United States v. Work

• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
• Writing for the Court: MARTIN, Justice, and ROBB and VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justices
• Citation: United States v. Work, 13 F.2d 302, 56 App. DC 330 (D.C. Cir. 1926)
• Decision Date: 01 June 1926
• Docket Number: No. 4442.,4442.
• Parties: UNITED STATES ex rel. GIVENS v. WORK, Secretary of the Interior.

56 App. DC 330, 13 F.2d 302 (1926)

UNITED STATES ex rel. GIVENS v. WORK, Secretary of the Interior.

No. 4442.

Court of Appeals of District of Columbia.

Submitted May 3, 1926.

Decided June 1, 1926.

J. H. Covington and Spencer Gordon, both of Washington, D. C., for appellant.

D. V. Hunter, of Washington, D. C., for appellee.

Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB and VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justices.

VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justice.

Appellant, plaintiff below, filed a petition in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary of the Interior to issue her a patent for certain lands located in the state of California.

It appears that the land in question was granted to the Atlantic & Pacific Railroad Company by the Act of July 27, 1866, 14 Stat. 292. It was also embraced within a grant to the Southern Pacific Railroad Company under the Act of March 3, 1871, 16 Stat. 573. Subsequently, by decree of court, it was excluded from the latter grant by reason of the prior grant. By the Act of Congress of July 6, 1886, 24 Stat. 123, the grant to the Atlantic & Pacific Railroad Company was forfeited for the failure of the railroad company to construct its road in compliance with the terms of the grant.

In 1882 one Daniel D. Brunk, a citizen of the United States, had settled on the land involved in this suit. In 1885 he contracted with the railroad company for the purchase of the land and made payments thereon. In 1886 Brunk assigned all his interest in and to his contract with the railroad company to one Milton D. Painter, and in 1887 this agreement was filed for record in the office of the recorder of Los Angeles county, the county in which the land is situated. The railroad company consented to this assignment in November, 1886.

The present action is founded upon rights alleged to have been embodied in the Act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 556 (Comp. St. § 4895 et seq.), which was enacted for the protection of those who in good faith had purchased land from the railroad company. Section 5 of the act (Comp. St. § 4899) provides as follows: "That where any said company shall have sold to citizens of the United States, or to persons who have declared their intention to become such citizens, as a part of its grant, lands not conveyed to or for the use of such company, said lands being the numbered sections prescribed in the grant, and being coterminous with the constructed parts of said road, and where the lands so sold are for any reason excepted from the operation of the grant to said company, it shall be lawful for the bona fide purchaser thereof from said company to make payment to the United States for said lands at the ordinary government price for like lands, and thereupon patents shall issue therefor to the said bona fide purchaser, his heirs or assigns."

By an executive proclamation of December 20, 1892, 27 Stat. 1049, the land in question, still unsurveyed, was included within the limits of the San Gabriel timber land reserve, and by executive order of June 26, 1908, it was included in the Angeles National Forest. The land was surveyed in 1911, and a plat thereof filed in the local land office at Los Angeles October 4, 1912.

It is not denied that Painter was directly within the provisions of the act of 1887. Indeed, his rights were adjudicated as such in United States v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 184 U. S. 49, 22 S. Ct. 285, 46 L. Ed. 425. Painter, however, took no steps to obtain a patent for the land between the date of the decree in 1902 and October 25, 1917, when he conveyed to the plaintiff, Helen L. Givens, all his right, title, and interest in the land, and his interest in Brunk's contract of purchase. Plaintiff, Givens, promptly filed her application to enter and purchase the land under section 5 of the act of 1887 aforesaid.

In 1901 or 1902, prior to the decree of the Supreme Court, a forest ranger took possession of a house on the land, which Brunk had constructed and resided in up to the time of his death, with a view of establishing a ranger station. Finding the house unsatisfactory, he tore it down and erected a cabin. In 1907 a new ranger station was erected on the land, which has been used since that time for the Forestry Service. Between the years 1907 and 1917, 30 permits were issued by the Forestry Service for the erection of cottages on the land. Each permit, however, contained the following provision: "This permit is issued subject to all existing valid claims."

It is alleged in the answer, and admitted by demurrer, that improvements amounting to $26,000 were made by these permittees on the land prior to plaintiff's application of November 2, 1917. It is not contended that these permits for the erection of small cottages conveyed any title or interest in the land. As consideration for the permits, a small rental in each instance is collected by the Agricultural Department, under whose direction and authority the permits were issued.

The primary question presented in this case is whether or not Painter was guilty of such laches as would render his conveyance to plaintiff voidable at the instance of the government. Defendant's answer to plaintiff's petition, which is admitted by the demurrer, alleges in substance that Painter up to 1916 owned property and resided in Los Angeles; that he had taken no steps toward exercising his right under section 5 of the act of 1887; that in 1916, through the efforts of one Harrison Ward, the land was identified; and that to exercise his right under the act, owing to unpaid taxes and other expenses, would require an outlay of some $300. Painter accordingly sold his right to Ward for $50, and Ward caused the deed to be executed and delivered to a relative, the plaintiff herein. It is further alleged and admitted that Ward had not seen the land since 1906, but bought it as a camp site for his mother, with whom plaintiff resided in Pasadena. The land is situated 30 miles from Los Angeles and 6 miles from Pasadena.

Painter was in every sense a bona fide purchaser under the act of 1887. His purchase from Brunk was prior to the act. The transaction, therefore, possessed none of the infirmities that might attach to subsequent purchasers, although it has been held by the Land Department, in ...