United States v. Yengel

• Decision Date: 15 February 2013
• Docket Number: No. 12–4317.,12–4317.
• Citation: 711 F.3d 392
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Joseph Robert YENGEL, Jr., Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

711 F.3d 392

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.Joseph Robert YENGEL, Jr., Defendant–Appellee.

No. 12–4317.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: Oct. 23, 2012.

Decided: Feb. 15, 2013.

ARGUED:Richard Daniel Cooke, Office of the United States Attorney, Richmond,Virginia, for Appellant. Caroline Swift Platt, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Alexandria, Virginia, Rodolfo Cejas, II, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Patrick L. Bryant, Appellate Attorney, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and WYNN and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge THACKER wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge TRAXLER and Judge WYNN joined.

OPINION

THACKER, Circuit Judge:

The instant case requires this court to consider whether the district court properly excluded evidence gained from a warrantless search. In so doing, we must address whether it was reasonable for an officer to enter a locked closet without a search warrant after responding to an armed domestic dispute, arresting the suspect and removing him from the residence, and gaining information that indicated a grenade may have been present in the closet. Based on the objective facts available to the officer at the time of the search, we agree with the district court and conclude exigent circumstances did not exist to justify the warrantless search in this case. Thus, the evidence obtained from such search was properly excluded.

I.

The relevant facts are undisputed by the parties. In the late afternoon of December 31, 2011, Sergeant Brian Staton responded to a call regarding a domestic assault at the home of Joseph Robert Yengel, Jr. (“Yengel”). The 911 dispatcher informed Sergeant Staton that a domestic dispute had erupted between Yengel and his wife. Sergeant Staton also learned that Mrs. Yengel had vacated the residence, and Yengel was potentially armed and threatening to shoot law enforcement personnel.

At around 4:00 p.m., Officer J.M. Slodysko was the first to arrive on the scene. The Yengels' two-story home featured a walk-up front porch and was located in a dense residential neighborhood, with very little space separating adjacent homes. Upon his arrival, Officer Slodysko observed that Yen-gel was “extremely upset.” J.A. 118.¹ Officer Slodysko was, however, able to calm Yengel, and to persuade him to come out of the residence onto the front porch, unarmed. Shortly thereafter, when Sergeant Staton arrived on the scene, Yengel was seated on the top step of the front porch, “agitated and emotional,” but unarmed.² J.A. 57–58, 124. The officers then further calmed Yengel, arrested him, and removed him from the scene.

While still at the scene, Sergeant Staton then interviewed Mrs. Yengel and Yengel's mother, Karol Yengel. During the interviews, Sergeant Staton learned Yengel kept a large number of firearms and a “grenade” inside the house. Sergeant Statonalso learned that Mrs. Yengel's young son was sleeping in one of the upstairs bedrooms. Upon learning of the possible existence of a “grenade,” Sergeant Staton did not immediately call for the assistance of explosive experts, nor did he evacuate the area. Rather, Sergeant Staton asked Mrs. Yengel to show him where the alleged grenade was kept.

Mrs. Yengel directed Sergeant Staton into the upstairs master bedroom. There, she collected a variety of firearms which were strewn about the bedroom, placed the firearms on the bed, and requested that Sergeant Staton remove them. She said nothing further at that point about the existence or removal of the alleged grenade. Therefore, Sergeant Staton reiterated his request to locate the “grenade,” and Mrs. Yengel directed him to a nearby guest bedroom located at the end of the upstairs hallway, directly next to the bedroom in which her young son was sleeping.³ Mrs. Yengel led Sergeant Staton to a closet inside the guest bedroom that was locked with a combination keypad and thumbprint scanner. Mrs. Yengel informed Sergeant Staton that she did not know the combination to the lock and did not have access to the closet, but told him the “grenade” was kept inside. She then gave Sergeant Staton permission to “kick the door open” and told him to “do whatever you need to do to get in there.” J.A. 64.

At this point, Sergeant Staton still did not notify explosive experts, did not evacuate the house or nearby homes, did not remove the sleeping child from the room located directly next to the room where the “grenade” was allegedly stored, and did not secure a search warrant. Instead, he simply pried open the closet with a screwdriver.

Once inside the closet, Sergeant Staton identified a variety of military equipment, including two gun safes, camouflage, and other weapons. Sergeant Staton also identified what he thought to be a military ammunition canister that he believed might contain the possible grenade.

After the warrantless entry into the closet, Sergeant Staton ordered an evacuation of the house, which at the time still included Mrs. Yengel's young son, as well as an evacuation of the surrounding residences. At approximately 6:25 p.m., he also notified the James City County Fire Marshal's office, and the Naval Weapons Station, requesting the assistance of its Explosive Ordnance Disposal (“EOD”) team. At around 7:00 p.m., Investigator Kendall Driscoll of the James City County Fire Marshal's office arrived on the scene, and began gathering further information from Mrs. Yengel by telephone, as she had by then been removed from the scene. Mrs. Yengel informed Investigator Driscoll that she had seen her husband place a “grenade”—four inches by two inches, dark green in color, with a pin in the top—into the closet two years prior. Shortly thereafter, around 7:30 p.m., the EOD team arrived and searched the open closet. Once inside the closet, the EOD team found a backpack containing not a grenade, but a one pound container of smokeless shotgun powder and a partially assembled explosive device attached to a kitchen timer. Law enforcement had been on the scene approximately three and a half hours at this point.

On February 14, 2012, Yengel was charged with possession of an unregistered firearm, in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861 and 5845, that is, “a combination of parts designed and intended for use in converting a device into a destructive device, not registered to him in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record.” J.A. 8. On March 8, 2012, Yen-gel filed a motion to suppress evidence gained from the warrantless search of the locked closet.

On March 27, 2012, the district court conducted a hearing to consider Yengel's motion. The district court heard testimony from Yengel, Sergeant Staton, and Investigator Driscoll. The district court also admitted as exhibits a picture of a door lock similar to the one used by Yengel, Officer Slodysko's report, and pictures of the explosive device and shotgun powder recovered from the closet.

The district court granted Yengel's motion to suppress from the bench and stated its reasoning by order dated April 3, 2012. The district court concluded the warrantless search did not fall into one of the narrow and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement, and, therefore, violated the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, the district court determined that neither Mrs. Yengel's consent to the search, nor exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search. The Government filed a motion for reconsideration on April 13, 2012, which the district court subsequently denied. On April 25, 2012, the Government filed a timely notice of appeal with this court.

II.

On appeal, the Government argues only that the district court erred in concluding the warrantless search of the closet was not justified by exigent circumstances. When considering an appeal of a motion to suppress, we review the district court's factual findings for clear error, and its legal determinations de novo. United States v. Hill, 649 F.3d 258, 262 (4th Cir.2011).

III.

The most basic principle of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence—and the genesis of our analysis here—is that warrantless searches and seizures inside a home are presumptively unconstitutional. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006). “Nevertheless, because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness,’ the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions.” Id. (citing Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 13, 120 S.Ct. 7, 145 L.Ed.2d 16 (1999) (per curiam)). Such reasonableness exceptions, however, must be narrow and well-delineated in order to retain their constitutional character. Flippo, 528 U.S. at 13, 120 S.Ct. 7 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)). One such exception is when exigent circumstances justify the warrantless entry of a home. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392–94, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978). The rationale underpinning the exigent circumstances doctrine is that when faced with an immediate and credible threat or danger, it is inherently reasonable to permit police to act without a warrant.

A.

The Supreme Court has recognized a variety of specific circumstances that may constitute an exigency sufficient to justify the warrantless entry and search of private property. These circumstances have included when officers must enter to fight an on-going fire, prevent the destruction of evidence, or continue in “hot pursuit” of a fleeing suspect. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403, 126 S.Ct. 1943 (citing Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963) (plurality opinion); and United States v....