United States v. Young
| Decision Date | 17 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | 1:16-CR-02058-SMJ-1 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff/Respondent, v. DARRYL WILLIAM YOUNG, Defendant/Petitioner. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Washington |
ORDER DENYING 28 U.S.C. § 2255 AND 18 U.S.C § 3582(c)(1)(A) MOTIONS
Before the Court are Petitioner Darryl William Young's pro se Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, ECF No. 167, and Motion to Reduce Sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), ECF No 182. For the below reasons, the Court finds that these motions are appropriate for decision without a hearing and denies all motions.
On July 12, 2016, Petitioner was charged by Complaint with one count of bank robbery. ECF No. 1. Petitioner was indicted on the same count on August 9, 2016. ECF No. 4. On October 11, 2017, the United States filed a Superseding Information charging Petitioner with three counts of bank robbery using a dangerous weapon (Counts 1, 2, and 5) and two counts of bank robbery (Counts 3 and 4). ECF No. 58. The Superseding Information indicated that Counts 1 through 4 occurred within the Western District of Washington; only Count 5 occurred in the Eastern District of Washington. ECF No. 58. On the same day that the information was filed, Petitioner waived indictment, consented to prosecution on the Superseding Information, and pleaded guilty to all five counts. ECF Nos. 59-61. In the Plea Agreement, Petitioner admitted to robbing five banks in Seattle, Issaquah, Woodinville, and Selah between June 8 and July 11, 2016. ECF No. 60 at 5-7 ¶ 6. He admitted that he brandished a pistol replica during the bank robberies in Counts 1 and 2 and informed the bank teller that he was armed in the bank robbery in Count 5. ECF No. 60 at 5-7 ¶ 6.
As part of the Plea Agreement, Petitioner waived his right to be tried for Counts 1 through 4 in the Western District of Washington-the District in which these crimes had been committed. ECF No. 60 at 3 ¶ 4, 7 ¶ 8. The United States agreed to recommend a 135-month sentence, and Petitioner agreed to recommend a 71-month sentence. ECF No. 60 at 9 ¶ 10. The Plea Agreement expressly stated that “the Court is under no obligation to accept any recommendations made by” either party and “may, in its discretion, impose any sentence it deems appropriate” within the statutory maximum sentences listed in the Plea Agreement. ECF No. 60 at 2-3 ¶ 3. The Plea Agreement also stated that these statutory maximum sentences were 25 years for Counts 1, 2, and 5 and 20 years for Counts 3 and 4. ECF No. 60 at 2 ¶ 2. Finally, Petitioner also waived his right to file any post-conviction motion challenging his conviction or sentence, except for a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion based on ineffective assistance of counsel. ECF No. 60 at 10-11 ¶ 16.
Petitioner's guidelines range, for a total offense level of 26 and a criminal history category of III, was 78 to 97 months. ECF No. 102 at 15. In Petitioner's sentencing memorandum, he requested a sentence of 97 months' imprisonment, which he argued “meets the goals of sentencing.” ECF No. 66 at 5. He stated that his robberies were motivated by growing economic desperation, and he denied having any intent to hurt anyone. ECF No. 66 at 6-8. He admitted that he decided “to rob a bank knowing his actions would result in his incarceration.” ECF No. 66 at 7. The United States orally recommended a 135-month sentence at the hearing. ECF No. 102 at 2.
District Judge Mendoza sentenced Petitioner to a total of 180 months of imprisonment, 5 years of supervised release, and $14,346.87 in restitution for Counts 1 through 5. ECF No. 82. The court cited the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors in support of its upward variance-the nature and circumstances of Petitioner's offenses, particularly the impact on victims; Petitioner's history and characteristics; the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities; the need to provide restitution to victims of the offense; the need to promote respect for the law and provide just punishment in light of the seriousness of the offense; and the need to protect the public. ECF No. 102 at 15-19.
Petitioner filed a pro se Notice of Appeal to the Ninth Circuit on February 20, 2018.[1] ECF No. 86. The Ninth Circuit granted Petitioner's trial counsel leave to withdraw, and Petitioner was appointed new counsel for his appeal. ECF Nos. 95, 97. Petitioner raised three issues in his direct appeal: (1) whether his waiver of rights in the Plea Agreement barred appellate review of his request to vacate his guilty plea; (2) whether the Eastern District of Washington had jurisdiction to accept his guilty pleas to the counts that occurred in the Western District of Washington; and (3) whether the plea colloquy sufficiently complied with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. Appellant's Opening Brief at 6, No. 18-30039 (9th Cir. Sept. 10, 2018), ECF No. 22. On June 6, 2019, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal, noting that Petitioner expressly waived his rights to appeal and to a different venue in his plea agreement and colloquy and had not shown plain error in the plea colloquy. ECF No. 117. Petitioner's petition for panel rehearing or rehearing en banc was denied on September 4, 2019, ECF No. 122, and his petition for a writ of certiorari was denied on February 24, 2020. ECF No. 126.
In July 2020, Petitioner's trial counsel was reappointed and filed a Motion to Reduce Sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).[2] ECF Nos. 131, 135. In that motion, Petitioner argued that his heightened risk of serious illness or death from COVID-19, due to his heart conditions, hypertension, Hepatitis C, liver disease, and age, was an extraordinary and compelling reason sufficient for relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). ECF No. 135 at 21-24. The court denied this motion, acknowledging Petitioner's high risk of complications were he to contract COVID-19 but ultimately finding that the sentencing factors weighed against Petitioner's requested relief. ECF No. 147 at 8. Petitioner also appealed this decision, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed on June 25, 2021. ECF Nos. 150, 171.
Petitioner filed the instant Section 2255 motion, along with a motion for appointment of counsel, on March 2, 2021.[3] ECF Nos. 167, 168. The United States opposes his Section 2255 motion. ECF No. 174.
Petitioner filed the instant Section 3582(c)(1)(A) motion on January 14, 2022. ECF No. 182. The United States also opposes this motion. ECF No. 184. In April 2022, Petitioner requested and received a continuance on the Section 3582(c)(1)(A) motion to allow him to provide updated medical information. ECF Nos. 186, 187. The court received Petitioner's supplemental briefing on May 23, 2022. ECF No. 188. In June 2022, Petitioner requested and received a stay of the court's decision to allow him to submit further supplemental briefing. ECF Nos.189, 192. The court received Petitioner's supplemental briefings on June 29, 2022, and July 21, 2022. ECF Nos. 193, 194. On September 19, 2022, the matter was reassigned to the undersigned judicial officer. ECF No. 195. On November 7, 2022, Petitioner filed another supplement to his Section 3582(c)(1)(A) motion and requested that counsel be appointed to explore “resolution” of his pending motions. ECF No. 196. Petitioner provided no updated medical information in any of these supplemental filings. See ECF Nos. 186, 188, 189, 193, 194, 196.
Petitioner asserts seven grounds in support of his Section 2255 motion. ECF No. 167. First, he argues that venue was improper in the Eastern District of Washington for Counts 1 through 4 under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 18 and that the failure to transfer those counts to the Western District of Washington violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 20 and his constitutional rights. ECF No. 167 at 5-13. Second, he argues that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise this Rule 20 issue with him or with the court before his plea and sentence on Counts 1 through 4. ECF No. 167 at 14-16. Third, he argues that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to advise him that he might receive a sentence greater than 135 months. ECF No. 167 at 17-20. Fourth, he argues that the court failed to address his waivers of the rights to jury trial, direct appeal, and collateral attack and to confirm that these waivers were knowing and voluntary in open court during the plea colloquy, in violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. ECF No. 167 at 21-27. Fifth, he argues that the court abused its discretion in sentencing him to 180 months' imprisonment and failing to explain the reasoning for this sentence “enhancement.” ECF No. 167 at 28-30. Sixth, he argues that the Assistant United States Attorneys for the Eastern and Western Districts of Washington committed prosecutorial misconduct by failing to transfer venue of Counts 1 through 4 from the Western District of Washington according to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 20. ECF No. 167 at 31-33. Finally, he argues that the Plea Agreement's integration clause was ambiguous and that he would not have accepted a plea that did not foreclose the United States from “recharging” Counts 1 through 4 in the Western District of Washington. ECF No. 167 at 34-37.
The United States responds in turn to each of Petitioner's seven claims for habeas relief. ECF No. 174. On ground one the United States argues that the Ninth Circuit has already rejected Petitioner's improper venue claim on direct appeal. ECF No. 174 at 15-16....
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