United States v. Young, 09-5823
| Decision Date | 21 September 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 09-5823,09-5823 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DONNELL YOUNG, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit) |
RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
File Name: 11a0270p.06
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville.
No. 98-00038-13—John T. Nixon, District Judge.
Before: GIBBONS and WHITE, Circuit Judges; MALONEY, Chief District Judge.*
ARGUED: Mary E. Spears, GILROY & KAMMEN, Indianapolis, Indiana, for Appellant. Blanche B. Cook, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Mary E. Spears, Richard Kammen, GILROY & KAMMEN, Indianapolis, Indiana, Thomas F. Bloom, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Blanche B. Cook, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee.
JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellant Donnell Young pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine and crack cocaine and to intentionally killone or more persons in furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise. As part of his guilty plea, Young preserved the right to appeal the district court's denial of his motions to dismiss based on the denial of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. He now argues that he suffered substantial prejudice due to delays in the trial court and that he is entitled to dismissal of the indictment with prejudice as a result of this constitutional violation. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the decision of the district court.
The case stems from the killing of Woody Pilcher in Oklahoma in 1997, a murder to which Donnell Young ultimately pled guilty twelve years later. The case produced 3,628 docket entries in the district court. Its scope and duration place it among the largest and most complex federal prosecutions ever undertaken. Because Young's appeal centers on a speedy trial claim, we limit discussion of the voluminous record to only those facts pertaining to the delay in his trial.
Young was initially arrested by the state of Oklahoma on August 16, 1997, but the parties agree, and the district court found, that for speedy trial purposes, Young's federal case began with the filing of the Second Superceding Indictment on November 20, 1998. Additional indictments followed on February 25, 1999, September 30, 1999, and September 27, 2002. The government filed a Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty on October 29, 2002.
The case, at times, involved twenty-four other defendants and numerous motions to continue, join, sever, and dismiss. Young participated in many of these motions. Twice he moved to have his case severed from the other defendants. His first motion for severance, filed in March of 1999, was denied by the district court in July of that year. His second motion for severance, filed in November 2003, after the return of multiple superseding indictments, was granted on July 1, 2004.
The many pre-trial motions delayed the beginning of Young's trial. While at times he requested a speedy trial or wrote letters informing the court of the lengthy delay, Young mostly caused or contributed to the delay through his admitted "vigorousmotions practice" and through his own requests for continuances and his acquiescence in the requests of other defendants. As the government notes, "During the eleven years of instant litigation, Young has never opposed a requested continuance from any party, including the Government or any co-defendant."1
In December 2004, as the pre-trial motions phase was concluding, Young moved for separate guilt and penalty juries. After the district court granted Young's motion in April 2005, the government filed an interlocutory appeal with this court. Both Young and the government asked this court to expedite its decision, which it did, issuing an opinion in United States v. Young (Young I), 424 F.3d 499 (6th Cir. 2005), on September 29, 2005. The government promptly requested immediate issuance of the mandate so that the district court could regain jurisdiction and the case could continue.
It was during the pendency of this first interlocutory appeal that Young filed his first motion to dismiss on grounds that his speedy-trial rights had been violated. The district court conducted a hearing after which it issued a ruling denying Young's speedy-trial claim. The district court found, United States v. Young, No. 3:98-00038, 2005 WL 3417305 at *6 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 13, 2005). The district court denied Young's motion for several reasons, including Young's requests for continuance, Young's failure to object to the motions to continue by co-defendants, Young's failure to object to the government's request for continuance and his requestfor an additional extension of time, and Young's frequent, complex motions that both "required the Court's careful and serious consideration" and could not be used by Young to claim a violation of his right to a speedy trial.
After Young's first motion to dismiss was denied, voir dire commenced. During voir dire, Young moved to exclude several government witnesses. The district court granted Young's request and denied the government's motion for reconsideration. This action led to a second interlocutory appeal to this court, which began on March 6, 2006, and took over two years to resolve. Ultimately, on July 18, 2008, this court reversed the district court's ruling and remanded for further proceedings on the admissibility of the previously excluded testimony. United States v. Young (Young II), 533 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 2008). The mandate returning the case to the district court issued on September 12, 2008.
Through the fall of 2008, the district court considered yet another motion by Young—this time to exclude another witness. Two hearings were held on the motion. At the first hearing, Young wanted an absent witness to be present, so the district court continued the hearing until November 3. Young moved for a further continuance of the hearing to November 25 and filed additional motions through the month of December. On January 11, 2009, Young filed his second motion to dismiss based on his denial of a speedy trial. Voir dire resumed the following day. On February 19, while voir dire continued, Young announced his intention to plead guilty. The district court denied Young's second motion to dismiss based on denial of a speedy trial on May 3. On May 30, Young pled guilty, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his speedy trial motions. On June 25, 2009, the district court sentenced Young to 40 years, and on July 7, Young filed a timely notice of appeal with this court.
On appeal, Young argues that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated and that he is entitled to dismissal of the indictment with prejudice as the proper remedy for the violation of this right.
We agree with Young that the proper remedy for a violation of a defendant's constitutional speedy-trial rights is dismissal of the indictment with prejudice. See United States v. Brown, 498 F.3d 523, 530 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Jackson, 473 F.3d 660, 664 (6th Cir. 2007)). Indeed, while such a remedy may seem "unsatisfactorily severe" because "a defendant who may be guilty of a serious crime will go free," the United States Supreme Court has held that dismissal is "the only possible remedy." Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 439-40 (1973) (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 513, 522 (1972)). Young is therefore correct that if this court finds that his Sixth Amendment speedy-trial rights have been violated, then the indictment should be dismissed with prejudice. But as we explain below, Young's Sixth Amendment rights were not violated; thus he is not entitled to dismissal of the indictment.
Young begins his argument by noting that the delay of eleven years between his indictment and his conviction is presumptively prejudicial. He asserts that this delay arose largely from systemic failures and should be charged against the government. Moreover, according to Young, the delay has caused him actual prejudice in the form of lost witnesses, lost memories, and lost records. For these reasons, he argues his constitutional right to a speedy-trial has been violated.2
When reviewing whether a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial has been violated, this court reviews legal questions de novo and factual questions for clear error. Brown, 498 F.3d at 530 (citing Jackson, 473 F.3d at 664).
The Supreme Court has specified four factors for evaluating a Sixth Amendment speedy-trial claim: (1) length of delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant's assertions of his right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. None of the factors is "a necessary or a sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial," but the factors are related and "must beconsidered with such other circumstances as may be relevant" in "a difficult and sensitive balancing process." Id. at 533. Because Young's claim depends on this balancing test, we initially consider each factor separately.
The first Barker factor—the length of the delay—serves as a threshold or a "triggering mechanism" for a speedy-trial analysis. Id. at 530. The length is measured from the earlier of the date of arrest or the date of indictment. United States v. Bass, 460 F.3d 830, 836 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Maples v. Stegall, 427 F.3d 1020, 1026 (6th Cir. 2005)). The district court found, and Young now agrees, that for purposes of his speedy-trial claim in this case, the length is measured...
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