United States v. Wyatt
| Decision Date | 03 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | Criminal Action No. 3:09cr148 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. THOMAS G. WYATT, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Thomas G. Wyatt's Motion for Compassionate Release pursuant to Section 603(b) of the First Step Act (the "Motion"). (ECF No. 66.) The United States responded in opposition, (the "Opposition"), (ECF No. 71), and Wyatt replied (the "Reply").1 (ECF No. 72.) The matter is ripe for disposition. The Court dispenses with oral argument because the materials before it adequately present the facts and legal contentions, and argument would not aid the decisional process. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the Motion in part and reduce Wyatt's sentence by ten months.
On September 24, 2010, Wyatt pled guilty to Possession with the Intent to Distribute Cocaine Base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) (Count One); and Possession of a Firearm by a Felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Count Four). (Presentence Report ("PSR") 1, ECF No. 60.) On November 10, 2010, a jury convicted Wyatt of Possession of a Firearm in Furtherance of a Drug Trafficking Crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count Three). (Id. 6.)
The PSR describes the facts underlying Wyatt's offenses. On November 1, 2007, Richmond Police Officers patrolling in the Hillside Court section of Richmond heard two gun shots near their position. (Id. 7.) When they arrived at where the shots had originated from, they saw Wyatt standing outside near the rear of a building. (Id.) Wyatt started to walk away as one officer approached, however, he stopped when he saw another officer coming toward him in the opposite direction. (Id.) After putting Wyatt in investigative detention, the officers found a firearm inside a trash can at the building where Wyatt was originally seen. (Id.) "[T]he firearm was cocked, the firearm was warm to the touch, and the firearm smelled of burnt gun powder." (Id.) "The Virginia Department of Forensic Science identified primer residue on both of Mr. Wyatt's hands." (Id. 7.) Wyatt informed the officers that he had narcotics on his person and was found with 3.5 grams of crack cocaine in his underwear. (Id.) Wyatt's DNA was also found on the firearm. (Id. 8.)
After being found guilty of the three offenses, the Probation Office prepared a PSR for Wyatt. The PSR calculated that Wyatt faced a combined offense level of 16. (PSR ¶ 75.) With a criminal history category IV,2 Wyatt faced a Guidelines range of 33-41 months for Counts One and Four. (Id. ¶ 77.) He faced a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years on Count Three. (Id.) On February 10, 2011, the Honorable James R. Spencer sentenced Wyatt to 12 months month on Counts One and Four, running concurrent, and 120 months on Count Three, running consecutive to the sentences imposed on Counts One and Four, for a total of 132 months' imprisonment. (J. 1-2, ECF No. 47.) The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) calculates Wyatt's release date as July 31, 2024. See Bureau of Prisons. Fed. Inmate Locator. https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/.
On August 11, 2020, Wyatt filed his pro se Motion for Compassionate Release. (Pro Se Mot., ECF No. 58.) On November 24, 2020, after being appointed counsel, Wyatt filed a second Motion for Compassionate Release. (Mot. 1.) In the Motion, Wyatt describes the current public health crisis caused by COVID-19, and the conditions at Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) Fort Dix. (See generally Mot. 3-5.) In doing so, Wyatt contends that he faces an increased risk for illness from COVID-19 based on chronic health conditions consisting of "asthma, chronic kidney disease, pre-diabetes, and high cholesterol." (Id. 8.) Further, he tested positive for the COVID-19 virus in October 2020. (Id. 4.) Wyatt, currently thirty-two years old, avers that he has a viable release plan in which he will live with family and learn a skilled trade from his father. (Id. 17.) In support of his release, Wyatt states that he has participated in GED coursework, he works in the prison's food service department and has done so since 2016, he has committed only one minor disciplinary infraction, and he has been given a low security classification while incarcerated. (Id.)
The United States opposes Wyatt's request for Compassionate Release. (Opp'n, ECF No. 71.) The United States does not contest Wyatt's health conditions as presenting an "extraordinary and compelling" reason for compassionate release. (Opp'n 1.) However, the United States contends that Wyatt has "failed to establish that the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553 factors warrant releasing him to a society that he has plainly endangered four years earlier" than his current release date. (Id.) Further, the United States avers that Wyatt's original crimes were violent, given the use and discharge of a firearm. (Id. 13.)
As of April 28, 2021, approximately 2,015 inmates—out of approximately 2,761 inmates total at FCI Fort Dix—have tested positive for the COVID-19 virus. See Bureau of Prisons, COVID-19, https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus. Also, as of April 28, 2021, Fort Dix FCI hasvaccinated 247 staff and 1481 inmates. See Bureau of Prisons, COVID-19, https://wvw.bop.gov/coronavirus.
In 2018, Congress enacted the First Step Act to provide incarcerated individuals the opportunity to directly petition the courts for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).3 Prior to the First Step Act in 2018, the BOP had the sole authority to petition the court for sentence modifications on compassionate release grounds. Coleman v. United States, No. 4:17cr69, 2020 WL 3039123, at *1 (E.D. Va. June 4, 2020). Following enactment of the First Step Act, criminal defendants may petition courts on their own initiative to modify their sentences if "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction." Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)). Before granting a reduction, courts must consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), see 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), and evidence of rehabilitation and other post-conviction conduct. See United States v. Martin, 916 F.3d 389, 397-98 (4th Cir.2019) (); see also United States v. McDonald, 986 F.3d 402, 412 (4th Cir. 2021) (). However, a petitioner's rehabilitation alone does not provide sufficient grounds to warrant a sentence modification. 28 U.S.C. § 994(t).
Although the Court generally cannot "modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed," the defendant may bring a motion to modify his or her sentence "after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier . . . ." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); see also United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 283 (4th Cir. 2020) (4th Cir. Dec. 2, 2020) ("Congress, aware of the BOP's history of extensive delays, also provided a '30-day lapse' alternative, under which a defendant may proceed directly to district court if his [or her] request is not acted on within that time."). "Accordingly, a petitioner seeking compassionate release is generally required to exhaust his or her administrative remedies prior to bringing a motion before the district court." Casey v. United States, No. 4:18cr4, 2020 WL 2297184, at *1 (E.D. Va. May 6, 2020).
The court may waive the exhaustion requirement, however, in certain circumstances. United States v. Jones, No. 3:11cr249, ECF No. 47, at *2-3 (E.D. Va. Apr. 3, 2020) (Lauck, J.). Courts may waive exhaustion if: "pursuing an administrative remedy would be futile[,]" "'exhaustion via the agency review process would result in inadequate relief[,]' or 'pursuit of agency review would subject the petitioner to undue prejudice.'" United States v. Robinson, No.3:10cr261, 2020 WL 4041436, at *3 (E.D. Va. July 17, 2020) (Lauck, J.) (quoting Poulios v. United States, No. 2:09cr109, 2020 WL 1922775, at *1 (E.D. Va. Apr. 21, 2020) (Jackson. J.)).
Throughout the country, courts have found the coronavirus pandemic, combined with a vulnerable defendant with underlying health conditions, implicates all three exceptions justifying a waiver of the exhaustion requirement. See United States v. Zukerman, 451 F. Supp. 3d 329, 332-33 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (); United States v. Perez, 451 F. Supp. 3d 288, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) ().
As amended by the First Step Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) authorizes courts to modify terms of imprisonment after considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) if "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The United States Sentencing Commission further defines "extraordinary and compelling reasons." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, n.1; see United States v. Kalivretenos, No. 1:15cr00073, ECF No. 109, at *4 (E.D. Va. May 21, 2020). The Sentencing Commission identifies four instructive categories of extraordinary and compelling reasons that allow for a sentence to be modified: the petitioner's medical condition, age, family circumstances, and other reasons. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. n.1 (A...
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