian sector) is essential because the military needs to be held to a higher standard just for reasons of our mission. It is a voluntary force and you come into the service knowing that you will be held to this higher standard[] and give up your civil rights. [74 M.J. 240]

On December 11, 2012, the convening authority relieved the panel members previously detailed to Appellant's court-martial, and assigned a new panel. CAPT Villalobos was detailed as the panel's senior member. The record does not reflect whether the convening authority reviewed CAPT Villalobos's questionnaire, but the parties agree that (1) the purpose of the questionnaire was to assess a prospective member's suitability; and (2) the questionnaire was available for review.

During voir dire, trial counsel addressed CAPT Villalobos's questionnaire response as follows:

ATC: Okay. Now in terms of the standard for finding guilt in a court-martial, you had indicated that the enforcement of " You are guilty until proven innocent is essential in the military." Now you heard the military judge talk a little bit today. If he advises you that the standard for proof is that Lieutenant (JG) Woods is, in fact, innocent until proven guilty, and he's innocent as he sits here right now and that it's the government's burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, could you follow the judge's instruction on that?

MBR: (CAPT Villalobos): Yes.

ATC: Okay. And would you also be able to follow the instruction that the burden of proof never shifts to the accused. The government always retains the burden to prove guilt.

MBR: Yes.

Trial defense counsel then explored CAPT Villalobos's questionnaire response:

ADC: You state that the -- you understand why in the military the enforcement of " You are guilty until proven innocent. Just the opposite [as] in the civilian sector is essential, because the military needs to be held to a higher standard." What did you mean by that?

MBR: Well, I mean I guess just the discussions that I've had with my husband. He's in the Army, Special Forces, and you know, this is, you know, we've talked about the military system and how we are held to a higher standard and never being -- I've never dealt officially in a court-martial, and have been told " No, this isn't the way it works," and so I understand the rules of the game, and I, you know, I don't have a problem following them. What I meant by that is yes, us military think we should be held to a higher standard since our behavior, because you know, we raise our hand, and we are defending our country.

ADC: Is that what you meant when you mentioned that we give up our civil rights?

MBR: Right.

ADC: Okay. So do you believe that because Lieutenant (JG) Woods is a service member, he has given up his civil rights?

MBR: Well, no, because he -- I mean obviously he hasn't, because we're here on his behalf, so that we can hear the testimony and find out if he, you know, if he's guilty or not.

ADC: Okay. I guess my question is do you hold him to a higher standard, because we're in a military court than you would if we were in a civilian court?

MBR: Well, I -- so do I think we should be held to a higher standard as when we put the uniform on and as we behave and as we go about our business, we should be held to a higher standard.

ADC: Okay.

MBR: Once you are in a court of -- you know, in a court, a court of law is, you know, then it's up to the parties to -- to them to find him -- to present a case so that we were presented with the facts and see if he's guilty or not.

ADC: Okay. If the case were close, would you give me more -- would you, you know, aid on the side of the government, because he's in the uniform, and we should hold him to a higher standard? Does that make sense?

MBR: Well, it's hard for me to say if I'm in that position. I think it depends on the facts that are presented, like, you know, if that -- I mean the facts are -- and if they have a case presented to -- in a way that yes, they prove he's guilty, that he's guilty, you know? I mean I don't know if -- I'm not sure what you're asking me.

ADC: And that's what I'm trying to find out, ma'am. I'm just trying to figure out [74 M.J. 241] when you mention that you automatically hold him to a higher standard, because he's in the military now. I'm just trying to figure out if the defense is already climbing the hill, because he's in the military, and you know, we're going to have to go even further than that to get a not guilty verdict.

MBR: I don't know what happened. I don't know any of the facts. You know, maybe -- I mean I have no idea. I haven't heard the case, you know. If I see Mr. Smokatellie and Petty Officer Smokatellie out in the town, I expect that Petty Officer Smokatellie to a higher standard [sic] and not get drunk and not act like this or that, you know. That's what I'm talking about as far as like we're held to a higher standard.

. . . .

ADC: And then finally the last -- one of the last questions on the supplemental questionnaire asked " Do you believe the defense has to prove Lieutenant (JG) Woods' innocence," and you say " No, I believe the defense is there to establish reasonable doubt." Do you mean that we don't have to do anything or do you think that we actually have to proactively try to establish reasonable doubt in the case?

MBR: I think it's on them to prove if he's guilty or not.

ADC: Okay. So the burden rests solely with the government?

MBR: Yes.

The military judge then questioned CAPT Villalobos:

MJ: Okay. Captain, going back to your answer to question 20, it appears that you, in fact, arrived at this court-martial with an erroneous understanding of the burden of proof in this case.

MBR: Right.

MJ: Is that fair to say?

MBR: Yes.

MJ: Okay. And your answer also tends to indicate that you might think that there would be a good reason for the military to operate under a system like the one that you presumed that we did.

MBR: Um-huh.

MJ: I want to make sure in my own mind and for the record that you understand that the burden of proof in this case is on the government, that it never shifts to the defense.

MBR: Right. I understand that.

MJ: And that the obligation for a conviction in this case is that the government must prove their case beyond a reasonable doubt. Do you understand that?

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