United States v. Young

• Decision Date: 03 May 2019
• Docket Number: No. CR 17-0694 JB,CR 17-0694 JB
• Citation: 403 F.Supp.3d 1131
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Apache YOUNG, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico

403 F.Supp.3d 1131

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,

v.Apache YOUNG, Defendant.

No. CR 17-0694 JB

United States District Court, D. New Mexico.

Filed May 3, 2019

John C. Anderson, United States Attorney, Paul H. Spiers, Kristopher N. Houghton, Paul Edward Schied, Assistant United States Attorneys, United States Attorney's Office, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Attorneys for the Plaintiff.

Jennifer J. Wernersbach, Law Offices of Jennifer J. Wernersbach, P.C., Albuquerque, New Mexico --and-- Charles E. Knoblauch, Charles E. Knoblauch Attorney at Law, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Attorneys for the Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

James O. Browning, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the Defendant's Amended Motion in Limine on Informing the Jury, filed November 26, 2018 (Doc. 138)("Motion"). The Court held a hearing on November 28, 2018. The primary issue is whether the Court should enter an order permitting Defendant Apache Young to inform the jury about a guilty verdict's consequences. The Court will deny the Motion. The Supreme Court of the United States' recent decisions about the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America's right to a jury trial suggest that some Justices on the Supreme Court may be willing to reconsider precedent by addressing whether a practice is necessary to the jury trial right as it existed at the time that the States ratified the Sixth Amendment. Historical sources and precedent show that the common-law jury at the Founders' time knew the ramifications of a guilty verdict and used that knowledge in reaching a verdict, frequently choosing a verdict because it would mitigate a defendant's punishment. Moreover, although courts at the Founders' time instructed the jury that the court's role is to provide the jury the law and that the jury's role is to apply that law to the facts as the jury finds them, the courts also instructed the jury that its role included ultimately deciding both the facts and the law. Courts at the Founders' time allowed lawyers to argue openly to the jury that it should exercise its ability to decide the law in the case and nullify the law that the court gives. Accordingly, the common-law jury in the Framers' era knew about and exercised its power to acquit even when the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty, or exercised its power to mitigate the defendant's sentence even when application of the law given by the court to the facts which the jury found provided otherwise. The Court concludes that Supreme Court and United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit precedent allowing the jury to know about sentencing ramifications only if its participation in sentencing is required, and preventing the jury from learning about its nullification right, are inconsistent with trial practices at the Founders' time, and that these practices have eroded the Sixth Amendment jury trial right as the Framers understood that right. Nevertheless, because, as a district court, the Court must faithfully apply controlling Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent, the Court will deny Young's Motion, and prohibit Young from instructing, arguing, or introducing evidence related to the jury's power to nullify or related to potential penalties resulting from a guilty verdict.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On March 14, 2017, a federal grand jury returned an indictment¹ charging Young with being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). See Indictment at 1, filed March 14, 2017 (Doc. 2). If convicted, Young faces a fifteen-year minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). See Motion at 1.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In the Motion, Young begins by asserting his expectation that the United States will rely on United States v. Parrish, 925 F.2d 1293 (10th Cir. 1991), and United States v. Greer, 620 F.2d 1383 (10th Cir. 1980), "for the proposition that a jury can only be informed of the possible penalties if a statute requires their participation in sentencing." Motion at 1. Young contends that the Supreme Court "implicitly overturned" United States v. Parrish and United States v. Greer in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (" Booker"); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004) ; and Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999) (" Jones"), which, according to Young, "command[ ] the courts to protect the right to a jury trial as it was at the time of the Founders and as it was understood by the Framers." Motion at 2. The Framers, Young argues, openly acknowledged and praised jury nullification, and courts therefore should permit modern juries to know a guilty verdict's consequences, which is the only way to preserve the Sixth Amendment's "sacred role within our criminal justice system." Motion at 2.

Young avers that, although courts in the twentieth century denigrated the jury's centuries-old common-law right to nullify the law's unjust application, the Supreme Court, beginning in Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993), has since directed district courts to examine the common law to deduce the jury-trial right's parameters. See Response at 2-3 (citing Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. at 278, 113 S.Ct. 2078 ). The Framers did not incidentally include the jury trial right in the Constitution, Young argues, but rather " ‘knew from history and experience that it was necessary to protect against unfounded criminal charges brought to eliminate enemies and against judges too responsive to the voice of higher authority.’ " Motion at 4 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968) ). According to Young, the Supreme Court has equated the people's right to control the judiciary through the jury trial with the people's right to control the legislative and executive branches through suffrage. See Motion at 4 (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. at 155, 88 S.Ct. 1444 ). Young adds that the current practice evidences the United States' delineating the jury's role in contradiction to the Supreme Court's guidance in Blakely v. Washington. See Motion at 4 (citing Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. at 306, 124 S.Ct. 2531 ("The very reason the Framers put a jury-trial guarantee in the Constitution is that they were unwilling to trust government to mark out the role of the jury.")). Young maintains that the Framers "would abhor attempts to limit" the jury's role in determining the law, because the Framers "saw the jury as a community body ‘to guard against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of rules’ and to act ‘as the great bulwark of our civil and political liberties.’ " Motion at 4 (quoting Booker, 543 U.S. at 239, 125 S.Ct. 738 ). Young adds that the Supreme Court in Jones emphasizes that the Framers strove to protect liberty " ‘from all secret machinations, which may sap and undermine it ,’ " which, according to Young, is precisely what results when courts keep from the jury information regarding sentencing ramifications. Motion at 5 (emphasis in Motion)(quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 246, 119 S.Ct. 1215 ). Hence, Young insists that the Framers would agree with him that this practice is "an affront to liberty." Motion at 5.

The jury historically has exercised its role as "the conscience of the community," Young continues, by exercising its nullification power when facing "severe sentencing laws." Motion at 5 (citing Jones, 526 U.S. at 245, 119 S.Ct. 1215 ("The potential or inevitable severity of sentences was indirectly checked by juries' assertions of a mitigating power when the circumstances ... endowed a criminal conviction with particularity sanguinary consequences.")). Courts must facilitate the modern jury's ability to exercise this vital role, Young argues, given "sentencing schemes['] ... ever-increasing harshness" and the Supreme Court's mandate to consider the jury's historical role in our society. Motion at 5-6. Young then quotes extensively from the dissenting opinion in Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 15 S.Ct. 273, 39 L.Ed. 343 (1895), wherein the Honorable Horace Gray, then-Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, in turn quotes extensively from Alexander Hamilton and John Adams for the proposition that the Framers entrusted the historical jury with the power to decide both the law and the facts in all criminal cases. See Motion at 6 (quoting Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. at 143, 147, 15 S.Ct. 273 )(Gray, J., dissenting). Avoiding candor with the jury for no reason other than to prevent the jury from understanding the "true essence of the case before them" disregards the Framer's intent for the Sixth Amendment, Young insists, and is therefore unconstitutional. Motion at 6. Young adds that such disregard for the Framer's intent for the Sixth Amendment is "a dangerous step towards tyranny." Motion at 7 (citing United States v. Datcher, 830 F. Supp. 411, 413 (M.D. Tenn. 1993) )(Wiseman, J.)("The Founding Fathers knew that, absent jury nullification, judicial tyranny not only was a possibility, but was a reality in the colonial experience. Although we may view ourselves as living in more civilized times, there is obviously no reason to believe the need for this protection has been eliminated.").

Without knowing a given sentence's harshness, Young asserts, the jury cannot perform its constitutional function. See Motion at 8. Although the function, according to Young, historically did not involve expressly informing the jury of its verdict's consequences, because harsh mandatory sentences were commonly known, for example, that convicted felons would receive the death penalty, the modern criminal justice system's complexity requires courts to permit juries to receive information regarding a guilty verdict's consequences. See Motion at 8 (citing Sparf...