United States v. Young
Decision Date | 14 November 1962 |
Docket Number | No. 21390.,21390. |
Citation | 210 F. Supp. 640 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Robert Austin YOUNG and Raymond Theodore Johnson, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri |
F. Russell Millin, U. S. Dist. Atty., William A. Kitchen, Assistant U. S. Dist. Atty., Kansas City, Mo., for plaintiff.
Robert G. Duncan, Kansas City, Mo., for defendant Young.
Richard B. Curtis, Kansas City, Mo., for defendant Johnson.
This case pends upon a motion to dismiss Counts II and III of an amended information charging violations of Section 2314, Title 18 United States Code. Count I, involving both defendants and charging the alleged unlawful transportation of a stolen motor vehicle in violation of Section 2312, Title 18 United States Code, is not attacked.
Count II, involving only defendant Young, as it was originally filed, merely paraphrased Section 2314 and proceeded upon the factual assumption that a Mobil Oil Company credit card was a "security" within the meaning of that statute and Section 2311 of Title 18 United States Code.1 The same thing is true in regard to Count III, involving only defendant Johnson, except that the "security" allegedly involved was a "credit sales slip" on an Esso credit card.2
Defendants' original suggestions in support of their respective motions to dismiss Counts II and III relied upon Judge Ridge's decision in United States v. Jones, (W.D.Mo.1960) 182 F.Supp. 146, and Judge Yankwich's decision in United States v. Fordyce, (S.D.Cal.1961), 192 F.Supp. 93.
The Government concedes that those cases are against it but suggests that "Jones and Fordyce were rendered in 1960 and 1961, respectively" and that they should not be followed in 1962 because "the weight of opinion has now shifted to the view that credit cards and credit sales slips are included in the provisions of Section 2314". The Government relies on Williams v. United States, (S.D.Cal.1961) 192 F.Supp. 97,3 United States v. Rhea, (W.D.Ark.1961) 199 F. Supp. 301, and Lewis v. United States, (10th Cir., 1962) 301 F.2d 787. And finally the Government suggests that .
The latter argument need not be noticed in detail because it is properly addressed to the legislative branch of the Government. Our problem is not what Congress should have done. It is what Congress did do.
We agree with that portion of the majority opinion in Lewis which suggests that the cited cases "may be susceptible of some nice factual distinctions".4 We therefore requested the Government to file an amended information which would set forth additional factual information and in which it would allege exactly how credit cards operate and the function served by a credit card sales slip in that operation. The Government has done so. In addition, the parties have stipulated that the Government's factual allegations are true and correct and that the original motions to dismiss be directed to the amended counts in the information.5
We are convinced that what Judge Ridge and Judge Yankwich said in Jones and Fordyce, respectively, is a correct statement of the law. We are further convinced that the facts as stated in the amended counts of the information underline the necessity of holding that credit cards and credit card sales slips can not fairly be determined to be securities within the meaning of Sections 2311 and 2314, Title 18 United States Code. Defendants' motions will therefore be sustained.
We add only to what was said in Jones and Fordyce that a basic principle of statutory construction is involved in the Government's effort to stretch the language of the statute.6 Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 304, 77 S.Ct. 1064, 1 L.Ed.2d 1356 (1957), relied upon the . "
What Marshall said in that ancient case is applicable to this case. He held that:
The principles announced in Wiltberger have been consistently applied by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. We particularly like the language of Judge Walter Sanborn in Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, (8th Cir., 1914) 213 F. 162, 168, wherein he held that "the natural and apparent meaning of the terms of a statute should always be preferred to any recondite signification discovered only by study, ingenuity, and strong desire." For other Eighth Circuit cases, see First National Bank of Anamoose v. United States, (8th Cir., 1913) 206 F. 374; Speeter v. United States, (8th Cir., 1930) 42 F.2d 937, 941; and Arnold v. United States, (8th Cir., 1940) 115 F.2d 523, 526. We are bound by those cases and we follow them.
For the reasons stated the respective defendants' motions to dismiss Counts II and III of the amended information should be and are hereby sustained.
It is so ordered.
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