United Steelworkers of America v. Rome Industries, Inc.

• Decision Date: 19 February 1970
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 2147.
• Citation: 321 F. Supp. 1170
• Parties: UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO v. ROME INDUSTRIES, INC., d/b/a Rome Plow Company.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

321 F. Supp. 1170

UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO v. ROME INDUSTRIES, INC., d/b/a Rome Plow Company.

Civ. A. No. 2147.

United States District Court, N. D. Georgia, Rome Division.

February 19, 1970.

Bernard Kleiman, Chicago, Ill., Michael H. Gottesman, Bredhoff, Gottesman & Cohen, Washington, D. C., J. R. Goldthwaite, Jr., Adair, Goldthwaite, Stanford & Daniel, Atlanta, Ga., Jerome A. Cooper, Benjamin L. Edreich, Cooper, Mitch & Crawford, Birmingham, Ala., for plaintiff.

Albert E. Phillips, Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Atlanta, Ga., for defendant.

SIDNEY O. SMITH, Jr., Chief Judge.

This is a civil action in which plaintiff, the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, sues Rome Industries, Inc., d/b/a Rome Plow Co., seeking damages and injunctive relief. Jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 185. Plaintiff alleges that the parties entered a collective bargaining agreement on October 13, 1969, by virtue of plaintiff's acceptance of defendant's offer. Subsequently, the Union asserts:

Defendant has failed and refused to recognize the existence of said agreement; has failed and refused to formalize said agreement into the customary form for such agreement, the substance of same having been finally negotiated; has failed and refused to recognize and enforce the provisions of said agreement; and has violated rights of certain employees guaranteed by the provisions of said agreement.

Because of such omissions and breaches, it is alleged, plaintiff and the employees it represents have not received "the benefits" of the agreement, and to that extent have been injured.

For such injuries, plaintiff seeks incidental damages. But the thrust of the prayer is injunctive relief. Plaintiff alleges that it and the employees it represents will be irreparably injured unless the Court:

(1) determines the rights of the represented employees under the collective bargaining agreement; (2) requires that the defendant specifically perform the provisions of the agreement; (3) enjoins the defendant from failing or refusing to perform its obligations under the agreement; (4) requires the defendant to formalize the agreement by reducing it to writing and signing it; (5) issues a temporary injunction pending the outcome of this case.

The Company has moved the Court to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The former grounds for this motion raises a preliminary question as to jurisdiction under Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 185.

JURISDICTION

I.

In many civil actions, brought pursuant to Section 301, a court must of necessity first decide whether a contract exists. For instance in a suit for specific performance of an arbitration agreement, defended on the grounds that no contract exists, the court must resolve that issue first, before it can rule on the merits of the claim for specific performance. See Teamsters, etc., Local Union 524 v. Billington, 402 F.2d 510 (9th Cir. 1968); Warrior Constructors, Inc. v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local Union No. 926, AFL-CIO (C.A. No. 9959, N.D.Ga., February ___, 1966), aff'd 383 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1967). And where an employer sues for injunctive relief against and damages for an allegedly unlawful strike, the court must first decide whether a contract between the parties exists. In many such cases, that issue will be dispositive of the entire case, E. g., Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Inter. Union, United Auto, Aerospace and Agr. Implement Workers of America, UAW, 287 F.Supp. 692 (W.D.Mich.1968). Cf. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO v. O'Neal Steel, Inc., 321 F.Supp. 235 (N.D.Ala.1969), where the union alleged that the employer's hiring of permanent replacements for striking members violated Section 301.

However, where there are no legal grounds for a breach of contract claim, allegations of breach are a legally insufficient peg on which to hang Section 301 jurisdiction. Cf. Ferguson-Steere Motor Co. v. Inter. Broth. of Teamsters, etc., Local 577, 223 F.2d 842 (5th Cir. 1955). A complaint thus stripped of breach of contract allegations in substance alleges that the defendant committed an unfair labor practice. Where an employer and a labor organization have reached agreement, the employer's refusal, in response to the request of the labor organization, to reduce their agreement to writing and sign it is a refusal to bargain collectively and an unfair labor practice under Section 8(a) (5) of the National Labor Relations Act as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a) (5). H. J. Heinz Co. v. N. L. R. B., 311 U.S. 514, 61 S.Ct. 320, 85 L.Ed. 309 (1941); N. L. R. B. v. Dalton Tel. Co., 187 F.2d 811 (5th Cir. 1951). The exclusive remedy for such an unfair labor practice is before the Board. San Diego Building Trades Council, Millmen's Union, Local 2020 v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959).

This Court holds as a matter of law that jurisdiction under Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 185, may not be invoked by a complaint which merely alleges generally that an employer's refusal to reduce an alleged collective bargaining agreement to writing, to sign it, and to implement it, constitutes a breach of the contract. Where a dispute between an employer and a collective bargaining agent is in this preliminary stance, before either party has committed specific acts in violation of the agreement, the proper remedy for either party which feels aggrieved is a proceeding before the National Labor Relations Board for an unfair labor practice. See Genesco, Inc. v. Joint Council 13, United Shoe Workers, 341 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1965).

Accordingly, the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter must be, and hereby is granted.

II.

However, if it should be found that the Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter herein, the Court makes the following

FINDINGS OF FACT

On or about January 1, 1969, plaintiff, United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO (the "union") filed a petition for an election at the plant of the defendant, Rome Industries, Inc. d/b/a Rome Plow Company (the "company") for certification as the collective bargaining agent for the employees. Following a successful campaign and election, it was duly certified on or about February 25, 1969, by the National Labor Relations Board.

In the latter part of March, the union and company began extensive negotiations over the terms of a collective bargaining agreement between the two. In all, some 16 or 17 meetings were held over the subsequent five months. At these meetings, the union was principally represented by Mr. Ned Kocher, a representative of the International union, and the company by Mr. Fairfax Mullen, executive vice president and by Mr. Frank Swift, its labor relations attorney.

As is customary, the negotiations proceeded on the written drafts of proposals, initiated first by one party and then the other. When there was agreement on a provision of the proposed contract an "OK" with the date would be placed alongside on the draft under discussion. The use of the "OK" system meant that there was agreement on that provision, conditioned on agreement as to an entire contract. In that sense, the "OK" was a tentative meeting of the minds as to such provision.

In March, the union made its first written proposal. In April, the company made written counterproposals. In May, there were two additional drafts, the latter being prepared on May 21. (Pl.Ex. "A"). This was the last attempt at a written tabulation of all provisions in one instrument and was the basis for negotiations throughout the summer. It recites in the caption "(Note: OK indicates tentative agreement)." This draft incorporated all previous proposals "Ok'd" and contained proposals on other necessary provisions not yet "OK'd". By early August, there was agreement and "OK" by many provisions as written or with interlineations inserted by hand to the typed provision, or specific written amendments, with the exception of the following substantial items:

ARTICLE XV—Representation

ARTICLE II-A—Union Security

ARTICLE IX—Holidays

ARTICLE XIV—Wages.

On or about August 13, 1969, the company made written proposals for all four articles. (Pl.Ex. "B"). Kocher said, at the time, that while the union was interested in the proposals they found no basis for them to get together and the membership would never agree to them. Swift replied that the four proposals constituted the company's last offer.

As a result, Kocher reported the status of the negotiations back to the local membership, the company proposals were rejected by them, and they voted to strike because of the failure to agree. The strike commenced shortly after the August 13th meeting.

On or about September 9, 1969, the last meeting occurred between the negotiators and a federal mediator. This meeting took place at the height of the strike. Each side thought it was "winning" the strike and the tempers of the negotiators were on edge. The final meeting ended in failure. There was constructive discussion about a discrimination clause and the union committee was notified that the company was cancelling group hospital insurance on all workers out on strike in one week. As to the four main articles of disagreement, however, both sides refused to yield. Swift stated that the company "would grant no further concessions and stood firm on its proposals." The mediator stated that there was no apparent basis for settlement.

After the meeting aborted, the strike continued for the reason that "the workers weren't getting a contract." By late September, it was obvious that the company was winning the strike. Most of the workers had reported back on the job and attendance at the union meetings dwindled. Shortly thereafter the strike was over.

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