United States v. Yates

• Decision Date: 28 January 1958
• Docket Number: Crim. No. 22379.
• Citation: United States v. Yates, 158 F.Supp. 480 (S.D. Cal. 1958)
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of California
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Oleta O'Connor YATES, Defendant.

158 F. Supp. 480

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Oleta O'Connor YATES, Defendant.

Crim. No. 22379.

United States District Court S. D. California, Central Division.

January 28, 1958.

Laughlin E. Waters, U. S. Atty., and Norman Neukom, Asst. U. S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff.

Margolis, McTernan & Branton, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant.

MATHES, District Judge.

It is now almost six years since the defendant at the bar, Oleta O'Connor Yates, and thirteen other paid, fulltime functionaries of the Communist Party were on trial in this court under an indictment charging them with conspiracy to commit offenses against the United States 18 U.S.C. § 371 prohibited by the Smith Act 54 Stat. 670 (1940), 18 U.S.C. § 10 (1946), § 2385 (1952) "by wilfully * * * advocating and teaching the duty and necessity of overthrowing the Government of the United States by force and violence * * * and by (2) wilfully * * * helping to organize as the Communist Party of the United States of America * * * a group * * * of persons who teach and advocate the overthrow * * * of the Government of the United States by force and violence, with the intent of causing the * * * overthrow * * of the Government * * * by force and violence as speedily as circumstances would permit." See: United States v. Schneiderman, D.C., 102 F.Supp. 52, Id., D.C.S.D.Cal.1951, 102 F.Supp. 87; United States v. Spector, D.C.S.D.Cal.1951, 102 F.Supp. 75; United States v. Schneiderman, D.C., 104 F.Supp. 405, Id., D.C., 106 F.Supp. 731, Id., D.C., 106 F.Supp. 892, Id., D.C., 106 F.Supp. 906, Id., D.C. S.D.Cal.1952, 106 F.Supp. 941; United States v. Yates, D.C., 107 F.Supp. 408, Id., D.C.S.D.Cal.1952, 107 F.Supp. 412.

The judgment of conviction entered upon the verdict of the jury was affirmed by the Court of Appeals Yates v. United States, 9 Cir., 1955, 225 F.2d 146, and later reversed by the Supreme Court, 1957, 354 U.S. 298, 77 S.Ct. 1064, 1 L.Ed. 2d 1356. On December 2, 1957, upon the Government's motion, the indictment was dismissed on the ground that the prosecution "cannot satisfy the evidentiary requirements laid down by the Supreme Court in its opinion reversing the convictions * * *."

Toward the close of the long trial which began in February and ended in August of 1952, after the Government had rested its case, defendant Yates alone of the fourteen defendants chose to take the witness stand. On direct examination she told what she wanted to tell day after day for many days. She was an extremely articulate witness and her appearance was a cleverly-staged stratagem, affording her the opportunity in effect to argue the defendants' case to the jury while purporting to give evidence on the issue of her state of mind or intent.

When at length the time came for Government counsel to cross-examine, it soon developed that defendant Yates came prepared and determined to testify only to such matters as she saw fit. She repeatedly declined to answer questions, and in defiance of the authority of the court persisted in her refusal after being instructed by the court to answer. All of this took place in the presence of the jury and in a courtroom crowded with spectators.

The criminal trial was interrupted and a hearing had. Upon this hearing counsel for the defense conceded that the questions which defendant Yates as witness had blatantly refused to answer were properly put to her, and that her conviction and punishment for contempt of court were matters "unquestionably * * * exclusively within the Court's sound discretion." See United States v. Toner, 3 Cir., 1949, 173 F.2d 140, 144.

The only excuse offered for this repeated defiance of the court was the sporting proposition that one does not wish to be an informer against anyone.

On the occasion in question here (there were others—see United States v. Yates, supra, 107 F.Supp. 408, Id., 107 F.Supp. 412, reversed 9 Cir., 1955, 227 F.2d 844, Id., 227 F.2d 848), defendant Yates was held in criminal contempt for refusal to answer eleven separate questions, and sentenced to imprisonment for one year on each of the eleven specifications of criminal contempt, all sentences to commence and run concurrently. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Yates v. United States, 9 Cir., 1955, 227 F.2d 851.

Upon certiorari 1956, 350 U.S. 947, 76 S.Ct. 322, 100 L.Ed. 825, the Supreme Court held that the eleven defiances constituted but a single contempt, and reversed the conviction as to specifications II to XI, affirmed the conviction as to specification I, but vacated the sentence and remanded the case to this court for resentencing on specification I. Yates v. United States, 1957, 355 U.S. 66, 78 S.Ct. 128, 2 L.Ed.2d 95; cf: Hirabayashi v. United States, 1943, 320 U.S. 81, 85, 63 S.Ct. 1375, 87 L.Ed. 1774; Sinclair v. United States, 1929, 279 U.S. 263, 299, 49 S.Ct. 268, 73 L.Ed. 692.

The mandate of the Supreme Court, filed in this court on January 15, 1958, reads in part:

"This Cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and was argued by counsel.

"On Consideration Whereof, It is ordered and adjudged by this Court as follows: The contempt convictions on specifications II-XI, inclusive, in this cause, be, and they are hereby, reversed. The contempt conviction on specification I, be, and it is hereby, affirmed, but the sentence on that conviction is vacated.

"It is further ordered that this cause be, and the same is hereby, remanded to the United States District Court for the Southern District of California for resentencing in the light of the opinion of this Court."

I am admonished by the Supreme Court in its opinion that this court should now consider "the extent of the willful and deliberate defiance of the court's order and the seriousness of the consequences of the contumacious behavior * * *." Yates v. United States, supra, 355 U.S. at page 75, 78 S.Ct. at page 134; United States v. United Mine Workers, 1947, 330 U.S. 258, 303, 67 S.Ct. 677, 91 L.Ed. 884.

As I understand that admonition, the extent of the defiance and the seriousness of the consequences are to be considered in the setting that existed at the time— remembering not alone the words spoken as recorded in the stenographic transcript, but also everything that occurred in the presence of this court in connection with the matter.

The record of the more-than-six-months' trial of defendant Yates and her thirteen co-defendants "consists of some 14,000 typewritten pages." Yates v. United States, supra, 354 U.S. at page 327, n. 34, 77 S.Ct. at page 1081. Reading at the rate of one page per minute throughout each hour of each eight-hour day, without rest or interruption, thirty consecutive days and more would be required in order merely to read that record of the words spoken—what was heard at the trial.

But what was heard at the trial tells only part of the story, and unfortunately my command of the English language is not such as to enable me to tell the rest— to describe adequately all that was seen or otherwise perceived by the senses as the words were spoken, and before and after.

From her own lips I learned that defendant Yates is a native-born American citizen and a graduate of the University of California; that she has been for many years an ardent and zealous Communist; that while in college she became a Socialist, but became convinced that the Socialist movement would not, because of its peaceful methods, be successful in this country; that she thereupon cast her lot with the Communist Party and embraced Lenin's teachings that only through forcible overthrow of the capitalist governments in power can socialism be established.

The Supreme Court observed that the defendant's "reluctance to be an informer" is "understandable" and a "factor" to be considered. But it must be remembered too that to be compelled to be an informer is distasteful to all freemen. Yet, if the trial courts of our land did not have and exercise the power to compel witnesses to become informers, our system of justice would in time collapse, and with it all of our courts.

Indeed, in criminal matters, with respect to all public offenses, the policy of the law is to encourage the citizen to become an informer. See: Roviaro v. United States, 1957, 353 U.S. 53, 59, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639; In re Quarles, 1895, 158 U.S. 532, 535-536, 15 S.Ct. 959, 39 L. Ed. 1080; Vogel v. Gruaz, 1884, 110 U.S. 311, 316, 4 S.Ct. 12, 28 L.Ed. 158. And one of the provisions of our Bill of Rights guarantees to every person accused of crime the right "to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor" U.S.Const. Amend. VI, which, to...