United States v. Yermian

• Decision Date: 27 June 1984
• Docket Number: No. 83-346,83-346
• Citation: 468 U.S. 63,82 L.Ed.2d 53,104 S.Ct. 2936
• Parties: UNITED STATES, Petitioner v. Esmail YERMIAN
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

468 U.S. 63

104 S.Ct. 2936

82 L.Ed.2d 53

UNITED STATES, Petitioner

v Esmail YERMIAN.

No. 83-346.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued March 27, 1984.

Decided June 27, 1984.

Syllabus

Title 18 U.S.C. § 1001 provides that "[w]hoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully . . . makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements . . . shall be fined. . . ." Respondent was convicted in Federal District Court of violating § 1001 on the basis of false statements he furnished his defense contractor employer in connection with a Department of Defense security questionnaire. At trial, respondent admitted having actual knowledge of the falsity of the statements, but requested a jury instruction requiring the Government to prove not only that he had actual knowledge of the falsity but also that he had actual knowledge that the statements were made in a matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency. The District Court rejected this request and instead, over respondent's objection, instructed the jury that the Government must prove that respondent "knew or should have known" that the information was to be submitted to a federal agency. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the District Court erred in failing to give respondent's requested instruction.

Held: Both the plain language and legislative history of § 1001 establish that proof of actual knowledge of federal agency jurisdiction is not required to obtain a conviction under the statute. Pp. 68-75.

(a) Any natural reading of § 1001 establishes that the terms "knowingly and willfully" modify only the making of "false, fictitious or fraudulent statements," and not the predicate circumstance that those statements be made in a matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency. Once this is clear, there is no basis for requiring proof that the defendant had actual knowledge of federal agency jurisdiction. Pp. 68-70.

(b) The legislative history supports the plain language of the statute. That Congress, when it amended the statute in 1934 and 1948, did not include any requirement that the prohibited conduct be undertaken with specific intent to deceive the Government, or with actual knowledge that false statements were made in a matter within federal agency jurisdiction, provides convincing evidence that the statute does not require actual knowledge of federal involvement. Nor is there any support in the legislative history that the term "knowingly and willfully" modifies the phrase "in any matter within the jurisdiction of [a federal] agency." Pp. 70-74.

(c) Respondent's argument that absent proof of actual knowledge of federal agency jurisdiction, § 1001 becomes a "trap for the unwary," imposing criminal sanctions on innocent conduct, is not sufficient to overcome the express statutory language of § 1001 and does not authorize this Court to amend the statute in a manner unintended by Congress. Pp. 74-75.

708 F.2d 365, reversed.

Carolyn Corwin, Washington. D.C., for petitioner.

Stephen J. Hillman, Los Angeles, Cal., for respondent.

Justice POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

It is a federal crime under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 to make any false or fraudulent statement in any matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency.¹ To establish a violation of § 1001, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was made with knowledge of its falsity. This case presents the question whether the Gov- ernment also must prove that the false statement was made with actual knowledge of federal agency jurisdiction.

I

Respondent Esmail Yermian was convicted in the District Court of Central California on three counts of making false statements in a matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency, in violation of § 1001. The convictions were based on false statements respondent supplied his employer in connection with a Department of Defense security questionnaire. Respondent was hired in 1979 by Gulton Industries, a defense contractor. Because respondent was to have access to classified material in the course of his employment, he was required to obtain a Department of Defense Security Clearance. To this end, Gulton's security officer asked respondent to fill out a "Worksheet For Preparation of Personnel Security Questionnaire."

In response to a question on the worksheet asking whether he had ever been charged with any violation of law, respondent failed to disclose that in 1978 he had been convicted of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. In describing his employment history, respondent falsely stated that he had been employed by two companies that had in fact never employed him. The Gulton security officer typed these false representations onto a form entitled "Department of Defense Personnel Security Questionnaire." Respondent reviewed the typed document for errors and signed a certification stating that his answers were "true, complete, and correct to the best of [his] knowledge" and that he understood "that any misrepresentation or false statement . . . may subject [him] to prosecution under section 1001 of the United States Criminal Code." App. 33.

After witnessing respondent's signature, Gulton's security officer mailed the typed form to the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office for processing. Government investigators subsequently discovered that respondent had submitted false statements on the security questionnaire. Confronted with this discovery, respondent acknowledged that he had responded falsely to questions regarding his criminal record and employment history. On the basis of these false statements, respondent was charged with three counts in violation of § 1001.

At trial, respondent admitted to having actual knowledge of the falsity of the statements he had submitted in response to the Department of Defense security questionnaire. He explained that he had made the false statements so that information on the security questionnaire would be consistent with similar fabrications he had submitted to Gulton in his employment application. Respondent's sole defense at trial was that he had no actual knowledge that his false statements would be transmitted to a federal agency.²

Consistent with this defense, respondent requested a jury instruction requiring the Government to prove not only that he had actual knowledge that his statements were false at the time they were made, but also that he had actual knowledge that those statements were made in a matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency.³ The District Court rejected that request and instead instructed the jury that the Government must prove that respondent "knew or should have known that the information was to be submitted to a government agency." ⁴ Respondent's objection to this instruction was overruled, and the jury returned convictions on all three counts charged in the indictment.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the District Court had erred in failing to give respondent's requested instruction. 708 F.2d 365 (1983). The Court of Appeals read the statutory terms "knowingly and willfully" to modify both the conduct of making false statements and the circumstance that they be made "in any matter within the jurisdiction of [a federal agency]." The court therefore concluded that "as an essential element of a section 1001 violation, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew at the time he made the false statement that it was made in a matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency." Id., at 371 (footnotes omitted). The Court of Appeals rejected the Government's argument that the "reasonably foreseeable" standard provided by the District Court's jury instructions satisfied any element of intent possibly associated with the requirement that false statements be made within federal agency jurisdiction. Id., at 371-372.

The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit conflicts with decisions by the three other Courts of Appeals that have considered the issue. United States v. Baker, 626 F.2d 512 (CA5 1980); United States v. Lewis, 587 F.2d 854 (CA6 1978) (per curiam); United States v. Stanford, 589 F.2d 285 (CA7 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 983, 99 S.Ct. 1794, 60 L.Ed.2d 244 (1979). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict, 464 U.S. 991, 104 S.Ct. 480, 78 L.Ed.2d 678 (1983), and now reverse.

II

The only issue presented in this case is whether Congress intended the terms "knowingly and willfully" in § 1001 to modify the statute's jurisdictional language, thereby requiring the Government to prove that false statements were made with actual knowledge of federal agency jurisdiction.⁵ The issue thus presented is one of statutory interpretation. Accordingly, we turn first to the language of the statute.

The relevant language of § 1001 provides:

"Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully . . . makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, . . . shall be fined. . . ."

The statutory language requiring that knowingly false statements be made "in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States" is a jurisdictional requirement. Its primary purpose is to identify the factor that makes the false statement an appropriate subject for federal concern. Jurisdictional language need not contain the same culpability requirement as other elements of the offense. Indeed, we have held that "the existence of the fact that confers federal jurisdiction need not be one in the mind of the actor at the time he perpetrates the act made criminal by the federal statute." United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 676-677, n. 9, 95 S.Ct. 1255, 1259-1260, n. 9, 43 L.Ed.2d 541 (1975). Certainly in this case, the statutory language makes clear that Congress did not intend the...