United States v. World's Columbian Exposition

Decision Date08 June 1893
Citation56 F. 630
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
PartiesUNITED STATES v. WORLD'S COLUMBIAN EXPOSITION et al.

T. E Milchrist, U.S. Atty., Charles Aldrich, Sol. Gen., Judge Hand, David Fales, and J. L. High, for the United States.

Edwin Walker and Gen. St. Clair, for Exposition Co.

Before WOODS and JENKINS, Circuit Judges, and GROSSCUP, District Judge.

WOODS Circuit Judge, (orally.)

Of the interesting questions involved in the case the first that I shall consider is that of the possession of Jackson Park. It is a question which must be determined by reference to the act of congress of April 25, 1890. There is, in my view of the case, no dispute of fact involved. It is true that the bill alleges and the answer denies that the defendant, the local corporation, delivered possession to the United States but I do not understand that the denial was intended to put in issue, or does put in issue, any matter of fact touching the possession. It is a matter of legal conclusion, to be deduced from the provisions of the act of congress under which the exposition was inaugurated and is being conducted.

The act referred to was passed April 25, 1890. On August 5, 1890, was passed an act of the legislature of the state of Illinois and on September 17, 1890, in pursuance of the authority conferred or attempted to be conferred by the act of the legislature, an ordinance was adopted by the commissioners of Jackson Park, permitting the use of the park for the purpose of the World's Fair. Both the act of the legislature and the ordinance refer expressly to the act of congress, showing that the legislature and the park commissioners intended that the park grounds should be used under the provisions of that act. Besides, on July 31, 1890, the general assembly of Illinois proposed a constitutional amendment authorizing the city of Chicago to incur a bonded indebtedness to the amount of $5,000,000 in aid of this project. The people voted on that amendment November 4, 1890, and the adoption of it was proclaimed by the governor November 29, 1890. So that, in addition to the direct act of the legislature of the state and the ordinance of the park commissioners, the consent of the people of Illinois was given by a constitutional amendment, adopted after the park had been designated as the site. There is therefore no room for reasonable question that the park has been lawfully made the site of the exposition.

Now what relations were established in respect to the possession of the park by the act of April 25, 1890? By the preamble it appears that a national and international scheme was designed which should be conducted under the sanction of congress. In the body of the act it is first provided that the exposition shall be inaugurated in Chicago. Sections 3 and 4 provide for the appointment by the president of the United States and for the organization of a commission, which by section 5 'is empowered, in its discretion, to accept for the purpose of the World's Columbian Exposition, such site as may be selected and offered, and such plans and specifications of buildings, to be erected for such purpose at the expense of and tendered by the corporation organized under the laws of the state of Illinois, known,' etc. In other words, the local corporation is to procure a site, and offer or tender it to the commission, and also to prepare plans and specifications for buildings to be erected; and the site and plans, if deemed adequate, are to be accepted by the commission. It will not do, I think, to interpret this provision as meaning only that the local corporation should select a site subject to the approval of the commission. It would have been easy to express that purpose in apt words. The words used indicate a transfer of possession. Other provisions of the act lead to the same conclusion. Numerous powers of control are given to the commissioners. They are authorized or required to allot space for the exhibitors,--an unmistakable act of possession; to appoint and prescribe the duties of the board of lady managers, and to name one or more members of all committees authorized to award prizes for exhibits produced by female labor; to modify the rules and regulations of the corporation touching rates of entrance and admission fees, or affecting the rights of exhibitors or of the public; to provide for the dedication of the buildings of the World's Columbian Exposition in Chicago, on the 12th of October, 1892, with appropriate ceremonies; to determine at what time, not later than October 30, 1893, the exposition shall finally close; to adopt regulations to be communicated by the president of the United States to diplomatic representatives of foreign nations; and to make reports from time to time to the president of the progress of the work, and in a final report to present a full exhibit of the results of the exposition. Besides these powers of general control vested in the commission, other provisions of the act are significant. The government itself, it is provided, shall erect buildings upon the grounds, including a life-saving station, which is to be removed at the end of the exposition, and placed elsewhere, and also shall make large national exhibits. Foreign goods subject to duty are to be admitted under regulations to be established by the treasury department. On the other hand, the local corporation, which also receives its powers from congress, is given only subordinate authority. The chief power conferred upon it is to establish rules, and is expressed in this wise:

'That after the plans of said exposition shall be prepared by said corporation and approved by said commission, the rules and regulations of said corporation governing rates for entrance and admission fees, or otherwise affecting the rights and privileges or interests of the exhibitors or the public, shall be fixed or established by said corporation, subject, however, to such modification, if any, as may be imposed by the majority of said commissioners.' In short, the commissioners have supervision and final authority in respect to the rules under which the fair shall be conducted.

I may as well state here my opinion concerning the question of the repeal of the rule for Sunday closing. It seems that after the enactment by congress of the act of 1892, making a donation of $2,500,000 in souvenir coins, a rule such as congress contemplated was adopted. At a later date an attempt at repeal was made, and, it is insisted, was successful. It is true, I think, as contended by counsel, that the right to originate rules is in the local corporation, and, generally speaking, rules so originated will be in force until the commissioners modify or reject them; but a proper interpretation of the act requires a qualification of that proposition. In order that the authority of the commission in this respect may be effective, it must be that, once the commission has modified or declared a rule upon a particular subject, that rule may not be changed or repealed without the approval of the commission; otherwise, once the commission has adjourned, the local board can annul its action by adopting or re-enacting rules to its own liking. It is not claimed that the consent of a majority of the commissioners was given to the repeal of the rule for Sunday closing, and, that being so, irrespective of other considerations, it must be held, I think, that the rule remains in force.

But to return to the question of possession. That congress itself understood that the effect of the act of April 25, 1890, was to put the exposition under national control is indicated by the twenty-first section of the act, in which it is declared that nothing in the act shall be construed to 'override or interfere with the laws of the state.' For that provision, in the absence of national possession of the exposition grounds, there was no necessity. It has no significance unless it was intended to keep in force the state laws for the preservation of the peace within the grounds, notwithstanding the possession taken by the government; the general rule being that when the United States, with the consent of a state, has taken possession of territory within the state for a national purpose, the state laws cease to have effect therein, except as provided by section 5391 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. The possession in this instance having been taken only for a temporary use, congress wisely provided against any suspension or exclusion of the laws and police powers of the state. The act of June 1, 1872, contained a like provision concerning the Centennial Exposition held at Philadelphia in 1876. It cannot be that this provision in the act of 1890 has reference to the law for the establishment of Jackson Park, and to the right therein given to citizens of 'free access forever,' because that right, unless lawfully suspended, is necessarily overridden by the establishment of the exposition in the park. If these views are right, there can be no doubt of the power of congress to make, or to require the national commission to adopt, any proper rule concerning the use of the grounds, or for the conduct and management of the fair. If this is not so, then congress had no right to say that the exposition should be open to the public as early as the 1st of May, 1893; or that it should be finally closed, in the discretion of the commission, not later than the 30th day of October, 1893; nor to confer upon the commission any of the important powers which have been enumerated; and, if it sees fit, the local corporation may repudiate all restraint and disregard every provision of the statute, and the government be without remedy.

In preparing for the Centennial celebration, congress, in 1871 created a commission like...

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